THE WAR WITH HAITI-pt_2 id OAA05023; Sat, 20 Sep 1997 14:17:04 -0400 Via NY Transfer News Collective * All the News that Doesn't Fit source: Bob Corbett THE "WAR" WITH HAITI PART II by John Bartlow Martin Former Ambassador to the Dominican Republic * Freites told me that Gonzalo Facio, President of the QAS Council, thought the Dominicans had a good case. Fritz Long relayed a report that Duvalier had signed a secret military assistance agreement with Castro. At about 5 P.M. Assistant Secretary Ed Martin telephoned me from Washington. The Council of the OAS was in session and Martin thought it might invoke the Rio Treaty against Haiti and condemn or at least investigate Haiti's threat to hemispheric peace; but, he said, Bosch was undermining his own position by threatening to act militarily before the OAS had time to act. President Facio had telephoned Freites but receivedno assurances. Could I get assurances from Bosch? I went immediately to Bosch's house. He said sternly, "I have received a message from the OAS asking me to wait. I cannot wait forever. The excitement in the Dominican people is great. I fear for the Haitian Embassy here - a group of young people is getting together. There is an internal political problem too." I made the case for restraint. Finally Bosch said, "Tomorrow the Constitution will be promulgated." Then I saw - he wanted to keep the Haitian crisis boiling so his controversial Constitution could be promulgated without much notice. I told him that if the debate in the QAS turned against him, it wouldbe a serious political blow. He frowned, thinking. Finally he said, "If the OAS could send me a message tomorrow publicly asking me to wait, I might not find it inconvenient to wait." I pressed him further. Reluctantly, he gave me his personal assurance that he would not invade tomorrow - that he would wait "until twenty-four hours from tonight, and that will really be Tuesday morning." Would he say this in his speech tonight? He did not reply directly. It was almost time for him to leave for the Palace to deliver the speech. I hurried back to the Residence and telephoned Ed Martin in Washington and reported, adding that at this point I did not believe Bosch really intended to invade at all, though I could be wrong. Martin expected the Council of the OAS to act by 10 P.M. tonight. Freites called: Haiti had officially broken relations with the Dominican government. We recommended that he ask the Haitians for safe-conducts for the asylees in the Dominican Embassy there and their transfer to another Embassy. At 6:50 P.M. a private source told me that the Trujillos had actually landed in Port-au-Prince. Shlaudeman immediately telephoned President Bosch at the Palace and told him so. Ten minutes later Bosch came ontelevision, flanked by his military high command. We watched, then I telephoned Ed Martin. Bosch had said Dominican sovereignty and dignity had been insulted and must be defended at all costs. Duvalier was conspiring against the Republic "in alliance with the Trujillos." Dominican diplomats would not leave Haiti until they had received safe-conducts for the twenty-two asylees then in their Embassy in Port-au-Prince. The OAS was "studying" the matter, but "with study or without it, the situation is grave." He said, "We have suffered with great patience the outrages of the Haitian government. But those outrages must stop now. If they do not stop in a period of twenty-four hours, we will put a finalpoint to them with the measures that may be found in our capability." At 9:30 P.M., Cass told me that the Dominican Navy had a frigate on the north coast ready to put to sea and that three thousand ground troops had begun to move to the border at Dajabon, Elias Pina, and Jimani. Colonel Long, however, said all Army troops were confined to their barracks - none were being moved to the border. I told the attache's to recheck. Long finally reached General Viilas, and he said that the troops were being rounded up all over the country and this process would probably take most of Monday. They were getting into a position to "do something" Tuesday morning. Vinas understood, as I did, the twenty-four-hour ultimatum would run out on Monday night. Our Embassy in Port-au-Prince ordered all Americans to stand by for evacuation. Late that evening the Council of the OAS voted 16 to 0 with two abstentions to invoke the Rio Treaty and convoke itself as a ministerial - level Organ of Consultation to make peace between Haiti and the Dominican Republic. It authorized President Facio to appoint a five-man commission to fly to Haiti immediately. It urged both governments to refrainfrom any actions that might disrupt its peace-keeping efforts. * On Monday morning Colonel Cass reported that Commodore Rib was talking irresponsibly about bombing the Palace in Port-au-Prince. A private source told me the Navy had asked for two hundred thousand gallons of diesel fuel oil and the Air Force three hundred thousand gallons of gasoline for the tanks. Kennedy Crockett, who had replaced Crimmins as Caribbean area director in the State Department, called King - several OAS ambassadors were saying that Bosch was the problem, not Duvalier. And Duvalier, or his Foreign Minister, Rene Chalmers, had made a clever move. The Haitian government had notified the OAS that it had withdrawn its troops from the Dominican Embassy and would guarantee the safety of Dominican diplomats until they left the country and the safety of twenty-one persons who had taken asylum in the Dominican Embassy. We had understood there were now twenty-two asylees. The figure twenty-one sounded ominous - did Duvalier intend to guarantee safety for all but Lieutenant Benoit, whom he blamed for the attack on his children? Would the OAS understand this? Long reported that the high command was scheduled to meet at the Palace at 10 A.M. Bosch had the Armed Forces excited. And the people too - a crowd rioted at the Haitian Embassy, the radio was filled with announcements - a druggist was offering free drugs and a man his truck to the troops - and the streets were filled with talk of war. Bosch had support as never before. At 12:30 P.M. Freites told King that Bosch had received a message yesterday from the OAS but had not yet replied. Betancourt had called Bosch today and told him that Venezuela was "100 percent for him"; Bosch took this to mean that the Venezuelan Navy and Air Force were at his disposal. Freites had vainly warned Bosch to be careful. Freites said that if the OAS Commission did not at least prepare to leave Washington today, Bosch might do anything. At 12:45 P.M., Long said that General Vinas planned to begin at once reinforcing three frontier battalions with four companies, including the crack troops trained in counter-insurgency. The Navy was moving four units along the south coast and three along the north coast toward Haiti. The Air Force would patrol the frontier but stay on the Dominican side. Tanks were going to San Juan de la Maguana. Long had told Vinas they'd be wise to keep the quarrel in the OAS, pointing out that thus far no Dominican lives had been lost but some might if the troops crossed the border. He had made little impression - the Dominican military was talking about their patriotic duty to die for their country. The ultimatum would expire at 7 P.M. No Dominican military man knew what would happen after that. Kennedy Crockett called me that afternoon. Bosch had not replied to a personal appeal from Facio. The OAS had selected only four of the five members of the Commission-Ambassadors of Chile, El Salvador, Ecuador, and Colombia. (Bolivia later was added.) It was not even certain the Commission could get into Port-au-Prince for Duvalier had not replied to two telegrams from Facio. It was absolutely impossible for the Commission to get to Port-au-Prince by seven o'clock that night, but the Dominicans in Washington insisted it must. Crockett said, "We feel this is inconsistent with what President Bosch promised you." Port-au-Prince was quiet - but Santo Domingo was mobilizing. Crockett asked me to go to Bosch again. And so at 2:30 P.M. I did. Bosch was taking a shower. Servants were setting his luncheon table. I waited, talking desultorily with members of his household. Sun light streamed into the room, and a gentle breeze blew. Bosch appeared, wearing a dressing gown apologizing for his attire, explaining he was dressing to attend the ceremony promulgating the Constitution. Sitting withhim while he ate his lunch, I asked if he considered that the OAS action, plus the Haitian note and the withdrawal of police from the Dominican Embassy, met the requirements of his 7 P.M. deadline. Frowning, Bosch said, "In the note, Duvalier assured that Haitian public order forces never had gone into the Dominican Embassy. And last night they were there on the street outside when he wrote the note, so his guarantee is not worth anything. He did not offer any satisfactions. Now he has broken relations with us. So our situation is worse. I do not comprehend how it is possible that the OAS with so many personnel has not enough to send a mission just in a moment. We are going to give Duvaher a fright. We are not going to kill Haitians. We are going to move troops inside our own territory." He was winning; as always, he intended to push his victory too hard. I tried to dissuade him, pointing out that he had won his original objectives withdrawal of Haitian police from Dominican property, guarantees to the asylees and Dominican diplomats. Bosch kept talking about moving troops. Finally when I again pointed out that the Haitian guard had been removed from the Embassy property, he said, "This is the first time I had known of that." (This seems doubtful) He paused, leaned back, sat rigid and silent a few minutes, then ordered his secretary, "Get the editor of La Nacion." I didn't know what he was going to do. When the editor came on, Bosch said, "I wish to dictate a headline. For this afternoon. The headline is: 'Dominican Victory, Duvalier Retreats.' Put it in the biggest type that you have." Then he called Freites and told him to reply to the OAS, assuring it that the Dominicans would await OAS action. I went back to the Residence, telephoned Ed Martin, then changed clothes and hurried to the Assembly Hall for the promulgation of the Constitution. It began at 4 P.M. President Bosch sat on the dais with the Vice President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House, and others. The Cabinet and military chiefs sat in the front rows. So did the diplomatic corps - but the Nuncio was pointedly absent, his vacant chair objecting to the Constitution. Behind us sat the Senators and Deputies. Outside, a heavy gun began booming 101 times, its sound re-verberating through the chamber, and below the dais clerks began reading the Constitution. Bosch looked grim, his face set. Television men scrambled around, cables strung out. The reading droned on and on. I noticed that the Deputies had only seats, not desks, as in a theater - the chamber had been built by Trulillo, when Congress' duty was to listen, not to work or think. Freites kept going in and out. So did the military high command. Bosch had deliberately whipped up a war atmosphere. He had told me that he was engaged in a great democratic experiment here in the Dominican Republic and that if he failed, it would be bad not only for the Republic but for the cause of democracy in Latin America. This was the leverage he had on us, and he knew it. The clerk was reading Article 168. He had eight more to go. I was getting fidgety. It was only fifty-five minutes to the 7 P.M. deadline. Bosch had said he would ignore it - but would he? Watching Bosch, I thought: He'd better not forget that Trujillo's end began when he tried to kill Betancourt. He'd better not go too far with Duvalier. Finally at six-fifteen the reading finished. Bosch stood, and nearly all stood; Bosch applauded, and nearly all applauded; and so did I, though several of the diplomatic corps remained seated and did not applaud. Speaker Molina Urena declared the promulgation done. A ceremonial signing of the Constitution began. Thelma Frias presented Speaker Molina Urefla with a big bouquet "on behalf of the Dominican women." Bosch, white-suited, grim and erect, strode out rapidly. I started to follow. It was 6:30 P.M. Another Ambassador said to me, "We should all not applaud, I think." And another, "Or else we should all applaud. We should be together." I said, "I'm sorry, I disagree, and I'd like to discussit with you, but I'll have to ask you to excuse me now," and hurried away through the crowd, found my car, and told the driver to getto the Chancellery fast. Driving, he said, "Every people must have a Constitution, Mr. Ambassador." As we turned off Avenida Jorge Washington by the sea, a loudspeaker was blaring the headline from La Nacion, "Dominican Victory, Duvalier Retreats." Back at the Chancellery, King reported that the OAS Commission would arrive the next morning at 7:50 A.M., stop for ten minutes, and continue on to Port-au-Prince. It did. The military appeared more relaxed. The capital was quiet. The trouble seemed to be flattening out. The New York Times said editorially that both sides must accept OAS mediation. The next day, Wednesday, was May Day, but nothing happened, perhaps because everyone was exhausted. * On Thursday, May 2, I sent a cable asking that the visit of Vice Admiral Rivero be canceled. I did so with great reluctance - we had intended this as an impressive public demonstration of our support for Juan Bosch. But we could not do it now, because of Haiti. The OAS Commission was returning from Port-au-Prince at six- fifteen. I wondered why it had stayed so briefly. Several ambassadors there had urged it to stay longer. The Times estimated that at least a hundred persons had been killed since last Friday's attack on Duvalier's children. Bosch held a press conference at 6 P.M. I got a report on it quickly. He said he would ask the OAS to impose diplomatic sanctions on Haiti. Asked if he had the votes, he didn't know and didn't seem to care. Asked what he would do if the OAS refused sanctions, he said, "We must do what we think is right." Off the record he added, "When you live with a person in the same bed who has tuberculosis, you have to do something about it. This is that situation." He seemed firm and determined. I went to see him alone at eight. His wife, Carmen, sat with us in the living room. Bosch said, "If one Dominican is hurt in the street in Port-au-Prince, I will send planes to bomb the Palace. If Haitian police or troops enter the Embassy, I will send the Navy and the ground forces and I will inform the OAS from the road." His wife said it was "nice" that the Venezuelans were going to send the Navy because "then we can send our ground forces," and she picked up an oil company map and began showing how Dominican ground troops could be pushed across the border at Elias Pina and Jimani, how the Venezuelan Navy could come up from the south, how Port-au-Prince could be encircled, surely as bizarre a military strategy conference as anyone ever attended. Often a rather wan person, she seemed happy that night, animated. She said, "It's nice to have these military things for a while - to give us time, you know." Bosch didn't like that - it implied, of course, that he was using the whole incident to cover political difficulties here at home. Bosch told me one thing more that night. He had ordered Minister Dominguez Guerra to forbid political meetings in town halls such as those Manolo Tavarez Justo had been holding. Bosch thought the measure unconstitutional but necessary. I agreed. * Later that evening, and next morning, Vallimarescu reported that the American press was saying that the OAS Commission's audience with Duvalier had been a "farce" and its report would whitewash him. Obviously Duvalier or Foreign Minister Chalmers had put his house in order. The Commission had spent only fifty-six hours in Haiti. It would spend sixty-seven hours in the Dominican Republic. Reporters felt that the Commission was uninterested in the Trujillos or the plot against Bosch, but did seem concerned about the right of asylum and the violation of Dominican sovereignty. All this was disturbing. If the OAS did in fact give Duvalier a cleanbill of health, Bosch would look foolish in world opinion and therefore would be in deep trouble here at home - and he would blame us for having pushed him into the OAS. That day, Friday, May 3, Duvalier declared martial law in Haiti and a nighttime curfew. Bosch told the press this brought "new tensions" He met with the OAS Commission. A Latin American diplomat in Port-au-Prince said that Latin American embassies there could not guarantee protection of asylees and proposed that the OAS assume the task, sending if necessary a small U.S. or multinational force to do the job. In Santo Domingo I detected a letdown. The military no longer seemed bellicose. The people were quiet. A joke went round: "After we invade Haiti, we can send our technicians to help them build democracy." Jokes are fatal to crises. If Bosch, fearing an OAS rebuff, intended to try to heat up the situation again by himself, he might run into trouble. * Saturday morning I went to the Palace to see President Bosch and askhow the situation was. "Bad," he said. "Very bad." He had made his charges against Haiti to the OAS Commission and said that "if something happens" in Haiti he would order his troops to cross the border to protect Dominicans in Haiti and defend hemispheric democracy. The Commission had not replied - "they did not answer me one word." He took their silence for assent. He spoke again about joint military action with the Venezuelan Navy and U.S. Marines. "This could be a Congo," he said. A dozen Haitian refugees had crossed the border today. Then, musing, he said, "Early in January I received news in Europe, and in February here, that the Haitian common people looked to me and to democracy for help. At this point Foreign Minister Freites arrived, and so, as I remember, did General Vinas and Commodore Rib, and we all studied a map of Haiti, the oil company map, discussing the question of violation of national territory at sea, and I explained that, as I understood it, most countries recognized the three-mile limit, but Haiti insisted on a six-mile limit, another strange high strategy conference. I left. In Washington, Facio said the OAS was "very alarmed" by the situation in Haiti. Back at the Chancellery, Commander Engelman, our Naval MAAG Chief, reported Commodore Rib was considering trying to put a ship at the very edge of the six-mile limit off Port-au-Prince. Colonel Richardson, our air attache, reported that the Dominican Air Force was getting a C-46 ready, presumably to transport paratroops. I went back to the Palace. Bosch said he was going to send the counter-insurgency troops to Jimani - three companies plus some armor. He was sending troops to Elias Pina. He was sending five planes to Barahona. He would have a ship ready to sail tomorrow. He had ordered Freites to get the Dominican diplomats, Bobadilla and Mejia, out of Haiti tonight. Troop movements would start at dawn. This sounded - and Bosch looked - serious. I sent all our military people out to get a firm fix on just what troops and equipment were being moved. And I met with King and Shlaudeman, whom I had sent to talk to Freites, the OAS Commission members, and the Colombian Ambassador here. They reported that Bosch had declared he would not order his diplomats, Bobadilla and Mejia Saufront, home until he had received safe conducts for all the asylees. There upon the Colombians had told Freites that they would not, as planned, protect Dominican interest in Port-au-Prince. So Bosch had ordered his diplomats home. But Freites now feared Duvalier would double-cross them or the asylees - give them safe-conducts, then have them killed en route to the airport, an old Trujillo trick. The OAS Commission seemed personally sympathetic to Bosch, or at least unsympathetic to Duvalier, but did not seem to see any legal basis for recommending action against Duvalier. So Freites was urging us to unleash Bosch with token support of forces from the United States and Venezuela. The Attaches began returning to the Residence with detailed reports on plans for troop movements. The commanders were encountering difficulties - Air Force ground troops would move to Jimani this afternoon if they could locate enough trucks, Wessin y Wessin would send tanks there if he could find ships or flatbed trailers, some military headquarters "seemed more like a big bull session" than a strategy meeting, and the tank commanders were worried about the road from Jimani to Port-au-Prince, for beyond Jimani the road goes through a narrow defile between a mountain and a lake, and Haitians might stop the tanks simply by rolling rocks down from the hills. Was it all just talk? Alone, I drove down to Avenida Jorge Washington to see for myself. The sun was setting, the sky magenta, with towering black thunderclouds over the western mountains. Presently I saw eleven trucks and a dozen Jeeps and ambulances and other small vehicles, all bullet loaded with troops, headed west. People on the sidewalks paid little at- tention. Vesuvio's was getting crowded. Back at the Residence, Freites called. The diplomats Bobadilla and Mejia had arrived safely. The Attaches confirmed actual tank and troop movements that earlier had been mere talk. The Army was sending its best. So was the Air Force infantry. So was the artillery. So was Wessin y Wessin. I asked our Colonel Long if the equipment and men the Dominicans had moved were those he would move if he seriously intended to invade Haiti and kill Duvalier. He said yes. The capital was strippedas bare as was safe-perhaps too bare. The New York Times reported from Washington that although the Boxer's task force contained about two thousand Marines, the Kennedy administration was "extremely reluctant" to land them in Haiti. No wonder. It is always easy to get them in but hard to get them out. Newspapermen kept asking us whether Bosch really intended to invade or was "playing a game." We said truthfully we didn't know. Our private opinion was that Bosch himself had not yet decided. He was precisely what he had done during the Church crisis in the electoral campaign getting himself into a position from which he could jump whichever way he thought best for him at the time of decision. The difficulty, however, was that this tactic is easier in a purely domestic situation than in an international one, because while the UCN would tryto help him get back into the election, Duvalier wouldn't help him do anything. * continued in Part 3... ================================================================= NY Transfer News Collective * A Service of Blythe Systems Since 1985 - Information for the Rest of Us 339 Lafayette St., New York, NY 10012 http://www.blythe.org e-mail: nyt@blythe.org ================================================================= nytcari-09.20.97-14:17:05-6732