China Bashing/Progressive Response 4:17 


Via NY Transfer News * All the News That Doesn't Fit

(sorry about the MAC litter in this post)

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The Progressive Response 20 April 2000 Vol. 4, No. 17
Editor: Tom Barry
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The Progressive Response (PR) is a weekly service of Foreign Policy in
Focus (FPIF), a joint project of the Interhemispheric Resource Center
and the Institute for Policy Studies. We encourage responses to the
opinions expressed in PR and may print them in the "Letters and
Comments" section.
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I. Updates and Out-takes

*** HOW TO DEBATE THE CHINA ISSUE WITHOUT CHINA BASHING ***
By John Gershman, FPIF Asia-Pacific Editor

*** MAJOR SECURITY CONCERNS IN U.S-CHINA-TAIWAN RELATIONS ***
By James H. Nolt, World Policy Institute

II. Letters and Comments

*** ZUNES SHOULD EXPLORE WHATS A REAL PEACE ***

*** MISINFORMATION SPREAD BY TIBET MOVEMENT ***

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I. Updates and Out-Takes

*** HOW TO DEBATE THE CHINA ISSUE WITHOUT CHINA BASHING ***
By John Gershman, FPIF Asia-Pacific Editor

(Editors Note: The congressional debate over Chinas trading status
with the United States and its entry into the WTO has stirred a parallel
debate among the directors and staff of Foreign Policy In Focus and
within the two organizations--Institute for Policy Studies and
Interhemispheric Resource Center--that sponsor the FPIF project.
Included here is an excerpt from an essay by John Gershman that is the
first in a series of FPIF discussion papers examining the
internationalist and nationalist tendencies within the fair trade
movement in the United States. The complete discussion paper is posted
at: http://www.foreignpolicy-infocus.org/papers/china/index.html. In an
upcoming Progressive Response we will include excerpts from a FPIF
discussion paper on the same subject written by John Cavanagh and Sarah
Anderson of IPS. We invite readers to join the discussion by sending
their comments to tom@irc-online.org for inclusion in the FPIFs ezine,
The Progressive Response.)

For Americans, China has not been a nation--but a metaphor, observes
University of Chicago historian Bruce Cumings in Parallax Visions, his
review of fifty years of U.S.-East Asian relations. Its an observation
that helps explain the intensifying debate over Chinas accession to the
WTO and the upcoming Congressional vote on granting normal trade
relations (NTR) status permanently to China. Granting permanent normal
trade relations (PNTR) would obviate the need to annually approve NTR
treatment for China--which Congress has done since 1980, after China
signed a bilateral trade agreement with the United States.

For the largely business-led campaign to approve PNTR, China is the
grand economic prize: the worlds largest market and source of cheap
labor. For many opponents, China symbolizes all that is wrong with a
corporate-driven form of economic globalization. In the words of AFL-CIO
spokeswoman Denise Mitchell, The China vote is going to become a proxy
for all of our concerns about globalization. Other opponents view China
as the last evil empire of communism and a major security threat to the
United States.

But I argue that there are good progressive internationalist reasons to
support approving PNTR and that supporting PNTR does not require buying
the arguments of the business-dominated pro-PNTR camp. These
arguments--which include that PNTR and Chinas entry into the WTO will
lead to greater prosperity for the majority of Chinese and U.S. citizens
and support the expansion of democracy in China, are in fact not likely.
Passage of PNTR and Chinas entry into the WTO will not lead to greater
prosperity for all (or even most) Americans and Chinese, as business
supporters claim. But to acknowledge this is not to say that Chinas
integration into the global economy and its membership in the WTO will,
in and of itself, worsen poverty levels, income disparities, worker
conditions, and environmental deterioration. These are problems arising
from the global capitalist economy, current free trade rules, and the
growing power of transnational corporations relative to states and
citizen movements--not attributable to China. Nor is PNTR likely to
promote democracy. While PNTR and Chinas entry into the WTO will
probably expand the levels of transparency in China on issues of
contracts, regulation of foreign investment, intellectual property
rights (IPRs) and other concerns primarily of interest to corporations,
this may very well be associated with greater crackdowns on independent
organizing efforts by Chinese workers and peasants.

The focus on PNTR and Chinas membership in the WTO has led progressive
trade activists into dangerous alliances and has fostered China
bashing--and, in the process, shifted attention away from the structural
problems in the global economy created by unregulated corporate power
and unaccountable institutions of global economic governance like the
WTO.

Many, if not most, voices in the anti-PNTR campaign echo the arrogant
and destructive tradition of U.S. unilateralism--a tradition most often
embraced by reactionary political groups, not progressive ones. It also
reinforces a growing anti-Chinese racist tendency within U.S. politics,
embodied in the prosecution of Los Alamos scientist Wen Ho Lee,
accusations of Chinese spying, and campaign-finance scandals in which
some Asian-American Democratic Party supporters have been convicted.

* Divergent Views on China and the WTO

The most vocal supporters of PNTR are the business community with
interests in expanded trade and investment opportunities in
China--primarily, but not exclusively, larger transnational
corporations. Also lending strong support to the pro-PNTR campaign are
the nations leading foreign policy think tanks and Asia scholars.

The opposition to PNTR is more heterogeneous. One wing comprises
veterans of the Battle in Seattle, including the AFL-CIO, the Citizen
Trade Campaign, Friends of the Earth, and many other environmental, fair
trade, and human rights groups. Opposition from this progressive
coalition ranges from fears about job losses associated with low-wage
Chinese imports to concerns about violations of labor, human rights, and
environmental standards. Some labor and other groups also oppose Chinas
entry into the WTO because reforming the WTO to add a social clause
and/or environmental conditions would be more difficult with China as a
voting member. These groups perceive Chinas membership as strengthening
the largely Southern opposition to the inclusion of labor and
environmental conditions regarding trade within the WTO. For example, in
John Sweeneys testimony to the Senate Finance Committee in March, 2000
he argued, in part, against granting WTO membership to China, because it
would give the world's biggest lawbreaker a voice in writing the
rules. In another statement, Sweeney called China a rogue nation that
decorates itself with human rights abuses as if they were medals of
honor. In his speech at the AFL-CIOs No Blank Check for China rally on
April 12, 2000 he even brought the old canard of China being military
threat against Taiwan as one reason for opposing PNTR.

Activists with a progressive internationalist stance, in contrast to the
nationalist stances above, provide two main reasons for denying PNTR
status for China. One is the provided by American University economist
Robin Hahnel, who argues that Americans should oppose Chinas entry
into the WTO on grounds that it will adversely affect the lives of the
great majority of Chinese as well as the lives of a majority of
Americans. Critical of the stances of many other opponents to Chinas
entry into the WTO, he argues that opposition to Chinas entry into the
WTO based on human rights grounds or the difficulty it poses in
reforming the WTO is arrogant and employs double standards. He argues
that the United States government has no authority to sit in judgment of
the human rights records of other governments, especially given the U.S.
governments own complicity in human rights violations worldwide and its
failure to ratify many international human rights agreements. He also
brands as hypocritical those who advocate both the democratization of
the WTO and the exclusion of the worlds most populous country from the
WTO.

The second reason progressive internationalists provide is that
defeating PNTR for China is an important tactical battle in the fight
against corporate-led globalization.

Like other trade fights, the opposition to the administration also
includes a broad spectrum of adversaries: right-wing forces that would
like to further isolate what they perceive as an aggressive China,
businesses in sectors like textiles and garments that will eventually
suffer from increased low-cost imports from China, the Tibet Lobby, and
Christian fundamentalists.

This diverse anti-PNTR alliance has fostered a spate of unprincipled
analysis. Whatever ammunition can be found that might win the battle
against PNTR is being used to bash China. Mike Dolan, Deputy Director of
Public Citizens Global Trade Watch and Field Director of the Citizens'
Trade Campaign, has called activists to put progressive pressure to
defeat PNTR for the brutal, arrogant, corrupt, autocratic, and
oligarchic regime in Beijing. Robert Scott of the Economic Policy
Institute presents arguments that combine many of the opposition
positions in a way that is more identifiably nationalist than
progressive, contending that "China can wait" to enter the WTO because
the Chinese government violates labor rights, China is a non market
economy, and Beijing pursues market distorting government policies,
including requirements for technology transfer to domestic firms, local
content and offset requirements. Essentially, he criticizes China for
not being sufficiently laissez faire (i.e., not looking like the U.S.
economy) and calls for the elimination of the very policies that have
been central to the relatively successful development strategies of
several Asian countries. These policies, including the strategic use of
protectionism, active state regulation of foreign investment, and
significant government direction of the financial sector, were all key
components of the relative rapid growth achieved by Japan, Taiwan, and
Korea in the post-war era and have been central to Chinas high-speed
growth in the 1980s and 1990s. Such regulations can be used to force the
transfer of greener production technologies, a major objective of
sustainable development advocates. The criticism of China for labor and
human rights violations is on target, but having a pro-labor think tank
argue that the Chinese economy should restructure itself in a more
laissez faire fashion underscores the unprincipled character of much of
the anti-PNTR coalition.

Supporting PNTR after stipulating human rights conditions is the
position of Human Rights Watch. In testimony before Congress, Mike
Jendrzejczk, Washington director of Human Rights Watchs Asia Division,
argued that WTO membership would provide some incentives for China to
become more respectful of international law, restructuring China's
economy to fit WTO standards will give a boost to those within China
arguing that it must open up further both politically and economically
if it is to be a respected member of the international community. But,
broader trade with China can be consistent with advancing human rights
only if it is combined with effective, sustained pressure on China to
respect basic civil and political rights, according to Jendrzejczk.
Human Rights Watch does not take positions on trade agreements, but it
recommends that in exchange for PNTR, Congress should insist on
reciprocal concrete steps on human rights by China. The Congress should
set concrete, meaningful and realistic human rights conditions that
China must meet before receiving PNTR. The president should be required
to certify that these conditions have been met, and this could happen
any time following China's accession to the WTO.

When human rights demands are linked to the granting of a trade status
enjoyed by all but a handful of the worlds nations, they constitute a
foreign policy characterized by selective treatment and double
standards. If the U.S. were to demand that China ratify the ICESCR as a
condition for normal trading status, it would be obligating China to
meet a standard that the U.S. itself has not met. In addition, on a
practical level, these conditions seem tantamount to blocking PNTR
because China certainly wont accept them.

* Its Not China, Its Corporate-Led Globalization

PNTR opposition draws from both sides of the political spectrum, but on
both the left and right the opposition forces tend to use China a
metaphor or a proxy for their real concerns about the direction of the
global economy. I argue that the real issue is corporate-led
globalization, not China, and thats where the reform agenda should be
focused--not on PNTR and blocking Chinas entry into the WTO.

To support PNTR does not mean to accept that human rights issues should
be de-emphasized in favor of business concerns. It simply means that
China should not be selectively evaluated and that normal trading
relations should not be held hostage to annual congressional reviews.
Human rights should be a major thrust of U.S. diplomatic efforts in all
negotiations with China. But, as Robin Hahnel notes, the application of
human rights grounds to Chinas trade status reeks of arrogance,
unilateralism, and double standards. Advancing human and labor rights
and environmental sustainability in China requires positive programs to
support and encourage positive steps, not just a policy of sanctions.

To support PNTR does not mean that increased trade with China is
necessarily good for U.S. workers. PNTR could create incentives for
greater investment by U.S. corporations in China that would lead to job
losses and downward pressure on wages in the United States. But it is
not clear that defeating PNTR is the best approach for addressing these
concerns. There are some benefits for U.S. workers in the November 15
agreement, including explicit safeguard provisions for import surges.
The proposed legislation for granting PNTR status to China includes new
resources for the USTR and Department of Commerce to monitor Chinas
compliance with the agreement. For all their flaws, WTO dispute
resolution mechanisms would strengthen multilateral oversight of Chinas
compliance with international rules, and remove the emphasis on
unilateral mechanisms. The main benefits of trade policies that attempt
to protect vulnerable sectors in the United States will mostly accrue to
protected businesses. Instead of shaping foreign policy around the
interests of a few economic sectors, policymakers should instead focus
on funding more effective retraining, incomes, and trade adjustment
assistance programs. Such measures would be a far better strategy in
attempting to manage to manage global economic integration than trying
to isolate China from the world and the U.S. from China.

It is likely that Chinas entry into the WTO will be bad for Chinas
workers. But should the U.S. government, in the absence of a call from a
dissident Chinese movement with popular support, reject PNTR in the name
of the Chinese people? Should progressive internationalists speak in the
name of Chinese workers and peasants? The sanctions in Burma and
apartheid-era South Africa were requested by internationally recognized
leaders of democratic liberation movements. To date, none of the major
Chinese human rights organizations are calling for a rejection of PNTR,
nor have any of the democratic trade unions or labor organizations
within China. They, rightly, however, point to the fact that the Clinton
administration has fought much harder for the rights of U.S. businesses
than for human rights. Would a defeat of PNTR lead to greater human
rights efforts on the part of the U.S.? Would those efforts be more
effective? There is no evidence that they would be, since Chinas NTR
status has been approved annually in spite of a worsening human rights
situation since 1998.

What of the argument that the anti-PNTR campaign is an important
tactical battle in the struggle against corporate-led globalization? I
argue that this is incorrect for three reasons. First, the historical
and contemporary political context suggests that the benefits of
defeating PNTR for China would be reaped more by the right and
nationalists than by progressive internationalists. Second, focusing the
debate on Chinas PNTR status displaces limited resources away from
other direct struggles against corporate-led globalization. It is
notable that while the AFL-CIO did endorse the recent Mobilization for
Global Justice in Washington, D.C. that targeted the World Bank and IMF,
its own mobilization focused on defeating PNTR for China. That reflects
a clear strategic choice over the use of resources. Finally, whatever
tactical leverage is gained in the fight against globalization is gained
at the cost of undermining multilateralism and internationalism. The
anti-PNTR position at least implicitly and often explicitly argues for
the need to retain annual NTR review of China by the U.S government.
Emphasizing the use of the annual reviews for NTR relies upon the
Jackson-Vanik amendment, a cold war era relic, which specifically
targeted then-communist/state-socialist countries. Progressives,
especially internationalists, should not be reinforcing the legal
infrastructure of the Cold War to make our points. If an annual review
is to take place, make it a consistent across the board requirement.
Intentions aside, campaigning against PNTR status for China as a
tactical maneuver in the fight against globalization reproduces the US
unilateralism central to the nationalist and reactionary agendas, and is
criticized as such even by such anti-PNTR advocates as Hahnel.

Focusing on PNTR as a defining issue runs the risk of stigmatizing China
as the source of U.S. economic problems, reinforces the interests of the
most reactionary and racist members of the opposition camp, holds China
to a double standard, risks endangering improved U.S.-China security
relations, and diverts attention away from the practices of corporations
in the global economy. The main challenges to U.S. workers are posed by
transnational corporations and the unaccountable organizations that
govern the world economy. These corporations--not China--are the
appropriate targets of those concerned about globalization. Furthermore,
there are important peace and security issues, also of importance to
progressive internationalists, that argue for enmeshing China within
multilateral organizations.

* Pitfalls and Contradictions

U.S.-China relations will be at the center of the U.S. political scene
this year because of the pending vote on PNTR and the election campaign
(a time in modern American political life when China bashing is always
popular). Stigmatizing China as a threat to U.S. economic and military
security may win sound bites and even votes. And citizen groups may find
a certain popular resonance in blaming China for Americas economic
woes. But to augment or to lend credence to such xenophobic policy
analysis undermines the internationalist claims of U.S. citizen and
labor organizations while deterring progress toward the creation of a
more progressive policy agenda for improved U.S.-China relations.
Writing in The Nation (January 31, 2000) about attempts to reform the
global economy, William Grieder observed that reformers from the
wealthy nations, especially the United States, must first establish
their bona fide intentions Poorer countries are naturally skeptical of
our high-minded motives, since they've had long experience with the
power of American self-righteousness. If this movement is truly
international, it will begin by convincing distant others (the citizens,
if not their governments) that our commitment to common humanity is
genuine. By joining in the anti-China crusade against PNTR, U.S.
reformers risk casting doubt about their true intentions and motives.

Certainly, it's important to keep up the popular and political pressure
against corporate-led economic globalization. But China--the worlds
most populous nation--should not be used as a proxy in the battle to
change the rules of the global economy. And progressives concerned about
the direction of economic globalization should be more careful about
joining alliances of convenience with the right wing--a pattern that
emerged in the NAFTA fight and continued in the political battles
against fast track and the IMF. Given the historical difficulties of
moving the progressive economic agenda forward, the U.S. labor movement
and the citizens fair trade movement have decided to hang their own
anti-free trade agenda on the legislative hook of Chinas NTR status.
Such a strategy entails more costs (delegitimizing the progressive
agenda in the U.S., increasing U.S.-China tensions, bolstering
hard-liners and militarists in China) than perceived benefits (keeping
China out of the WTO, protecting vulnerable U.S. industries, obstructing
the free trade agenda).

If the fair trade movement needs a legislative hook with which to target
the WTO, there are other options. As required under the legislation that
approved U.S. entry into the WTO, the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR)
prepared a report on U.S. gains and losses after five years of
membership in the WTO and delivered it to Congress in January 2000. The
legislation has a provision that allows a congressional vote on
maintaining U.S. membership if such a bill is introduced in Congress
within 90 days of the issuing of the USTR report. Such a bill has been
introduced, but WTO opponents led by the Citizens Trade Campaign have
decided not to mobilize to have Congress terminate U.S. membership in
the WTO. Citizens Trade Campaign says its a battle that they can't win
and argues that engaging in such a losing battle would legitimate
continued U.S. membership in the WTO. Instead they have focused on the
vote to grant China uncontested normal trading relations along with all
but a few other nations. The CTC (among others) feels the PNTR campaign
has a better chance of success, because the self-identified fair trade
forces can count on the strong anti-China sentiment in Congress.

If the WTO is the problem, then reforming or abolishing the WTO should
be goal--not isolating China. The Citizens Trade Campaign Fix It or
Nix It campaign (and others like it) should keep its focus on the WTO,
rather than making China a referendum on the WTO or, as the AFL-CIO
spokeswoman says, a proxy for all of our concerns about globalization.
If globalization is the issue (or perhaps more accurately, global
capitalism), make that the fight.

Since the early 1990s, some progressive forces opposing the dominant
free trade agenda have repeatedly joined formal and informal alliances
with nationalist and reactionary forces. In some cases, these alliances
have failed (annual votes on Chinas NTR status and passage of NAFTA),
while in other cases they have succeeded (fast track votes). These
alliances are understandable because politics is inherently a game of
tactical alliances. But as leading elements in the progressive community
are about to throw their support to another such alliance, more
reflection and clarity are needed regarding the conditions under which
such alliances should be forged and important questions need to be
asked:

Does a short-term victory of stopping PNTR--and thereby perhaps slowing
down globalization--enhance the long-term goal of redirecting
globalization? What are the implications of this selective treatment of
China for international peace and security? This fight against China is
dominated by advocacy groups focused on achieving legislative
victories--forging whatever alliances are deemed necessary and using
whatever ammunition is at hand to ensure victory. But such an approach
has implications beyond DC politics. The alliances formed around global
economy issues over the past decade have set a dangerous direction for
the powerful citizens movement in the United States. The right-left
lobbying alliance in Washington has given the fair trade movement a
nationalist, unilateralist, protectionist, and U.S-centric edge.

By using China as a proxy, progressives risk promoting self-righteous
double standards while sacrificing a distinctly progressive
internationalism. Its an internationalism that in rhetoric--and more
importantly in practice--differs sharply from the globalism of the
corporations and foreign policy elite. Its an internationalism that has
historically opposed the reactionary nationalist strain within populism.
Traditionally, the advocacy of unilateral (rather than multilateral)
instruments to shape international affairs has not come from the
progressive community. It is time to break the tradition of dealing with
China as a metaphor or as a proxy, and instead deal with China as China.

(John Gershman < jgershman@igc.org> is a research associate at the
Institute for Development Research and the Asia-Pacific Editor for
Foreign Policy In Focus)

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*** MAJOR SECURITY CONCERNS IN U.S-CHINA-TAIWAN RELATIONS ***
By James H. Nolt, World Policy Institute

(Editor's Note: As the debate of U.S.-China economic relations heats up
around the upcoming vote over Chinas trading status, so too has the
debate over U.S.-China-Taiwan security relations. The two debates often
overlap as indicated last weak when the AFL-CIOs John Sweeney in his
No Blank Check to China speech called for the rejection of permanent
normal trading relations status for China partly because of its threats
against Taiwan. Congressional hawks led by Senate majority leader Trent
Lott (R-MI) want the U.S. to authorize the sale of high-tech destroyers
and other advanced weapons to Taiwan. Lott, in whose district the $1.5
billion destroyers are manufactured, reacted angrily to an April 18
decision by the Clinton administration to refuse to authorize the
high-tech arms sales deal. However, the Clinton did agree to sell Taiwan
upgraded versions of three missiles and a long-range radar system.
Beijing is concerned that any weapons sales at this time will be viewed
in Taiwan as an indication of U.S. support for the pro-independence
movement. Beijing also views with concern the Taiwan Security
Enhancement Act, which would pave the way toward greatly strengthened
U.S.-Taiwan military ties. The House overwhelmingly passed this
militaristic measure, and Lott has threatened to move the act through
the Senate if the Clinton administration did not approve the destroyer
deal. In a new FPIF policy brief, U.S.-China-Taiwan Military Relations,
Jim Nolt of the World Policy Institute offers the following overview of
the major concerns in security relations among the three governments.
The entire brief is posted at:
http://www.foreignpolicy-infocus.org/briefs/vol5/v5n11china.html)

Given that Chinese external relations have generally improved, its arms
exports have declined, and its military forces have deteriorated during
the 1990s, there should be less U.S. fear and criticism of China;
nevertheless, there is more of both. The most obvious reason is that the
bloody repression of the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests shattered for
many Americans the image that China was liberalizing along Western
lines. Another less widely recognized reason is that the end of the cold
war has made China less useful to the U.S. as a military ally and more
useful as a potential threat in order to justify U.S. military spending.

The U.S.-China rapprochement of 1971-89 was rooted in a common
opposition to the Soviet Union. During the 1980s, however, the lure of
the vast Chinese market began to surpass the anti-Soviet alliance as a
motivation for closer U.S.-China relations. In recent years, there have
been four major concerns in U.S.-China security relations: 1) Taiwan, 2)
U.S. proposals for deploying theater missile defense (TMD) systems in
Asia, 3) supposed leaks to China of military-related technologies and
nuclear secrets, and 4) Chinese arms export policies. In all four areas,
the emerging frictions have more to do with the post-cold war changes in
U.S. policy than with memories of Tiananmen or any adverse changes in
Chinese policy.

The U.S.-China rapprochement was founded in a fundamental realignment of
U.S. foreign policy embodied in the Shanghai Communiqui of 1972.
Washington agreed to support Beijing's bid for the UN seat formerly held
by the Nationalist Chinese government on Taiwan, and the U.S. withdrew
its military bases and forces from Taiwan. Washington restored full
diplomatic relations with Beijing in 1979 and withdrew official
recognition of the Taiwan government. Yet the U.S. has maintained
"unofficial" relations with Taiwan under the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act.
This law also mandates U.S. military protection of Taiwan in defense of
its independence from China, while not disputing Beijing's claim that
Taiwan is merely a province of China.

In 1982 the Reagan administration agreed to limit arms sales to Taiwan
in return for Beijing's promise to resolve differences with Taiwan
peacefully.  But then the Bush administration resumed sales of high-tech
weapons to Taiwan, including 150 F-16 fighter aircraft, ostensibly to
counter China's purchase of 50 modern Russian Su-27 fighters. Such a
response was disproportionate, especially since Taiwan also acquired 60
French Mirage fighters and manufactures its own modern fighters using
imported U.S. technology.

The second area of U.S.-China tension concerns Beijing's objections to
U.S. proposals to share a Theater Missile Defense (TMD) system with
Taiwan and Japan. Such systems are restricted by the U.S.-Soviet ABM
(Anti-Ballistic Missile) Treaty of 1972. But now that China has
apparently developed multiple warhead technology (perhaps, in part,
through spying), a TMD system could be inexpensively overwhelmed by
multiple-warhead Chinese missiles and probably also by cruise missiles
flying below the radar horizon of the TMD system. Although Taiwan lacks
nuclear-armed missiles with which to counter any Chinese use of such
weapons, a TMD system for Taiwan and Japan increases the possibility
that the U.S. could once again (as it did in the 1950s) make nuclear
threats against China with the risky expectation that the TMD system
might protect Japan and Taiwan from any Chinese retaliation.

The third area of tension involves U.S. restrictions on the transfer of
military-related technologies to China since 1989. At that time, several
major U.S. arms manufacturers had contracts with Chinese firms to
upgrade weaponry, including fighter aircraft, tanks, and missiles.
President Bush forced cancellation of all these contracts as part of the
sanctions imposed after Tiananmen. Despite an uproar over supposed leaks
of missile technology to China in the months prior to Clinton's June
1998 visit, limits on transfer of dual-use or military-related
technologies are much stricter today than during the 1980s. Recently it
has been alleged that China's spies have acquired U.S. nuclear weapons
technology. Since Chinese missiles and nuclear weapons remain a tiny
fraction of the arsenals of the U.S. and Russia, this should not portend
a new nuclear arms race.

The fourth area of tension revolves around U.S. efforts to restrict
Chinese arms exports. Ironically, Chinese exports were much greater in
the 1980s, when the U.S. did not complain. Several of China's biggest
arms customers then, including Pakistan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and
Thailand, were also U.S. allies and arms customers. The United States,
China, and U.S. allies all sold weapons to both sides during the
Iran-Iraq war.  During the 1990s, the low quality of Chinese weapons and
the end of the Iran-Iraq war led to a precipitous drop in Chinese arms
sales. By the mid-1990s, Chinese arms sales were one-sixth the peak
level of 1987-88 and only 4% of U.S. arms sales. While the U.S. has
increased its market share of global weapons sales, China's sales and
market share have decreased.

In a final blow to Chinese arms exports, the U.S. and its allies decided
to restrict international sales of ballistic missiles with the Missile
Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Although the MTCR was negotiated
without Chinese input, China was asked to adhere to it and agreed to do
so in 1992. Chinese military-industrial interests resent these
restrictions, because the MTCR limits China's ability to sell one of the
few weapons it can produce that happens to be in demand abroad. China
considers U.S. arms control efforts one-sided, since the U.S. offers no
reciprocal concessions, such as limiting arms sales to Taiwan.

(James H. Nolt <noltj@newschool.edu> is a Senior Fellow specializing in
East Asia relations at the World Policy Institute.)

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II. Letters and Comments

*** ZUNES SHOULD EXPLORE WHATS A REAL PEACE ***

What needs to be explored by Progressive Response (and apparently never
will be by the learned Professor Zunes) is just what kind of "peace" the
Palestinians and Syrians envision in the "land for peace" formula. [See
PR article Dividing the West Bank posted at
http://www.foreignpolicy-infocus.org/progresp/vol4/prog4n16.html] Is it
the type of peace between, say, the U.S. and Canada or Denmark and
Norway, or of the variety of "peace" between North and South Korea. At
the moment, it appears that Syria is not interested in the former type
of peace with free flow of citizens, free trade, a full diplomatic
recognition between the two countries.

The Palestinian desires in this regard are less clear though the
statements of the minority but influential Hamas leaders are not
promising. The point is that is if there is REAL peace, not merely a
temporary cessation of armed hostilities, it is obvious that the roads
in question will soon become part of the infrastructure open to all. And
it is silly to claim that if the Palestinians control over 80 percent of
the land, they will be living in tiny enclaves.

The Oslo accords called for negotiating these points, not merely giving
in to every Palestinian demand.

It is Israel which is taking great risk in moving from the status quo to
less defensible positions if their neighbors prove to be hostile. The
Palestinians have everything to gain and nothing to lose from the Barak
proposals if their intentions are not hostile.

- Bob Schlesinger" ibob612@mediawave.com

*** MISINFORMATION SPREAD BY TIBET MOVEMENT ***

I enjoyed reading your March 10th issue article "Time to Reassess Tibet
Policy" by A. Tom Grunfeld. [See FPIF Policy Report on Tibet policy
posted at
http://www.foreignpolicy-infocus.org/briefs/vol5/v5n09tibet.html]

As a Mongolian Chinese American, I feel the current ambiguous U.S.
policy on Tibet is very hurtful to me, as most of the people in this
country do not seem to realize minorities exist in central China. My
heritage is constantly being badgered by the misinformation spread by
the Tibet movement, which wants to portray China as a mono-ethnic
nation.

I applaud your publication's courage in bringing this issue to the open.

Please forward my letter to A. Tom Grunfeld. I have enjoyed reading his
book "The Making of Modern Tibet." Thank you very much.

- Sue Jones <SJones149@aol.com>

-------------------------------------------------------------------------

GLOBAL FOCUS: U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AT THE TURN OF THE MILLENNIUM, edited
by IPS Fellow Martha Honey and IRC Senior Analyst Tom Barry, offers a
penetrating critique of current U.S. foreign policy through a series of
original essays by leading progressive scholars. This second biannual
volume outlines the principles, practices, and policy alternatives that
would help to make the U.S. a more responsible global leader and global
partner. More details about this latest Foreign Policy In Focus
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http://www.foreignpolicy-infocus.org/global_focus_2000.html.

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reflect the institutional positions of either the Interhemispheric
Resource Center or the Institute for Policy Studies.

We're working to make the Progressive Response informative and useful,
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IRC
Tom Barry
Editor, Progressive Response
Co-director, Foreign Policy In Focus
Email: tom@irc-online.org

IPS
Martha Honey
Co-director, Foreign Policy In Focus
Email: ipsps@igc.apc.org

 
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