Via NY Transfer News Collective * All the News that Doesn't Fit INTELLIGENCE N. 30 New Series, 5 February 1996 Publishing since 1980 Editor Olivier Schmidt (intelligence-adi@wanadoo.fr; tel/fax 33 1 40 51 85 19; ADI, 16 rue des Ecoles, 75005 Paris, France) ISSN 1245-2122 Copyright ADI 1996, reproduction in any form forbidden without explicit authorization from the ADI. FRONTPAGE NETHERLANDS: VAN TRAA "UNDERCOVER OPERATIONS" REPORT A "BEST SELLER" On 1 February, in less than one hour, the entire first printing of 4,200 copies of the official Van Traa commission report on police undercover operations and methods was sold out. Initial reactions from Dutch political figures and the cabinet seem to be quite positive concerning the findings which "Intelligence" has mentioned previously (INT, N. 22/48 & 23/50). There is also excitement in the media and the general public. However, German and French law enforcement officials have, off the record, given their initial reactions to "Intelligence" and Bonn officials are worried that future cooperation with Dutch police officers in undercover operations may be hampered by what are considered excessive and narrow legislative restrictions recommend by the report. This is especially true in Rotterdam harbor where German and Dutch police often cooperate in narcotics investigations. French police won't even touch such recommendations "with a long stick". But they'll all get their chance to express themselves at a two-day symposium that the European Institute of Public Administration (EIPA) in Maastricht is organizing under the title of "Undercover Policing and Accountability from an International Perspective" on 11-12 April 1996. The intention is to give politicians, academics and senior practitioners an opportunity to situate the findings in an international perspective. Invited speakers include the Dutch Justice Minister, Mrs. Winnie Sorgdrager, commission chairman Mr. Maarten Van Traa, MP, plus a host of professors and senior law enforcement practitioners from various Western European countries and Europol. The working language will be English and the entrance fee is Dfl. 1,000, including reference material. Registration deadline is 25 March 1996 and further information is available from Ms. Jeannette Zuidema (tel 31 43 3296204; fax 31 43 3296296). The Parliamentary Investigations Commission into police methods, chaired by Mr. Van Traa MP, published its final report after a year of intensive work. The commission was set up, following a series of scandals which demonstrated that authorities had apparently lost control over covert policing (INT, N. 16/41 & 21/1). The report stated that there is a severe crisis in the criminal investigation policy touching the very foundations of democratic rule, and for which all persons involved, from detectives all the way up to the minister, are to be held responsible. The Commission concludes that a complete overhaul of doctrine and working methods is required, resulting in every investigative method being explicitly based on a written law. The method of covert importation and distribution of drugs -- "controlled shipments" intended to gain the confidence of criminals -- should be abandoned entirely, with the exception of a single test shipment of no more than a few kilos of cannabis products. Active infiltration of criminal organizations by criminal civilian informers should also be terminated; only trained police undercover agents or specialists, such as accountants, should be allowed to penetrate criminal organizations. The four criminologists, who have analyzed the criminal situation in the Netherlands for the Commission, reported organized crime has not yet gotten a grip on Dutch society. The narcotics trade remains by far the major and most profitable criminal sector. The legitimate world has, so far, only incidentally been infiltrated by organized crime, although there are disquieting developments in certain sectors such as the catering and transport industries. The extensive involvement of sections of the ethnic communities is also a cause for great concern (INT, N. 29/53). People of Surinamese, Turkish and Moroccan origin, and the political power structures in their home countries, are substantially involved in the drugs trade. The Dutch indigenous criminal networks have not taken on the shape of permanent and firmly structured organizations, but they come in a wide variety, ranging from small groups to professional and extremely wealthy drug barons. Firmly organized groups and networks number about forty, and caravan dwellers and the Hell's Angels represent some of the more violent and successful domestic criminal groups. The police are advised to pay more attention to the middle cadres of organized crime and gain more knowledge of the financial- economic aspects of serious crime. The Commission asserts that the so-called "IRT affair" (INT, N. 13/54; the scandal from which other investigations and the parliamentary inquiry originated) has caused great damage to society and has had a great impact on public belief in the ability of authorities to combat serious crime in a democratic and effective manner. Over the past few years, at least 285 tons of soft drugs and hundreds of kilos of hard drugs have been imported under the supervision of law enforcement authorities, and about 100 tons of soft drugs and some of the hard drugs have subsequently disappeared and been sold on the market. This makes the Dutch government the largest player in the cannabis market. Criminals have earned millions in the process: one criminal informer turned infiltrator has earned an estimated 50 million guilders by selling the "controlled" drugs and keeping the profits. Another informer received two million as hush money under direct orders from Justice Minister Sorgdrager. An entire regional criminal intelligence branch developed into an uncontrolled "state within the state"; its former chief and one of his staff are to be indicted for perjury while testifying under oath before the Commission. It developed into a situation where criminal informants ran the police and virtually held the authorities hostage by claiming their lives to be in danger should the operations be terminated. The Commission found that, under the banner of fighting organized crime, a wide array of unregulated investigative methods had developed. Those responsible for maintaining the rule of law, including the public prosecutor's office, judges, police chiefs, and the Justice Ministry, all remained largely ignorant of what was happening in the daily reality of crime- fighting. Former minister, Ernst Hirsch Ballin, acted in an clearly "irresponsible" way by maintaining ignorance about what subordinates were doing. These authorities, and parliament itself, are to be held responsible for the present extremely serious situation. The Commission recommends that in the future, all information- gathering activities carried out during an investigation be written down in detail so that the court can effectively oversee the operations and judge on the basis of written evidence. The so- called "closed CID procedure", which presently offers the possibility to hiding the origin of sensitive information from all outsiders, should no longer be allowed, although knowledge of certain most sensitive aspects should still be withheld from solicitors and their clients. The 4,900-page report offers an unprecedented insight into the practices and doctrine of Dutch covert policing, with details on almost every investigative method ever used. It describers in detail the number and nature of informers, the number of wiretaps, direction finders, call tracers, various observation methods, etcetera. In general, the Commission prefers to encourage development and reliance upon such technical surveillance tools, including directional microphones and audio bugs, instead of on more risky human sources. The need for a proper legislative framework and for oversight is recognized so that more intrusive methods will require increasingly higher authorities to authorize their use. The Commission notes that in the past, the Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst (BVD) domestic security service, has also engaged in improper policing tasks. Therefore, a new and more solid legal framework is required to oversee the security service, funnel its activity and put all intelligence methods into an explicit legal framework. The recourse to dealing with criminals-turned-witnesses, the so-called crown witnesses, should only be allowed after all other options have remained unsuccessful. The practice of selling drugs in so-called "pseudo-sales operations" should also be abandoned. The Commission emphasizes the increasingly serious efforts by indigenous criminal groups, mainly in the Amsterdam area, to mount full-blown counterintelligence operations against the police and judicial authorities. These efforts range from the use of state-of-the-art electronic surveillance equipment to organized burglaries and corruption campaigns. Criminal countersurveillance teams almost continuously monitor and follow covert police surveillance teams and relay their information to criminals. Some groups even run informants inside the police. In the recent past, police investigations against Yugoslav criminals have been reduced following serious threats against the lives of police officers. The Commission's report has struck hard, especially in police circles, where the initial reaction was "let's close down the shop and return to policing traffic." Police and justice department personnel have been instructed not to react in public before parliament has had its say, and the Justice and the Interior ministers will react only after consultation with Prime Minister Whim Kok. As the Commission covers the entire political spectrum and carries great weight, its conclusions stand a good chance of being adopted. This would result in a fundamental reform of Dutch prosecution which will become more similar to the American system with all evidence presented in open court. The main flaw of the otherwise very strong report is the fact that it blames everyone, which could mean, at the end of the day, nobody is in a position to cast the first stone and clean out the stables. While the overall tone of the report is very harsh indeed, explicit judgment of specific functionaries is limited to a minimum. In its political verdict, the report already carries an undertone of compromise and caution. On the other hand, the recommendation to draw up a catalogue of all allowed investigative methods and the near-total condemnation of "controlled shipments" of narcotics, the so-called "Delta method", has surprised and worried law enforcement authorities. Other European law enforcement authorities have been watching the humiliation of their Dutch colleagues with some apprehension, knowing that it could very well inspire legislators and lawyers in their own country to question covert police methods. Van Traa has already complained he had little cooperation from foreign organizations such as the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)and the German Bundeskriminalamt (BKA), whose officers are also believed to run informants and covert shipments of drugs on Dutch soil. Several specialists have emphasized that the soft drug traffic appears to be the most profitable criminal activity, which gives further weight to the argument that it should be legalized entirely, given the purchase of cannabis products in small quantities is already tolerated as a matter of policy. Dutch parliament will debate the report in early March, but in the meantime, more disclosures, leaks and dismissals can be expected and international tension will surely increase leading up to the 11-12 April symposium on the Van Traa report. * For subscription info, write to: intelligence-adi@wanadoo.fr or point your browser to Intelligence online: http://www.blythe.org/Intelligence ================================================================= NY Transfer News Collective * A Service of Blythe Systems Since 1985 - Information for the Rest of Us 339 Lafayette St., New York, NY 10012 http://www.blythe.org =================================================================