INTELLIGENCE
                       No. 269, 24 July 1995
                        (Vol. 16, No. 15)

                      Publishing since 1980

Copyright ADI 1995. Reproduction in any form forbidden without explicit
authorization from the ADI. A one-year subscription (23 issues) is US $280.

NETHERLANDS

NO EUROPEAN SECURITY SERVICE ON THE HORIZON

     A recent study by the Netherlands Clingendael Institute of
International Relations, on behalf of the Binnenlandse
Veiligheidsdienst (BVD) security service, on the influence of
European cooperative structures upon the BVD's autonomy
concludes that the chance of more permanent and dedicated
structural arrangements developing in the field of internal
security in the near future are rather small.  The report draws
attention to the fact that at present, no dedicated structure
exists within the European Union which explicitly deals with
strict security and intelligence matters.  However, the present
practice of mainly bilateral working contacts between like-
minded "sister services," independent of existing European and
international forums, could be expected to develop into ad hoc
"coalitions," operating jointly both in operational matters and
in policy-implementing bodies such as the European Union
Working Group on Terrorism.

     The author of the report, Mrs. J. Pouw, writes that at
present, the cooperation in the police area is the most
important for security services.  The best guarantee for
influencing decision-making is participation in those forums
that are active in this area.  As long as no serious
centralization of competences and powers has taken place in the
police and justice areas, there seems to be no need to come to
a dedicated European forum on internal security matters.

     Mrs. Pouw describes the intensive participation of the
Dutch security service in a large number of commissions that
prepare the Dutch positions in European forums such as the
Schengen consultations and a wide range of other working groups
on policing matters and issues such as organized crime,
terrorism, customs and narcotics matters.  She discusses the
possibility of forming a separate security intelligence "cell"
within Europol which would allow security services to exchange
sensitive information, but recognizes that major obstacles are
still in the way of such a construction.  Security services
could adopt the Europol model for their own information
exchange needs, but the general fear of losing control over
sensitive information is likely to prevent such a development
in the coming decade, unless Europol itself turns out to be an
unexpected success.  According to Mrs. Pouw, security services
could opt for active participation instead of mere consultation
in the Europol Working Group now that terrorism will become
part of Europol's mandate.

     Security services do participate fully in certain EU
forums, such as the EU Working Group on Terrorism that meets
several times a year, but according to the Clingendael report
these meetings are of little practical value.  Although the
Trevi Secure Fax Network (TSFN), in operation since 1987, is
still considered secure and reliable, it is cumbersome and a
more sophisticated crypto email system is under preparation.
The Working Group has expressed criticism on the security of
confidential information transferred through the Commission
Secretariat to the various Bureaux de Liaison in the national
security services.  Within the Secretariat such documents are
being xeroxed in large numbers, thus increasing the risk of
leaks.  Although the threat analyses produced in the Terrorism
Working Group are largely based on publicly available
materials, they are classified as "Secret" and are supposed to
be treated with great care.  The apparent lack of trust in such
international arrangements does little to improve the quality
of information exchanged through these channels, thus
undermining the usefulness and seriousness of the whole
endeavor.

     The European Commission Office for Security (ECOS) also
has the ambition of becoming a "European Security Service."
Its director Mr. Pieter De Haan has repeatedly expressed these
desires, and many employees of European security services,
hoping for a fast track career, have taken up positions in the
ECOS offices.  Its present role, however, is limited to
securing European Union bodies, mainly through vetting their
employees in close cooperation with the national security
services, and Mrs. Pouw sees little chance of the ECOS
developing into anything more substantial in the near future.

                                  *

For more info on Intelligence, or to subscribe, write:

Olivier Schmidt
intelligence-adi@wanadoo.fr
tel/fax 33 1 40.51.85.19
ADI, 16 rue des Ecoles, 75005 Paris, France