Interview with Jamil Majdalawi, PFLP Via NY Transfer News * All the News That Doesn't Fit source - So Oder So Online, February 2001 Interview With Jamil Majdalawi, Politburo Member, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) Gaza, January 2001 Question: What is your opinion of the peace process? It's not possible to say that there is a peace process in the Middle East at the moment. Rather there is an American-Israeli project aimed at liquidating the Palestinian Question. Israel continues to refuse to recognize any Palestinian rights, most importantly our right to self-determination, a Palestinian state, and the right-to-return for refugees. Israel also continues to reject any Palestinian autonomy or rights in Jerusalem. Instead, Israel continues to build new settlements. As long as the rights of the Palestinian people are ignored, we cannot speak of peace. Question: How strong is the Palestinian left these days? Historically, the Palestinian left has always been a considerable force. But there have been various tendencies. Alongside the traditional left of the Communist Party there was also the fighting left, characterized by the PFLP (Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine) and the DFLP (Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine). The latter have always been a considerable presence, sometimes stronger and sometimes weaker. At present, the fighting left is the third strongest force behind Fatah and the Islamists. The Palestinian left was seriously affected by the collapse of the Soviet Union. We in the PFLP took a close look at our history after that to learn from our mistakes. But we do not want to abandon our leftist principles. We are on a path to make the left more effective. Especially now, at a time when the Palestinian bourgeoisie has failed, it is necessary to develop and carry out a social and political program to create a democratic alternative for the Palestinian people. Question: What mistakes were made in the past? One mistake was the fact that we did not struggle at all levels against imperialism and Zionism in the region. We thought that just one form of struggle could solve the conflict. We did not clearly see the historical differences between the Zionist project in the region and the Palestinian liberation project. Now we see the conflict in a more comprehensive way. Not just at the level of struggle, but also in an economic, social, cultural, and historical sense. We no longer see armed struggle as the only path to liberation. Rather there are other forms of struggle as well: political, social, cultural, and economic. Another mistake was our failure to recognize the differences between the various communities, meaning the different national conditions faced by Palestinians in the countries where they live. We did not place enough emphasis on social and democratic struggle. For us today, national liberation also means social liberation. With respect to internationalism, we still view the line of internationalism as an important strategic line. The mistakes we made with respect to internationalism were related to our failure to criticize the practices of the Soviet Union. Today we believe that strategic alliances with allies and friends must be accompanied by criticisms. Because criticism is necessary to stay on the correct path. This is a very complex issue. The failure of the PLO in the late 1980s gave a great boost to the Islamists. Then came the collapse of the Soviet Union, the crisis of the leftist ideology, and the failure of the Palestinian left (including the PFLP) to create an alternative. The Islamist organizations have a long history as well, one which can roughly be broken down into two phases: the phase before the first Intifada, and the phase after this Intifada. Before, they viewed the left as their main opposition and there were frequent bloody clashes. The Islamists had this approach: first eliminate the left, then take on the Israeli occupation forces. So they were tolerated by Israel at that time and were able to create a vast infrastructure in Palestinian society. At that same time, the leftist forces were being bitterly attacked by Israel. By the time the Intifada began, the left was already bleeding and the Islamists were gaining in strength. But they had to make a choice: continue with their old ways, or struggle together in the Intifada. They chose the latter. Any other choice would have alienated them within Palestinian society, so this created a dynamic whereby the Islamists became a problem for Israel. This situation also altered the reality for the left. It's important to stress that the main contradiction in the view of the left has always been the occupation. That's because this occupation is aimed at liquidating the Palestinian people. So the left cooperates with the Islamists in the struggle against the occupation. This is literally a question of survival. Of course there are contradictions involved in this. There are ideological differences, differences in terms of social viewpoints, and differences with respect to the questions of women, the family, education, democracy, personal freedoms, and so on. Question: Did the Palestinian left emerge from the first Intifada in a weakened position? If yes, why? The entire Palestinian liberation movement and all Palestinian organizations emerged from the first Intifada in a weakened condition. The Intifada itself was by no means weak, but its political culmination, the Oslo Accords, was a wasted effort which left all groups worse off than they were before the uprising. Question: How did the cooperation between the leftist people's committees and the religious forces work? The Islamist forces were not part of the united national leadership at that time. The national leadership consisted of Fatah, the PFLP, the DFLP, and the People's Party. Nor were the Islamists politically or organizationally active in the people's committees. Only at the level of individual participation in the committees in some neighborhoods were they involved. Question: What lessons were learned from that experience? The Islamists, at that time, did not want to participate in the national leadership. It would have been better for all forces if they had participated. This would have prevented many of the mistakes which weakened the resistance to the occupation. The Islamists carried out their activities parallel to, not together with, the actions of other forces. So there were many protest actions which were isolated from each other. There were also problems during joint demonstrations, because the Islamist marchers took their orders from other leaders than the rest of the participants. But it's essential during demonstrations and other activities to have unity during the action, otherwise it's easy for the Israelis to defeat them. That is one very important lesson from the first Intifada. Question: What was the PFLP's position during the Gulf War? The Gulf War had two phases. The first phase was the arrival of the U.S. troops in the Gulf. During this very short phase, the PFLP was opposed to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. We felt that Arab unity should not be achieved through force and that the Iraqi troops should withdraw from Kuwait. Then there should be an Arab solution to the problem. With this in mind, George Habash [PFLP leader] visited various Arab states and sought an Arab initiative to solve this crisis. Two principles were to be central to this initiative: The withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait, and the right to self-determination for the Kuwaiti people. The second phase of the Gulf War was the advance of U.S. and other Western troops into the Gulf region. During this phase, the PFLP placed a priority on the struggle against the imperialist troops. We felt there could not be a solution which sought to strengthen the imperialist domination over the region. Question: Is it true that the PFLP allied itself with Baghdad for opportunistic reasons? The relationship between the PFLP and any Arab state is based on the idea that Palestinians and Arabs have common interests. During the Iran-Iraq War, the PFLP's position was against Iraq. This led the Iraqi government to close all PFLP offices in the country and to expel PFLP members. From 1980 to 1989, there were no contacts at all between the PFLP and Iraq. The presence of the PFLP in Iraq was clandestine. In the 1990s, the PFLP did not receive any benefits from a relationship with Iraq. Iraq is in no position to support other forces. Rather Iraq itself needs support against the imperialist powers. Question: What effect did the Oslo dynamic have on the Palestinian left? The left did all it could at all levels to resist. At the level of armed struggle, the left has always been active in Palestine and South Lebanon. At the popular level, the left did what it could to expose the failings of the Oslo Accords. We tried to convince the people not to be led astray by the Palestinian bourgeoisie, the Israelis, and the Americans. At the pan-Arab level, the PFLP was very active, particularly among the Arab masses in other countries, to convince the various independent Arab parties, trade unions, and popular initiatives of the the dangers of the Oslo Accords. We wanted to see the creation of a Arabic popular front against the normalization with Zionism, with Israel, and with imperialism. At the inner-Palestinian level, the left fought for democracy and against corruption within the Palestinian Authority. The PFLP also organized protests and supported the struggles by political prisoners in Israeli and Palestinian jails. In the schools and universities, the PFLP organized resistance to the Oslo Accords and its after-effects. Israel and the CIA, by means of the Whye River Accord in 1999, tried to exert influence over Palestinian schoolchildren. They wanted the Palestinian Authority to rewrite all textbooks and insert more neutral positions to create an atmosphere friendly towards the USA and Israel. It was only by means of intensive efforts that these plans were foiled. The left did a lot of base work and explaining among the population, and this led to a broad front in resistance to the new pro-imperialist educational curriculum. These are some examples of the daily tasks which the left undertook since 1993 to resist the Oslo Accords. The left also started to reach out in new directions. The left has been able in recent years to send its political cadre to neighboring countries and the occupied Palestinian territories in order to directly support the struggle of the people against the occupation. Our comrades are at the front lines of the protests in the new Intifada. The greatest achievement of left in its struggle against the Oslo dynamic is the fact that its political work has been well-received by the Palestinian public, to the point that a Palestinian red line has now been drawn which the official Palestinian leadership may not step over. This red line stands for the fundamental rights of the Palestinian people which no representative may violate, namely: self-determination, a Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as the capital, the right-to-return for millions of Palestinian refugees, an end to the occupation, and the dismantling of Israeli settlements. Question: What relevance does the left have in the new Intifada? The left, by means of its work of political explanation over the past few years, has strengthened the political atmosphere for the Intifada. At present, the left is involved in all activities of the new Intifada. The left is present on the streets, in the upper coordinating committees, as well as in the people's committees, and is involved in tasks such as caring for poor families, creating political committees, supporting political prisoners, and so on. The left is also involved in the armed struggle as well. Question: How does the Palestinian left now view the perspective for liberation? The left views the liberation process as a double-faced process: social liberation without ending the occupation is just as impossible as ending the occupation without achieving social liberation. In the advance of the social liberation, it is possible to mobilize the people against the occupation. At the same time, defeating the occupation also creates conditions for social liberation. The main task of the Palestinian left is to protect the lives of the Palestinian people and to defend them until conditions have changed fundamentally. To make this defence possible, the left accepts the "two states solution" as a temporary solution. This, of course, is only accepted on the condition that the Palestinian people receive their basic rights and the lives of the Palestinian people are protected. From the historical point of view, however, the problem of Zionism remains. So the struggle against Zionism has a strategic dimension. The Zionist-imperialist alliance is an enemy to all people in the region. So the only strategic solution can be a democratic state for all the people who live there, free from Zionism and imperialism. For this struggle to be successful, we need to have the support of the left from all over the world. Therefore international solidarity is a central part of the work of the Palestinian left. Question: What is the Palestinian left's opinion of the Israeli left? The Palestinian left only has contacts with anti-Zionist leftist Israeli groups, which are unfortunately very small. We hope that these groups will grow in size and come into a position where they can challenge Zionist ideology within the Israeli society. That's not only in the interest of the Palestinian people, it's also in the interest of the Israeli people. Our contacts with Israeli groups are based on the condition that they be anti-Zionist, that they be opposed to the occupation, and that they recognize the basic rights of the Palestinian people, including the right to self-determination and the right-to-return for the millions of refugees in the diaspora. Question: What's the main difference between the first Intifada in 1987 and the present uprising? First of all, the Palestinian Authority did not exist yet in 1987. The Intifada was an uprising by the people against the occupation. At that time there were only two authorities: the Israeli occupation powers were confronted with the Palestinian people's movement, the only popular authority which the Palestinians had. Today, in addition to the Intifada there is also the Palestinian Authority which has made agreements with the Israeli occupation powers. So they are in a relationship with the occupation powers. This gives them little room to manoeuvre in opposition to the occupation. This means that sometimes the Palestinian Authority is confronted with the emotions of the people and must oppose the tactic of the national leadership and the Intifada. The people expect the Palestinian Authority to fulfill their aspirations with respect to economic and security questions within Palestinian society. Secondly, the use of force and weapons by the Israelis against the Palestinians during this new Intifada is much more intense and heavier than it was during the first Intifada. This is evident in the high number of Palestinian casualties. Thirdly, the national leadership of the Intifada is much better organized than it was before. So it has been in a position to organize the activities of the Intifada while at the same time maintaining civil activities such as schools, businesses, etc. An attempt has been made to accommodate both of these aspects. Fourthly, this new Intifada has a great deal of solidarity in various Arab countries. The massive solidarity demonstrations on Arab streets have been supported by several regimes. Question: What are the most significant political tendencies in the Palestinian resistance movement according to the PFLP? In general, we can identify the following tendencies. First, the tendency of the national bourgeoisie, mainly represented by Fatah. This line is led politically, socially, and ideologically by the bourgeoisie. The movement's base, however, is represented by the poor masses of the Palestinian society, for example the youths in the refugees camps. Then there is the Islamist tendency, whose leadership comes mainly from the middle classes. Its base is rather mixed. This tendency benefits from the fact that Palestinian society is traditionally a religious society. Then there is the leftist tendency. This tendency is represented by the PFLP and the DFLP. The activists of this tendency come from the Palestinian proletariat. This tendency also includes other organizations, such as the People's Party (formerly the Communist Party), the FIDA group, the Front of People's Struggle, and many individual persons. This tendency encompasses all progressive, secular, and democratic forces. These forces are all based more or less around Marxism. Question: How would you describe the present situation of the Palestinian left and what is your political position towards the uprising? In the past few years, the Palestinian left has been able to spread its roots in Palestinian society. Previously, the Palestinian left was weakened by two main factors: the collapse of the Soviet Union and the socialist bloc and the general crisis of the left around the globe. But it's possible to say that the retreat by the Palestinian left was less than that suffered by the left in Europe and elsewhere in the world. The PFLP enjoys a special form of credibility among the Palestinian people. By its various forms of struggle and its correct social and political analyses, the PFLP has credibility. The leftist positions with respect to uprisings are united with the goals of the Intifada. These goals are: an end to the Israeli occupation, the creation of Palestinian state with real sovereignty and Jerusalem as its capital, and a guaranteed right-to-return for Palestinian refugees. There is unity around all of these points. So we are all convinced that the Intifada must not end until these goals have been reached. One point where there is disagreement is to what degree the left should participate in the Palestinian Authority. The PFLP and the DFLP are opposed to participation in the Palestinian Authority. There is also disagreement as to what forms of struggle should be used against the occupation. Some people say that it would be better to avoid violence, for example. Question: What are the immediate and strategic goals of the PFLP with respect to the Palestinian Question? The immediate goal of the PFLP is the realization of the project of national liberation. The goals of this project are: self-determination, a state with Jerusalem as the capital, and the right-to-return for refugees. The strategic, long-term goals with respect to Palestine concern the creation of a just and peaceful region as a whole. Such a solution can only be realized through the creation of a democratic, secular state which can be home to all the peoples of the region, irrespective of their skin color, religion, or ethnicity. Such a solution would spare the region from the suffering which has been unleashed by the racist ideology of Zionism. This solution would also be an alternative to the creation of two religious states, a Jewish religious state and a religious Palestinian state. At present, we are united with all national forces who are fighting to end the Israeli occupation. We believe that this is the main contradiction in the present phase of our national liberation. This unity is necessary because we are confronted with such brutality and massive force on the part of the occupation forces. But this does not mean that we ignore the inherent contradictions involved in such a unity. Nor do we overlook the social contradictions. At present, it is in the interest of all the forces of the Palestinian people to struggle against the occupation. The contradictions between the various elements of Palestinian society will then become clearer once we have achieved independence. Translated by Arm the Spirit ================================================================= NY Transfer News Collective * A Service of Blythe Systems Since 1985 - Information for the Rest of Us 339 Lafayette St., New York, NY 10012 http://www.blythe.org e-mail: nyt@blythe.org ================================================================= nytmid-05.19.01-18:25:59-12759