SUMMARY VERSION INTELLIGENCE ISSN 1245-2122 N. 116, 1 May 2000 Every Two to Three Weeks Next Issue on 15 May 2000 Publishing since 1980 Editor Olivier Schmidt (email intelligence-adi@wanadoo.fr; web http://www.blythe.org/Intelligence) TABLE OF CONTENTS, N. 116, 1 May 2000 FRONT PAGE GREAT BRITAIN/LIBYA - LEAKED INTELLIGENCE REPORTS p.1 TECHNOLOGY AND TECHNIQUES CONSUMER'S GUIDE TO ADVANCED ENCRYPTION STANDARD (AES) p.2 NEW US MILITARY TECH IN THE NEWS p.3 US COAST GUARD - New Weapons & Tech. p.4 BACK DOORS - Microsoft Will Clean It Up ... Again. p.5 FASHION - Wearable Tech. p.6 WEB - Recent Postings. p.7 BOOK - Open Source Guru Speaks Out. p.8 PEOPLE USA/RUSSIA - EDMOND POPE p.9 USA - Kevin Mitnick. p.10 NORTHERN IRELAND - COLIN WALLACE p.11 IRELAND - JOHN GILLIGAN p.12 FRANCE - Jean-Charles Marchiani. p.13 FRANCE - Alexandre Adler. p.14 SWEDEN - Anders Eriksson. p.15 MIDDLE EAST - Ayman al-Zawahiri. p.16 AGENDA COMING EVENTS THROUGH 15 JUNE 2000 p.17 INTELLIGENCE AROUND THE WORLD USA - CHINESE EMBASSY BOMBING BLAME MISSES REAL TARGET p.18 - BROOKLYN RAPPER SUES FOR ANTI-IRISH BRIT PSY-OPS p.19 - CUSTOMS GETS ITS OWN GAO "INTRUSIVE SEARCH" p.20 - LAPD RAMPART STATION SCANDAL MOVES ON p.21 - LEE CASE & SILICON VALLEY GIVE FBI BAD PRESS p.22 - IRAN COUP, IRAQI EVACUEES & ED WILSON HAUNT THE CIA p.23 - NSA IN THE NEWS ... OFFICIALLY p.24 - State Loses Laptop with "Thousands" of SCI Documents. p.25 CANADA - CSIS "CRACKS UP" AS COPS GET "MAFIABOY" & DAD p.26 GREAT BRITAIN - GATHERING EVIDENCE AGAINST FRU WHISTLE BLOWER p.27 - ISC HITS MI5 HOLA DECISION & GCHQ PAYS UP p.28 - OPPRESSED MINORITY OF FREEMASONS p.29 IRELAND - MI5'S GARDA ASSETS p.30 FRANCE - EXTENDING "SECURITY" BEYOND AFRICA & MIDDLE EAST p.31 NETHERLANDS - NEW "COMPREHENSIVE" EAVESDROPPING LAWS p.32 GERMANY - CHECHEN & STASI AFFAIRS TROUBLE THE CALM p.33 EU - COPS, EUROPOL & ENCRYPTION EXPORTS UP FRONT p.34 CROATIA - Different political conceptions of spying. p.35 RUSSIA - NO KGB PHOENIX FOR CIS REPUBLICS p.36 SOUTH AFRICA - BUILDING A REGIONAL SPY POWERHOUSE p.37 INDIA - LINING UP ALLIES AGAINST PAKISTAN p.38 --------------------------------------------- Intelligence, N. 116, 1 May 2000, p. 1 GREAT BRITAIN/LIBYA LEAKED INTELLIGENCE REPORTS The British government's campaign of attrition against former MI5 agent, David Shayler has involved court injunctions against the British press and broadcasting media, threats of legal action against American Web sites (on Yahoo and Geocities), court orders demanding that files and private correspondence be made available to the Scotland Yard Special Branch investigating alleged breaches of the 1911 Official Secrets Act (INT, n. 113 10), the brief detention of Mr. Shayler's girlfriend, Annie Machon, and the heavy-handed arrest of Kingston University student, Julie-Ann Davies, last month in connection with the posting of a MI6 CX report on the Internet. Despite concern about this campaign, expressed privately by a number of Labour MPs, including the Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook, MI5 director-general, Stephen Lander, and MI6 boss, Richard Dearlove, supported by senior officials at the heart of the intelligence establishment, have persuaded Home Secretary, Jack Straw, MP, to "stay the course". Their case has been strengthened considerably by the latest classified report to appear on the Internet, this time taken from the files of the Security Service itself, much to the embarrassment of Mr. Lander who is convinced that this particular document can be traced to the Paris doorstep of Mr Shayler. The top-secret MI5 report, with the designation "UK Eyes A" is a detailed assessment of the intelligence career of Khalifa Ahmad Bazelya, head of the Libyan Interests Section (LIS) in London from July 1993 until December 1995, ...(cut)... The information in the report, detailing Bazelya's activities in London, is sourced to MI5 contacts within the LIS, HUMINT surveillance, the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), the "revolutionary student" community, the Libyan dissident community in Britain, and telephone intercepts -- referred to as "telecheck information" -- a previously unknown system for filtering phone traffic to trace, identify and record important calls. During his 30 months in Britain, Bazelya handled a network of "spies", paid between œ500 and œ800 "per agent per month" from a "political budget". These included: Mohammed Abdelhakim Daib, an Egyptian who reported on Syrian, Libyan and Egyptian dissidents; Wasfi Bin Issa, a British-based Libyan businessman who was on the "locally engaged staff" at the Libyan embassy in the 1970s; Nasr Abdelnasser Abdrabah, who met Bazelya regularly and "volunteered information on dissidents" and passed on details, in September 1995, "about the identities of Muslim fundamentalists involved in disturbances in Benghazi, who had been arrested by Sudanese security", one of whom was resident in Britain; an Iraqi-Kurd who was in regular contact with the Bazelya "since at least January 1994" and visited Tripoli on a number of occasions. ...(cut)... Bazelya was also in telephone and fax contact with ESO general secretary Muhammad Niama, with Lieutenant Colonel Abdullah Senussi (brother-in-law of Colonel Qadhafi); with Captain Abdulsalem Sadma, the "de facto and deputy head of the ESO", in October 1993, according to MI6; with senior ESO officer Khaled Mabruk; and with intelligence operative Mustafa Zaidi, an agent "with a history of violence in Europe" who was refused a British visa in July 1995. ...(cut)... This disclosure has once again highlighted a major headache for British government lawyers worried about the use of the Internet to publicize official secrets. Among MI5's main worries about the disclosure of the contents of the Bazelya document is its exposure of MI5 working methods. Little can be done about that now, but British intelligence will be urgently looking to prevent further material appearing on the Internet. British authorities, assisted by various US agencies, have tracked down and make representations to American ISPs which have posted the MI5/Bazelya document, titled "Libyan Intelligence Service Activity in the UK". The precise nature of these approaches remains somewhat opaque but there is no doubt that in some cases, they have been highly effective. The document has been posted on at least two sites: cryptome.org and www.mathaba.net. A few days after its first appearance on Cryptome, John Young, who runs the New York-based site, received a letter forwarded from his ISP, Verio, originating from a "British Intelligence Agency" asking Young and Verio to remove the document from the site. Mr. Young declined, noting that such "an informal request, not a court order, is insufficient reason to remove the document which provides significant public information". Sonia Rector, a senior Verio official, broadly support Young's position, and expressed amazement that "A British intelligence agency would directly request Verio to remove a document without providing written legal authority to do so". ...(cut)... On Good Friday, Young reportedly told ZDNet UK, an Internet magazine, that he did not believe that posting the document, which he said was sent to him anonymously, was illegal under US law. Within 24 hours the Alternative Republican Bulletin Board, a Web site run by opponents of Sinn Fein, had published the address of a mirror site, where the document continues to be available to surfers world wide. It is reportedly still available at: http://www.libreopinion.com/mathaba/news1/z0416ukeyesA2.htm http://www.zdnet.com/zdnn/stories/news/0,4586,2555003,00.html?c hkpt=zdnnstop http://www.bytecenter.com/members/bbs/RepublicanAlternative/ind ex.cgi? --------------------------------------------- Intelligence, N. 116, 1 May 2000, p. 2 CONSUMER'S GUIDE TO ADVANCED ENCRYPTION STANDARD (AES) The 15 April issue of "Crypto-Gram", written by Bruce Schneier , has an excellent report on the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) which is the forthcoming encryption standard that will replace the aging DES. In 1996, the US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) initiated the AES program and, in 1997, sent out a public call for algorithms. Fifteen candidates were accepted in 1998 and whittled down to five in 1999. In early April, the Third AES Candidate Conference was held in New York (INT, n. 112 19), and attenders presented 23 papers and held 12 informal talks, as NIST prepares to make a final decision concerning AES later this year. Several of the algorithms took a beating cryptographically, according to "Crypto-Gram". RC6 had the worst results: two groups were able to break 15 out of 20 rounds faster than brute force decryption. Rijndael fared somewhat better: seven rounds broken out of 10/12/14 rounds. Several attacks were presented against MARS, the most interesting breaking 11 of 16 rounds of the cryptographic core. Serpent and Twofish did best: the most severe Serpent attack broke 9 of 32 rounds, and no new Twofish attacks were presented. Schneier, author of the "Crypto-Gram" article, admits that he is also one of the author's of Twofish. ...(cut)... --------------------------------------------- Intelligence, N. 116, 1 May 2000, p. 9 USA/RUSSIA - EDMOND POPE On 5 April, in Moscow; Russian FSB officers detained US businessman, Edmond Pope, 53, claiming he was stealing scientific secrets. A Russian accomplice was also arrested. The press mentioned plans for a missile to be deployed on submarines. A FSB statement said it confiscated "technical drawings of various equipment, recordings of his conversations with Russian citizens relating to their work in the Russian defense industry, and receipts for American dollars received by them." On 7 April, the US embassy in Moscow identified Pope by name which the FSB had not done. Reports soon emerged that Pope was the head of a private security firm and had earlier worked for US intelligence. ABC television said Pope was a retired US Navy captain who spent much of his career working in naval intelligence. ...(cut)... On 20 April, FSB revealed that Pope was seeking plans for a new kind of underwater missile fired by submarines which can reportedly achieve speeds of up to 100 meters per second. Pope is currently confined in Lefortovo prison. Western experts believe the missile to be the most effective submarine weapon available. This is a misnomer since it is not a question of a missile but a torpedo which travels twice as fast as anything the West has. Western intelligence has been seeking it for several years and it's called "Shkval" (squall; see "Torpedoes - Double Speed with Porous Second Skin", INT, n. 18 7). What is known is that it produces a high-speed and high-pressure stream of bubbles from its nose and skin which coat the torpedo in a thin layer of gas and allows it to travel at extremely high speeds, for an object in the water. Apparently its propulsion system is rocket-based -- not propeller-driven -- and guidance is a problem, particularly at 360 kph underwater. Pope cannot be defended in any way as a scientist or businessman since the technology has only military applications (at present) and, indeed, strategic military applications. In short, doing what Pope was doing, without diplomatic cover, was extremely dangerous, but the target was extremely important. The fact that the US embassy in Moscow released his name may be an indication that someone in Washington is going to "cover" Pope. Otherwise, he may spend a long time in prison. --------------------------------------------- Intelligence, N. 116, 1 May 2000, p. 15 SWEDEN - Anders Eriksson. Head of the Swedish Sakerhetspolisen (SAPO) internal security service (INT, n. 65 12 & n. 71 42), Anders Eriksson, is leaving his job and no successor has been found. The Justice Ministry denies that he was fired. Eriksson, appointed as head of the Security police in 1994, was under contract to head the SAPO at least until the end of June 2000. He left in April, taking a holiday until end of May, and then Justice is supposed to find him another job which will have to be a top job. Last autumn Eriksson said that he was already tired of the job and wanted to leave. ...(cut)... --------------------------------------------- Intelligence, N. 116, 1 May 2000, p. 18 USA CHINESE EMBASSY BOMBING BLAME MISSES REAL TARGET ...(cut)... Even some of those who accept the American assurances that the bombing was accidental say they believe that blame has not yet been shared by all of those who contributed to the mission. That is clearly the opinion of Patrick Eddington, former action officer at the CIA Central Targeting Support Staff (CTSS) from May 1994 to February 1996 whose job it was to select targets, check them out and forward them to the Pentagon. The CTSS existed as late as October 1999, six months after the embassy bombing, according to Eddington, and it was the CTSS' job to take care of such operations. CTSS work has reportedly been of very high quality in the past, although the CIA and the press have not mentioned it, and if there was a target vetting failure, Eddington clearly places the blame on "a fundamental failure of senior and midlevel CIA managers to make use of an established target vetting process." Eddington's statements clearly contradict those of the CIA which never mentioned the CTSS, claimed there was no target vetting process in place and that the CIA never suggested targets. The open question is what Tenet and his managers did with the CTSS and why they avoid talking about it now. A related question is why the major press is only repeating Tenet's line and not digging into Eddington's information and the CTSS which was mentioned in the "Los Angeles Times and "Defense News". We guess it "just doesn't fit the Langely picture". --------------------------------------------- Intelligence, N. 116, 1 May 2000, p. 22 USA LEE CASE & SILICON VALLEY GIVE FBI BAD PRESS The computer files at the heart of the case against the former Los Alamos scientist, Wen Ho Lee, were given higher security classifications last year only after he was fired in the midst of an espionage investigation at the weapons laboratory. At the time Dr. Lee down-loaded the files onto his computer, they were not classified but designated "protect as restricted data" (PARD) which the FBI has conceded as a low security level. Dr. Lee's lawyers say "the indictment is deceptive" and takes the case out of the category of "crown jewels", "worse than the Rosenbergs" and "change the strategic balance" as conservative "securicrats" have claimed. ...(cut)... --------------------------------------------- Intelligence, N. 116, 1 May 2000, p. 26 CANADA CSIS "CRACKS UP" AS COPS GET "MAFIABOY" & DAD On 17 April, the "Globle and Mail" caused a hubbub by reporting that the "Canadian Security Intelligence Service has shuffled some of its most senior staff" and ... it had "obtained a list of the secret spies' names." The newly appointed officers reportedly included the new head of the counter-intelligence division, the head of the Toronto regional office and the agency's officer in Washington who deals with the FBI and CIA. It was, of course, the latter part of the statement that worried the accident-prone CSIS. But that was only "kid's stuff" compared to what was coming. Two days later, the same daily reported that Michel Simard, a 34-year RCMP and CSIS veteran and head of a group of CSIS agents suing the federal government, had been suspended indefinitely after going public with complaints about leader- ship and morale problems at CSIS. He was suspended on 13 April, two days after a media interview describing the agency as a "rat hole" and claiming that senior CSIS officers "don't know what's going on in the service." He heads a group of 120 cur- rent and former CSIS intelligence officers who created a firm, X MP Fund, to launch a lawsuit against the federal government for millions in back pay and bonuses they insist the agency owes them. The lawsuit reportedly amounts to a "near-mutinous situation". A few days later, the Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC) released its intelligence oversight report doubting the CSIS had the skills to accomplish its latest mission probing mobsters, money-launderers and other organized criminals. The SIRC was not even sure CSIS, responsible for catching ter- rorists and foreign spies, should be investigating the criminal underworld. "The very germane issue of whether CSIS should be involved in this area, given its current mandate, remains open for the committee at this time," according to the report. Such activities has long been the domain of the RCMP and other po- lice agencies. ...(cut)... --------------------------------------------- Intelligence, N. 116, 1 May 2000, p. 31 FRANCE EXTENDING "SECURITY" BEYOND AFRICA & MIDDLE EAST We have previously mentioned French intelligence cooperation in setting up security in Egypt, a country formerly reliant on Russia for training and equipment in intelligence, security and defense (see "France - Exchange Terrorists for Tourists with Egypt, INT, n. 81 21, & "France - 'Boxing-In' Israel & 'Boxing- Out' the US", int, n. 88 13). Another country, also reliant on Russia, is now talking about a "united strategy" with France to combat terrorism: India. France's previous attempt to "expand" outside its "backyard" in Africa was only partially successful. In 1997, France set up and trained Japan's Special Assault Team (SAT; see "France - Japan Moving Out of US 'Backyard'", INT, n. 65 34), but it didn't manage to get Japan on board for reconnaissance satellite spy business (INR, n. 88 13). ...(cut)... COMMENT -- Among other things, the Indians might be interes- ted in is France's anti-terrorism expertise developed while fighting against Algerian bombing campaigns over the past few years. India has a similar problem with Pakistan and many Pa- kistan-inspired local rebel groups in India. But before French specialists from DST internal security, DGSE foreign intelligence and DRM military intelligence move in, there is a "sensitive question" of a few other forgotten French "free- lance specialists" rotting away in India under house arrest because they got caught diving in waters off an Indian military base in Kerala on 11 December 1995. Specialists say wait and see if Philippe Elle, 47, and Francois Clavel, 62, are released, like their four teammates in March 1997, before stating that Franco-Indian security cooperation has entered a new era. Seems like good advice. --------------------------------------------- Intelligence, N. 116, 1 May 2000, p. 36 RUSSIA NO KGB PHOENIX FOR CIS REPUBLICS On 20 April, at the President Hotel in Moscow, CIS intelligence chiefs and security ministers got together to discuss fighting international terrorism and establishing a CIS anti-terrorist center. The meeting, opened by Russian President Vladimir Putin, voted unanimously to appoint Russian Major General Boris Mylnikov, Senior Deputy Director of the FSB Department for Fighting Organized Crime, head the center. FSB director, Nikolai Patrushev, who introduced Mylnikov to journalists, reported the results of the meeting. Mylnikov stated that the "center will be located in Moscow and its main task will be to carry out coordinated activities of special services and special units for fighting organized crime and, in particular, to create a corresponding data base, while units of the security structures will not be included in the personnel of the center." Two weeks previously, on 4 April, "Segodnya" journalists, Andrei Soldatov and Kirill Frolov wrote an excellent study of the disintegration of the former Soviet KGB and the resulting evolution of CIS intelligence services before this recent effort to reestablish CIS "center". According to them and most experts, it is now almost impossible to restore the structure of intelligence cooperation between the CIS countries. On 31 March, four members of the Shanghai Five (Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan) got together in Astana and pompously announced foundation of a CIS Anti-Terrorist Center before the Moscow meeting. But these measures are too late, "catastrophically late", according to most experts and actual intelligence cooperation across post-Soviet territory is out of the question. None of the CIS agreements on cooperation signed over the past few years is working now and the past has left a legacy. Those republics where Soviet anti-terrorist agencies were stationed are strong in this field even now, according to the report. But those republics that did not have anti- terrorist agencies on their territory are still weak in this area ten years later, such as Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. ...(cut)... --------------------------------------------- Intelligence, N. 116, 1 May 2000, p. 37 SOUTH AFRICA BUILDING A REGIONAL SPY POWERHOUSE Head of the National Intelligence Agency (NIA) Department for Counter-Espionage (CE), Hilton "Tim" Dennis, who replaced Billy Masethlha at this post last Decmeber, has reportedly been promoted to lead the NIA's sister foreign intelligence service, the South African Secret Service (SASS). According to certain specialists, this move augers "interesting times" to come since Dennis has made extensive use of the sister department responsible for surveillance against local politicians, journalists and many diplomats in the executive capital, Pretoria, and the legislative capital, Cape Town. As head of the foreign spy service, Dennis is expected to transfer some of his "CE culture" and usher in a period of more purposeful surveillance of foreign diplomats and domestic opponents of the ruling coalition of the African National Congress (ANC) and the South African Communist Party, foremost the Democratic Party and the Pan Africanist Congress. ...(cut)... Surveillance tasking is done by eight departments including CE, and SASS which, like their military counterparts, Chief Staff Intelligence, have focussed on East Africa and France. Previously headed by another Nhanhla confidant, Gabriel Mtembu, its active Pretoria staff numbers around forty. Surveillance is coordinated out of the satellite town of Centurion in the Kiepersol (Cabbage tree) building that also houses CE on Astra Circle. Often the butt of SASS and NIA jokes as the "Kiepersol Kasternades - Cabbage Patch Capers", the tenants have decided to get serious about their own security. Three swivel cameras within tinted balls suspended from white supports have been installed under the eaves at three of the four corners, focussing on Botha Avenue, the N1 highway, and nearby access roads. Staff have been told not to park openly in ranks outside, must now park among the public and hoboes near the liquor store in the adjacent shopping complex and walk across to their red brick office block. Many doing vehicular surveillance find this unnecessarily compromising, although some seeking access over weekends without their cell phones can now use the two public phones recently installed outside the liquor store and the phone booth (number 27 12 667 1210) well situated with a line-of-sight position on the outside parking. Mtembu's replacement feels that suspected foot surveillance on the "Cabbage Patch" by Russian SVR and French DSGE operatives has compromised the watch on foreign intrigues, which would seem to be a reasonable supposition. ...(cut)... ---------------------------------------------