INTELLIGENCE ISSN 1245-2122 N. 65 New Series, 25 August 1997 Publishing since 1980 Editor Olivier Schmidt (email intelligence-adi@wanadoo.fr; web http://www.blythe.org/Intelligence) TABLE OF CONTENTS, N. 65, 25 August 1997 FRONTPAGE EASTERN EUROPE - FAN MAIL & TURMOIL IN INTELLIGENCE p.1 TECHNOLOGY AND TECHNIQUES COPY TECHNOLOGIES AND "INTELLIGENCE" p.2 "LONG, HOT SUMMER" ON THE INTERNET p.3 MORE SCIENTIFIC BASIS FOR GULF WAR SYNDROME FOUND p.4 CIABASE - January to July 1997 Update on Data. p.5 LAW ENFORCEMENT - Anti-Cop "Acid Tests" & Vest Penetrators. p.6 SANDIA - Great Technical Results But Poor Security. p.7 WEB - Military Recruiting & "Keeping In Shape". p.8 EAVESDROPPING - "Kids' Stuff" or High-Tech Equipment. p.9 PEOPLE U.S.A. - JOHN L. MARTIN p.10 NORTHERN IRELAND - MARTIN MCGARTLAND p.11 SWEDEN - ZEWAR AL-DABBAGH p.12 ISRAEL - MORDECHAI VANUNU p.13 U.S.A. - Carol "Freya" Howe. p.14 U.S.A. - Bernard Parks. p.15 SWEDEN - Stig Bergling. p.16 RUSSIA - Oleg Morozov. p.17 CHILE - Hartmut Hopp. p.18 ISRAEL - Ehud Yatom. p.19 AGENDA COMING EVENTS THROUGH 7 OCTOBER 1997 p.20 INTELLIGENCE AROUND THE WORLD U.S.A. - CIA'S WHISTLE-BLOWER & SECURITY "DOUBLE-BIND" p.21 "SHOO-IN" DCI TENET DOESN'T CALM CIA DEBATE p.22 New York Subway Bombers' Affiliation. p.23 New FAS Intelligence E-Weekly. p.24 New Female NSA Deputy Director. p.25 Sloppy Security at ICITAP. p.26 GREAT BRITAIN - POLICE CORRUPTION INCREASING p.27 DATA PROTECTION VERSUS SPY AGENCIES p.28 NAO REVEALS MAJOR DEFENSE DELAYS p.29 "Times" Intelligence "Bios". p.30 "Times" IRA Terrorism Fiction. p.31 MI5 Losing Its NCIS Cover. p.32 NORTHERN IRELAND - REPUBLICAN CEASE-FIRE COMES AROUND AGAIN p.33 FRANCE - JAPAN MOVING OUT OF U.S. "BACKYARD" p.34 "Carlos" and Media Against Justice. p.35 GERMANY - NEW INFORMATION ON PANAM 103 POINTS TO IRAN p.36 New Book on Economic Espionage. p.37 NETHERLANDS - SURINAME "TERRIBLE TWINS" CAUSING TROUBLE p.38 NORWAY - GERMAN BND MONITORING STATION IN JESSHEIM p.39 WESTERN EUROPE - Self-Regulation & "Cybercops". p.40 UKRAINE - New NBI Chief. p.41 RUSSIA - Openings & Closings in Intelligence. p.42 ANGOLA - WITHOUT MOBUTU, UNITA FIGHTS RECONCILIATION p.43 NAMIBIA - Spy Agency Good for the Public. p.44 SOUTH AFRICA - Iran's Nuclear "Pants Down". p.45 GAMBIA - Watching Libyan Instructors. p.46 ISRAEL/PALESTINE - Direct CIA Contacts. p.47 AUSTRALIA - NCA Rendetta Investigated. p.48 --------------------------------------------- FRONTPAGE Intelligence, N. 65, 25 August 1997, p. 1 EASTERN EUROPE FAN MAIL & TURMOIL IN INTELLIGENCE When "Intelligence" published its special report on Slovak intelligence early this year (see "Slovakia - Reaching West while Sliding East"; INT, n. 51 1), one intelligence specialist wrote in: "It looks like you have a man on every roof in Bratislava", which is not exactly the truth. The first official "fan mail" to come out of Bulgaria was on 2 December 1996, when Zhivko Zhelev, former head of the Science & Strategy Department of the disreputable Bulgarian firm, Disk Memory Systems (DZU), and now head of a private security firm (Security Mark), gave a press conference and claimed that articles of the "American magazine 'Intelligence'" about the killing of Andrey Lukanov (see, "Bulgaria - Neva's Vast Network of Money and Death"; INT, n. 47 1) and others were a "deliberate disinformation attempt." Zhelev claimed that "Intelligence" was a publication "closely tied to the Central Intelligence Agency of the U.S.A." (INT, n. 50 15). Little did he know that on the same day, "Intelligence" published an article, "Bulgaria - Ex-Communists Banking on ... Bankruptcy" (INT, n. 49 39), presenting the conclusions of the "Banking Corruption White Book" prepared by Edvin Sugarev, Union of Democratic Forces MP (INT, n. 58 1). But Eastern European intelligence "fan mail" took a quantitative jump as the major media got on the bandwagon following our recent story, "A Fiery 'Far-West' Fortnight in Sofia"; INT, n. 63 1), in which we mentioned that the newly- appointed head of Bulgarian Customs, Ms. Elka Vladova, had stated that part of the widespread mismanagement and corruption in Customs involved dubious affairs and felonies committed with the protection of politicians and influential personalities under the previous government. She specifically mentioned "a well known, large company that owes the state over $100,000,000 in import duties" whose name is familiar to "Intelligence" readers: Tron Holding, owned by Krassimir Stoytchev and Stuart Karalian and known as "a large company which appeared out of nowhere soon after the fall of the Communist regime" (INT, n. 35 19). The day before (15 June), the National Office of Investigation had ordered Stoytchev, Karalian, Hristo Kulishev (former head of Bulgarian Customs) and Tihomir Kuntchev (former head of Customs at Sofia International Airport) not to leave the country because they are all under investigation. On 14 August, the BBC and Reuter's picked up our Bulgarian story, clearly attributing it to "Intelligence", and created a media deluge resulting in a four-minute prime-time coverage on Bulgarian private TV station, Nova TV, crediting "Intelligence" as the source. However, the facts were slightly "off the mark" when the new program's anchor insisted that it was "worth stressing" that "Intelligence" was a publication made by and for former and still active Western intelligence officers. However, we thank Nova TV for calling "Intelligence" a "prestige" publication, but stating that we are "expressing the views of the Western intelligence community" would not be the opinion of the "majors" such as the U.S. CIA, British MI6, French DGSE, or German BND, not to mention all the "minors" in the Western intelligence community. The same day, the mass circulation former Bulgarian Communist worker's daily, "Trud", devoted 3/4 of a page to the story under the headlines: "'Intelligence' Accuses Bulgarian Companies of KGB Connections - Tron and Multigroup Said to Be Involved in Dirty Deals". Multigroup, headed by Iliya Pavlov, is Bulgaria's largest holding company and is connected with people from the circle of the late British tycoon, Robert Maxwell. The "Trud" article printed large archive photographs of Pavlov and Stoytchev. According to Nova TV and "Trud", Tron and Multigroup refused to comment. "Trud" quoted a woman secretary of Tron chief Stoytchev, and one of Multigroup secretary general, Boyko Draganov, who both stated that their bosses were "familiar with said publication and, if proper, they will make their comments later." According to the Bulgarian BTA press agency, the National Office of Investigation essentially replied to the "Intelligence" story for Multigroup by issuing a subpoena against Multigroup chief Pavlov whose testimony was taken concerning several of the attacks mentioned in our article. In recent Bulgarian developments, the heavily indebted firm, Mobiltel, or whoever is behind the company (INT, n. 63 1), has unexpectedly paid the $100,000,000 in import duties owed to Bulgarian Customs and most of a nine-digit sum owed to Siemens and other major creditors. According to "Intelligence" sources, Mobiltel will soon invest about DM 100,000,000 in expanding its GSM cellular telephone net in Bulgaria. All this means that either fresh money is flowing in, or a new big player has entered the game and "picked up the tab". Local reports, which have mentioned a possible role for the U.S. financial firms Merrill Lynch and Landenburg Tallmon in this context, have been neither denied nor confirmed. Also in Sofia, Capitalbank, that was closed and is pending bankruptcy procedures, has started to make payments to customers again. Sources from the Control Department of the Bulgarian National Bank have confirmed that there has been "a significant improvement" in the situation of Capitalbank and that unnamed foreign banks had started to buy its debts and inquired about buying shares. Let us add that First Financial, owned by Anghel Parvanov, holds a majority of Capitalbank shares. Thus the circle closes with somebody "bailing out" both Stoytchev's Mobiltel and Parvanov's Capitalbank. Capitalbank, incorporated in 1992 in Sofia, is the only bank in Bulgarian history to have been given a license by the Bulgarian National Bank without having the minimum capital required by law. But Bulgaria is only one of several Eastern European countries where turmoil in intelligence has taken place this summer. On 5 August, the Czech press reported that a portable computer was stolen from an agent of the Czech Bureau for Foreign Contacts and Information (UZSI) foreign intelligence service in May 1996 in a bar. The computer reportedly contained a list of all UZSI agents. The UZSI and the Interior Ministry decided to keep the affair secret. The UZSI is not under parliamentary oversight like the two other major Czech intelligence services: the internal security Czech Intelligence Service (BIS), and Military Defense Intelligence (VOZ). The story was due to an anonymous tip which Czech officials say is "an intentional provocation" attempting to compromise Czech intelligence after the recent invitation to join NATO. There seems to be some truth in this claim since Interior Minister Jan Ruml has stated that the loss of the computer "does not threaten the running of the service or the security of its workers or of the state." In clear, this probably means the computer's files were strongly encrypted and the list of agents may have contained only codenames or not enough information to identify each of them directly. In Hungary, on 16 July, the National Security Committee issued a report rejecting media accusations that, under "Operation Birch Tree" (INT, n. 57 35), the civilian internal security Intelligence Office (IH) had unlawfully collected information on Socialist politicians. Certain politicians called for the resignation of Intelligence Services Minister Istvan Nikolits and his chief of staff, Tamas Somogyi, on grounds of inefficiency. Nikolits did not immediately make the document public on the grounds that it had to be reviewed for "intelligence sources and methods". The report concludes that the IH collected potentially damaging data on Socialists while investigating organized crime by foreign groups, but there were supposedly no indications the service intended to use the information against the politicians. However, on 4 August, IH director Jozsef Szasz got a shock when the Budapest Military Prosecutor's Office (BKU) reversed its 19 June decision concerning Operation Birch Tree and charged Colonel Laszlo Foeldi, former IH director of operations, and three of his colleagues, with violation of state secrets and unauthorized data processing. However, on 6 August, the Socialist Party lost its "good press" when Socialist deputy Imre Simon stated he would leave parliament because his past collaboration with Communist-era intelligence services had been revealed. His timing was good, since the government announced, on 13 August, that 15-20 million pages of Communist-era intelligence files on 160,000 people will be opened to the public on 1 September at the Interior Ministry. There has also been major intelligence trouble in Romania. On 1 July in Bern, Switzerland, a Swiss Foreign Ministry employee was arrested and confessed to supplying secret intelligence over the past six years to Romanian SIE foreign intelligence in exchange for money. On 18 July, SIE director, General Ioan Talpes, denied any involvement with the Swiss diplomat, stating his service "is not and was never involved in any activity of espionage against Switzerland." After an official protest from Bern, Romanian President Emil Constantinescu instructed Romania's ambassador-designate to Bern and the Romanian Justice Ministry to collaborate with the Swiss authorities in the investigation of the affair. On 21 July, the name of the alleged spy, Vice Consul Jean-Pierre Vettovaglia, appeared in the press. The next day, General Decebal Ilina, head of the Romanian Military Intelligence Service, announced that he was resigning as of 1 August after completing four years at the job and citing the fact that intelligence chiefs in modern democracies shouldn't serve much longer than that. The general also fired an incredible parting barrage at Prime Minister Victor Ciorbea, who claimed Romanian intelligence should be de-Sovietized, stating that all ties with Warsaw Pact intelligence services had already been cut many years ago. On 23 July, the press reported that former SIE deputy director, General Dumitru Ciobanu, was under investigation for leaking secret information, adding that Gen. Ciobanu may be the scapegoat for the Swiss affair to save SIE chief Gen. Talpes. Problems continued when Pres. Constantinescu asked Costin Georgescu, head of the internal security Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI), to revoke the appointment of Colonel Gheorghe Atudoroaie as head of the SRI western Romania desk. The latter had supposedly been implicated in the December 1989 anti- Communist Timisoara revolt but had also served in that city as deputy chief of the Communist-era Securitate. The smoke seemed to clear on 24 July when Gen. Talpes resigned as SIE chief, taking blame for the Swiss affair. Nonetheless, both the SIE and SRI deny responsibility for the case. On 30 July, the general was replaced by presidential counselor and engineer, Catalin Harnagea, 39, who has no experience in intelligence and no party affiliation. He worked as a journalist after the 1989 fall of the Communist regime, and graduated in 1997 from the National Defense College with a thesis quite appropriately entitled "Crisis Management and the Secret Services." He was also Prime Minister Ciorbea's successful 1996 campaign manager. The final complication to the Romanian intelligence scene came on 4 August when the spokesman for Romania's 400,000 to 1.5 million Gypsies (figures differ) announced that the community had formed its own intelligence service to protect the community's image and interests, and prevent internal feuds. It would be an exception in Eastern Europe intelligence, but we nonetheless wish them good luck. --------------------------------------------- TECHNOLOGY AND TECHNIQUES Intelligence, N. 65, 25 August 1997, p. 2 COPY TECHNOLOGIES AND "INTELLIGENCE" Those of our readers who have been with us for more than nine years will remember that our journals at that time, "Intelligence Newsletter" and "Le Monde du Renseignement", included printing with black ink on dark red paper. It was a "home-made technology" to render massive photocopying and redistribution of our material difficult. At that time, color photocopiers were not publicly available, and our use of red paper seemed to have been relatively effective. In 1989, these two journals adopted the format of a commercial publisher which reduced their volume and abandoned printing on red paper. When our team left that publisher and started producing "Intelligence" in late 1994, we were not particularly concerned with illegal photocopying, since our publication was conceived as an electronic periodical with only a few paper copies being printed for correspondents who did not have access to the Internet. "Intelligence" was soon confronted with many requests for paper copies and the possibility of paying for hardcopy subscriptions. Therefore, we started producing a hardcopy version which has not used any serious anti-copy technology. Printing "Intelligence" on peach-colored paper since September 1995 has only been an attempt to discourage illegal copying, since copies are almost always on white-colored paper and are, therefore, easily identified as illegal copies. Nonetheless, "Intelligence" has been systematically encouraged by friendly contacts in different intelligence services to adopt some form of anti-copy technology "for your own good". In fact, one French intelligence source had firsthand knowledge of a French ministry, with one single subscription to "Intelligence", which has been making over 40 copies of each issue "for internal use only". This alone represents an annual loss of over $12,000. Induced by these considerations, "Intelligence" has reviewed existing anti-copy technologies with the following results. None of the commercially available products are worth much and, moreover, are relatively expensive. One firm, which we will not mention by name, gave us samples showing how efficient their well-known product was. But we simply wrote in ball- point pen across bands of their product on white paper, and then photocopied the sheet with maximum contrast. The result was clearly readable and relatively easily rephotocopied. The only product that passed our test was the same firm's blue- colored paper filled with tiny holes. Apparently, individually designated copies of a classified CIA periodical for allied intelligence chiefs is printed on this "paper" which can only be read when laid on a layout artist's "light table". And since it is also very expensive, we decided not to use it. Other advanced anti-copy technologies, which work against normal photocopiers (for example, pages which turn "blank" or all black under intense photocopier light), can usually be defeated by a "camera kit", which almost all security agents have handy, or a good computer-linked image scanner. A digital photograph or scanner image can then be reproduced easily and inexpensively. Therefore, for effective and inexpensive anti-copying, "Intelligence" recommends and, with this issue, and will be printing on ... deep red paper, "just like the good old days". We recommend this technology as a cost efficient solution for all but very sensitive information which merits the additional cost. The result is an inexpensive original copy which is easy to read under normal conditions. But when photocopied, it becomes very difficult to read: black printing on a dark gray background, nearly impossible to photocopy again. The only solution is an advanced color photocopier which filters the red background and turns it into another color, such as yellow. But that costs up to one dollar per page. That is why subscriptions to "Intelligence" are $290 per year for one copy per issue, but only $60 for each additional one-year subscription to the same person or organization. We hope our institutional subscribers will find our policy equitable ... after testing our anti-copy technology. ---------------------------------------------