Stratfor on Chinese Submarines and US Surveillance Via NY Transfer News * All the News That Doesn't Fit source - http://www.stratfor.com Was America Hunting for a New, Killer Submarine? Summary A series of incidents - stretching back several years and culminating in the apparent loss of the EP-3E aircraft - indicates that the United States has been hunting for signs of a breakthrough in Chinese submarine technology. Sources inside China and a series of incidents stretching back months and years indicate that Western militaries have been intensively hunting for clues to two new classes of submarines. One is a quiet, diesel design that entered service one-year ago. The other is a potential breakthrough: a homegrown version of the Russian Victor III that would allow Beijing's navy for the first time to threaten America's most powerful conventional weapon, the aircraft carrier. Analysis With the apparent boarding of the EP-3E aircraft, the United States is likely to lose at least some abilities to eavesdrop along China's coastline. There have only been 11 of these aircraft in the U.S. Navy inventory. Highly prized by U.S. commanders, these aircraft can monitor and trace UHF and VHF communications, as well as radar signals. But what was the American crew looking for in its long flight down the Chinese coast? And why does it appear that the U.S. Navy has stepped up its intelligence collection, not just in the South China Sea, but also recently as far north as the exercise areas of the Chinese northern fleet in the Yellow Sea? A string of incidents in recent years - including arrests of Western defense attaches - and a U.S. vessel chased from an exercise area in recent weeks - suggest China is close to a breakthrough in its long-stalled efforts to build an effective submarine threat. Sources in China confirm that the Chinese military reaction to the EP-3E incident was sharp because the military is trying to safeguard its submarine secrets. The People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) placed a new version of the Russian-designed Kilo-class submarine into service on April 4, 2000 according to a brief report in the Hong Kong-based Sing Tao Jih Pao. The new Kilo is equipped with anti-ship weapons and has conducted recent drills simulating combat with carrier-type warships, according to the paper, which cited sources in the People's Liberation Army. It takes up to one year to qualify a new vessel and crew for duty at sea. Perhaps more ominously, the Chinese navy may have made a more recent and significant breakthrough: It has been working for years on a variant of the larger, more powerful, 6,000-ton Victor III submarine. This submarine, known in China as a type 093 and due for completion sometime in late 2000, is designed to launch cruise missiles while submerged - a technological feat that has defied previous attempts of the Chinese navy. Doing so would allow the Chinese to threaten the pre-eminent American weapons system in the region: the aircraft carrier. The flight of the EP-3 - right along the Chinese coastline - suggests it was monitoring transmissions of navy vessels and coastal installations. The aircraft may have been looking for signs of either of these two submarines as well; their periscopes emit electronic transmissions when raised. As significantly, it appears that the U.S. Navy was taking an intense interest in a recent exercise far to the north in the Yellow Sea - not far from the port where the new boat has been under construction. A U.S. vessel was chased from an exercise area recently. Sources inside China confirm that the PLA's reaction to the EP-3E incident has been unusually sharp -- because Beijing's military is desperately trying to protect its submarine technology. The most recent U.S. spy mission took place as new submarines were apparently being tested in the South China Sea, according to the sources. These tests were not just routine exercises, but instead intended to flex potential naval capabilities - specifically, how China will project submarine power in deep-ocean operations. Hainan: At the Edge of China's Nascent Naval Power That the damaged American EP-3E should make an emergency landing on Hainan is an unusual coincidence. The island lies at the epicenter of Chinese efforts to extend its naval force far beyond its coastline and out into the ocean; by doing so, it can interdict the sea lanes that bring oil to Northeast Asia. And by doing so, the Chinese can finally put an end to their worst nightmare, realized in 1996, when American carriers were just off the Chinese coast. To the north of the island is the headquarters of the South Sea Fleet, at Zhanjiang. Zhanjiang is a likely target for collecting Chinese signals from telephone calls and other transmissions, because the headquarters there controls operations that range far from China and into the hotly contested Spratly islands, claimed by multiple Asian nations. Two submarine flotillas operate out of the South Sea Fleet, according to a recent version of Jane's Security Assessment. Hainan hosts a naval base at the northern port of Haikou. These port facilities have apparently been of intense interest to Western militaries in recent years. In 1996, China ordered American and Japanese military attaches to leave the country after they were detained on Hainan Island. The official Xinhua New Agency said the government accused the two men of having been caught in restricted areas that "compromised the national security of China." The government reportedly confiscated photographs and videotapes. The two were also reportedly in Zhanjiang, home of the headquarters. It appears likely that the new Kilos have not only entered service but may have been certified to take part in deep-water operations, ostensibly against an American carriers in the case of war. A year is sufficient time to train crews, conduct sea trials and hone combat skills. Long before they put to sea, the new Kilos were expected to be nearly as quiet as the U.S. Los Angeles class nuclear-attack submarine and "thus very difficult to detect," according to a report by the Heritage Foundation's Richard Fisher. While Heritage is a highly partisan institution, Fisher's research is well respected. He noted that in 1997 Taiwan's naval forces could not even detect a less advanced version of the Kilo passing through the Taiwan Strait. The U.S. Defense Department estimated last year that the Kilos will be adapted to use Russian technology in quieting and sonar, as well as weapons systems. The department estimated in a 2000 report that China "is expected to begin arming some of its submarines with submerged launch cruise missiles." The Chinese navy is also emphasizing its own anti-submarine operations, emphasizing training. "As a result, China's submarine fleet could constitute a substantial force capable of controlling sea lanes and mining approaches around Taiwan," the U.S. military report concluded, "as well as a growing threat to submarines in the East and South China Seas." Operations in the South China Sea are the key for China, breaking out of its largely defensive naval posture. From the South China Sea, a force can sail to intercept an opposing force - far away from the Chinese mainland. Such a force can harass shipping, particularly ships carrying petroleum, to Japan and South Korea. Significantly the South Sea Fleet has the largest single swath of exercise areas in the PLAN, seven in total. The most recent E-3E mission appears to have been keenly interested in this southern Chinese coastline. Taking off from Kadena Air Base, Okinawa, the aircraft flew toward China and then turned south, tracing the shore, finally tracing the area around the South Sea Fleet headquarters and Hainan. Sources inside China confirm that the Chinese military reacted as sharply as it did to the intrusion of the E-3E because senior officials believed the American aircraft was spying on new submarine technology. Significantly, these sources indicate that the Chinese navy was conducting tests not only to measure the strength of these submarines and their crews - but also to see if China is succeeding in developing new doctrine to project submarine force far from home. Importantly, the Chinese military appears to feel that the United States - keenly interested in the submarine program - is moving to counter this threat by bringing its own weapons closer to the coast. The PLA is particularly concerned at the recent decision of Singapore to allow U.S. carriers to tie up at dock facilities there, a short sail from the Chinese coast. Breakthroughs: A Deadlier Submarine? China has also been at work on a far more lethal submarine - a variant of the Soviet submarine that once stalked American carrier battle groups during the Cold War. Under construction at the Bohai Shipyards at Huludao in northeastern China, the vessel - known as a Type 093 - has been estimated due for completion in late 2000 or early 2001. Construction reportedly began in 1996 or 1997 and the vessel may have already put to sea; varying estimates have suggested that it would be complete by late 2000 or early 2001. The Victor-type submarine was one of the old Soviet Union's most effective weapons against U.S. aircraft carrier battle groups. And the new, nuclear-powered Chinese vessel - about the length of a football field - has been expected by the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence to perform similarly to its Russian predecessors. Up to six could enter service by 2012. Fast, capable of sinking nearly any surface vessel, this design comes with 21-inch torpedo tubes and is capable of doing what the Chinese navy can't: launching large cruise missiles through these tubes while submerged. The vessel is also reportedly designed to carry land attack cruise missiles, like the American Tomahawk. There is evidence to suggest that the Chinese military either has such a submarine or is experimenting with the doctrine necessary to put it to use. On March 18, a report in the Beijing's Jiefangjun Bao noted that a "new-type" submarine had been used to simulate a clash between "red" and "blue" forces in the Yellow Sea. The "blue" force submarine used speed to go around the defending force, prompting them to change attack positions and simulate launching their torpedoes. The exercise took place in the Huang Hai, or Yellow Sea. The navy "chose a new-type submarine with good combat functions and strong maneuverability as the target of attack," the report noted. The exercise appears to have taken place in the exercise areas of the North Sea Fleet, the waters of the Yellow Sea between China and the Korean peninsula. These waters are adjacent to the shipyard where the new Victor-type submarine has been under construction. This exercise took place less than two weeks before the collision over the South China Sea. The United States also took an interest in this exercise: An American research vessel appears to have nosed around the exercise area until Chinese combatants chased it away. A Chinese frigate closed to within 100 yards of the vessel and trained its gun-sighting equipment on the ship until it moved away. The vessel appears to have been the USNS Bowditch, officially an oceanographic research vessel whose equipment includes multibeam echo-sounders, towed sonars and expendable sensors. The Loss of the American Spy Plane The U.S. military is clearly concerned at the loss of the EP-3E. It appears that the Chinese military has somehow managed to obscure the ability of American surveillance satellites to see the U.S. plane at the airport in Hainan, according to sources. Either the Chinese have moved the aircraft or somehow managed to keep it from view by satellites. Chinese state media broadcast an image of the plane early in the standoff; new images are no longer being broadcast. The aircraft, a variant of the plane developed by Lockheed Martin in the 1960s, includes a series of high-tech listening devices and top-secret workstations to intercept and analyze multiple types of communications traffic and electronic emissions. These aircraft are particularly suited at intercepting UHG, VHF and radar signals. The 11 planes also carry computers and analytical tools designed to locate, decode and characterize signals. Together these systems monitor a slew of different naval targets, including low-band signals such as early warning radars and height-finding and meteorological radars. The crew is likely to have protected the data and some of the equipment. Based on the total flying time from their base in Okinawa and the approximate times of the incidents, released by U.S. authorities, the crew probably had about 15 minutes to destroy any sensitive information or software before landing on Chinese soil. The crew would have had time to erase data from the mission, disable hard drives, tapes and evidence of their targets in bags, weighted to plummet into the ocean. Such an event, however, is not generally expected by EP-3E crews, according to sources experienced in these operations. The Chinese, in turn, are likely to learn exactly how the United States was listening in on its submarine program - and take steps to thwart such eavesdropping in the future. ================================================================= NY Transfer News Collective * A Service of Blythe Systems Since 1985 - Information for the Rest of Us 339 Lafayette St., New York, NY 10012 http://www.blythe.org e-mail: nyt@blythe.org ================================================================= nytas-04.12.01-02:37:00-31654