Heartbeat of Mexico 10/17/97 Via NY Transfer News Collective * All the News that Doesn't Fit source: frontcomunes@laneta.apc.org Oct 17, 1997 MEXPAZ ANALYSIS #144 "Heartbeat of Mexico" October 17, 1997 PART I: LOCAL ELECTIONS IN TABASCO, VERACRUZ (Fronteras Comunes) PART II: THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, MASS MEDIA AND DRUG DEALING (CAM) LOCAL ELECTIONS IN TABASCO, VERACRUZ - Opposition Parties Denounce Vote Buying - History of Violence, Political Bossism Casts Shadow - First Test of Electoral Democracy After July 6 Tomorrow, Sunday, October 19, citizens of Veracruz and Tabasco go to the polls to elect state legislators and mayors, in the first test of Mexican electoral democracy after the July 6 "democratic fiesta". But far from the nervous excitement that preceded July's elections, the atmosphere in the two southern states is tense and belligerent, clouded by opposition allegations of vote buying, diversion of public funds and harrassment of challenging candidates. At stake are 210 municipalities in Veracruz, and 17 in Tabasco. In addition, all 31 seats in the Tabasco state legislature are up for grabs. The following are some pertinent statistics on tomorrow's elections: TABASCO, VERACRUZ IN NUMBERS Tabasco: Municipalities: 17 (four governed by PRD) State Legislative Seats: 31 - Districts: 18 - Proportional Representation: 13 Registered Voters: 977,573 Parties' Performance in 1994 and 1997 Federal Elections: - PRI: 1994: 351,000; 1997: 282,000 (51.37%) - PRD: 1994: 205,000; 1997: 222,000 (40.61%) - PAN: 1994: 47,000; 1997: 25,700 (4.85%) (figures are approximate) Federal Legislative Districts: 6 - PRI: 6 - PRD: 0 - PAN: 0 Polling Sites: 1,931 Party Representatives at Polls - PRI: 5,621 - PRD: 5,076 - PAN: 2,209 - PT: 1,798 - Others: 975 Electoral Observers: 871 (representing Civic Alliance, Sociologists of Tabasco, Association of Professionals, Movement for Democracy, Network of Promotion and Defense of Human Rights) Veracruz: Municipalities: 210 Registered Voters: 3,916,110 Parties' Performance in 1997 Federal Elections: - PRI: 928,000 (43.62%) - PRD: 563,000 (27.03%) - PAN: 460,000 (21.62%) Federal Legislative Districts: 23 - PRI: 20 - PRD: 2 - PAN: 1 Polling Sites: 7,630 Party Representatives at Polls: - PRD: 24,820 (three at each polling site) - PAN: 13,000 (90% coverage of polling sites) Electoral Observers: unknown number (organized by Civic Alliance, Citizen Movement for Democracy, Democratic Convergence and other groups, under the umbrella of the Civil Mission for Electoral Transparency in Veracruz). (Information taken from La Jornada, October 17; Reforma, October 18; IFE Web Page: http://www.ife.org.mx) ELECTIONS SHAPING UP AS PRI-PRD BATTLE The Party of the Democratic Revolution's (PRD) historical presence in the poorer, southern states and its electoral upturns in Tabasco and Veracruz last July 6 make it the leading contender to unseat PRI political hegemony in both states, although the PAN also registered notable improvement in Veracruz, vaticinating that it will win 19 municipalities, including the port of Veracruz. Opposition estimates predict that the PRI will lose over 50% of Veracruz municipalities, including the capital (Jalapa) and other important cities. In Tabasco, while the PRI publicly assures that it will win 15 of the 17 mayorships to be contested, internal polls revealed that the party is on "red alert" in 12 municipalities. The PRD predicts that it will win both the state congress and the majority of cities and towns. DENUNCIATIONS OF IRREGULARITIES, "PREVENTIVE FRAUD" Perhaps the biggest obstacle opposition parties face is the reluctance of old authoritarian, pre-electoral practices at the local level to give way to the new democratic spirit that prevails in the federal ambit. A report released by a Special Commission of the federal congress found evidence that public monies had been diverted to PRI campaigns in 80 of 210 Veracruz municipalities, mostly in indigenous regions with long histories of political bossism. In the southern foothills region, in San Andres Tuxtla, a PRD federal deputy decried the existence of warehouses full of food staples and construction materials distributed to the populace by local government agencies in an attempt to sway voters to the PRI. The same party filed a formal complaint concerning the discovery of voting lists with photographs and 700 un-numbered ballots in the State Pension Institute. Meanwhile, non-governmental organizations (NGO's) such as Civic Alliance denounced the State Electoral Commission's efforts to halt systematic vote buying as "lukewarm", further documenting cases in which the official party had distributed food baskets, grants, sheet metal and rural assistance checks to potential voters, conditioning continued support on votes for the PRI. Finally, the PAN's national president, Felipe Calderon Hinojosa, reported physical aggression against his party's mayoral candidates in the state. Similar complaints abounded with respect to Tabasco: copious public resources (money, government vehicles) used in PRI campaigns, purchase of votes with foodstuffs, impartiality in the media, etc. Governor Roberto Madrazo's discretional handling of federal funds and public works projects has tied down many voters to the PRI. A Special Commission report cited one peasant: "All benefits filter down to the community through [the federal budget]; these are works that the governor gives us and that's why we continue to be PRI members ... I'm here to defend Roberto Madrazo Pintado..." There were also reports that the printers hired to produce electoral ballots may have printed double the number of ballots required, in addition to numbering errors in the ballots. The Tabasco Electoral Institute (IET) was accused of partiality by opposition parties. IET president Leonardo Sala is known to be close to governor Roberto Madrazo, and was elected head of the State Human Rights Commission at Madrazo's proposal. Six of the nine electoral counsellors have held diverse posts in the Madrazo administration (Worker Housing Institute, Institute of Culture, State Human Rights Commission, Attorney General's Office). The IET has refused to investigate allegations into misappropriation of funds during Madrazo's 1994 gubernatorial campaign, and waited until scarcely two weeks before elections to "recommend" that the state government desist from publicizing government programs and public works in TV and radio spots--which weren't suspended until Friday, October 17. One commercial still aired depicts the governor's wife dispensing aid packages to those left homeless after huracane "Paulina" ravaged the shores of Oaxaca and Guerrero. ANALYSIS Will the jubilant July 6 triumph translate into clean, transparent and peaceful elections in Tabasco and Veracruz? Several important conditions for July 6's success are absent from the context of tomorrow's elections. First, whereas the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) enjoyed the confidence of all parties --which elected IFE members by unanimous consensus-- and did a splendid job in organizing elections and publishing results, the state election boards in Tabasco and Veracruz have earned the mistrust of opposition parties. In Veracruz, the electoral institute has been reluctant to investigate irregularities, whereas Tabasco election officials are known to have ties with the Madrazo administration. Second, the ambience prior to the July 6 elections was, in general, harmonious and hopeful. In contrast, the pre-electoral atmosphere in the two southern states is plagued by allegations of irregularities and preceded by a recent history of violent inter-party conflict. The last several years in Tabasco have seen fraudulent gubernatorial elections in 1994, where Madrazo was alleged to have spent 238 million pesos (far in excess of legal limits), subsequent skirmishes between PRI and PRD members that left 40 injured, blockages of roads leading to oil refineries undertaken by PRD members and Chontal Indians in 1985, and a hunger strike in Mexico City by Tabasco janitors loosely affiliated to the PRD. In Veracruz, dozens --and possibly hundreds-- of members of opposition parties and civil organizations have been assassinated in the last decade. A third element which could impede smooth elections in Tabasco and Veracruz is the predominance of local political bosses ("caciques"), governors and municipal authorities who wield absolute control over local economic, political and police structures to guaranty official party permanence in the region. Both Madrazo and Veracruz Governor Patricio Chirinos are widely considered to belong to the "syndicate of Salinas governors" (others include Mario Villanueva of Quintana Roo, Manuel Bartlett of Puebla, and ex-Governor Ruben Figueroa of Guerrero), PRI dinosaurs whose political fortunes were linked to Salinas and who constitute an impediment to democratization in Mexico. The "caciques" operate with relative automony from the center, tolerated by the federal government because of the blocks of votes they deliver to the official party. The strength of regional political bossism makes it difficult for federal legislation and institutes --as well as the "spirit" of July 6-- to have spinoff effects on state elections. However, one positive element that gives grounds for hope is the increased presence of both party representatives and electoral observers at polling sites. Party members will cover the vast majority of polls in both states. An important factor in the success of the July 6 elections was rigorous citizen vigilance over electoral processes, which significantly reduced the chance of fraudulent practices related to voting (if not pre-electoral irregularities). Whether or not citizen involvement can counter-act well entrenched official corruption and a history of electoral conflicts, however, remains to be seen. David Crow Javier Medina Fronteras Comunes e-mail: frontcomunes@laneta.apc.org ______________________________ THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, MASS MEDIA AND DRUG DEALING In the last months, the subject of the catholic church has given place to several scandals in the media, particularly in the press. This summer, the priest Marcial Maciel Degollado, founder of the religious order Legionaries of Christ, was accused of sexual abuse; shortly after that, the chastity of Girolamo Prigione, previous apostolic nuncio, was questioned. In this context, the Church's opposition to the promotion of condoms must be mentioned, particularly the proposal of Norberto Rivera, Archbishop Primate of Mexico, who suggested that condom packages should read: "This product can be harmful to your health." On the other hand, the mexican Bishopric's strategy for members of the clergy to occupy popular election positions was mentioned*, and recently the Church has been investigated for links with important drug dealers. Unfortunately, some of these scandals have come up because of erroneous interpretations of clergy members' words. The number of errors made by reporters in one month is surprising. There are two possible interpretations of this behavior: either there is a campaign to run down the Church, or those who cover this source of information don't have the necessary knowledge to reflect the Church hierarchy's position in public opinion. This problem of the media combines with the Church's inexistent communication strategy, and in this context appears the last scandal: the links of drug dealers with the Church. The priest Rau'l Soto Va'zquez, professor at the Pontificial University of Mexico, canon at the Basilica of Guadalupe and judge at the Mexican Interdiocesan Ecclesiastical Tribunal, said in a homily about solidarity, in remembrance of the 1985 earthquake: "...not very commendable people like Caro Quintero (...) we would like to be able to give charity as he does and the help he gives to people (...) people like Amado Carrillo who sometimes gave money for huge good works, and the people don't care they were drug dealers and all the other things they said he had..." (cited in Punto, 29/09/97) There were two different ways of treating this subject with journalists. On the one hand there was the Archbishop of Mexico, who first tried to escape from journalists and, in the face of their insistence, even became aggressive. On the other hand there was Rau'l Soto who, far from retracting, informed on the amounts of donations and has not doubted on speaking of the drug dealers' good side. "After the 1985 earth quakes Caro Quintero donated to the Church 300 thousand pesos, 'of the old pesos (...) and there are others whose names we won't mention because it is inconvenient, but who also do good works, and that doesn't mean that all they do is bad'." (Punto, 29/09/97) The press has reacted pungently: on front pages it has underlined demands for a clear account on charity, and there also have been comments on priests accompanying drug dealers, as if they gave their blessing to commercializing drugs: "Little more than a month ago, several newspapers published a photograph of Amado carrillo carrying a cross in the streets of Jerusalem accompanied by a priest; another priest directed a religious service before the body of Carrillo... outside the building destined to religious services..."* (Punto, 29/09/97) All these facts provoke the following reflections: 1. On the one hand, it is very healthy that urgent problems such as sexual abuse of children by religious authorities be made public. In these cases, freedom of press can be a determining factor to stop this drama. In this sense, the attempt to control information, characteristic for the Church, doesn't help to modify such behavior. One can't hide such things, and attempting to do so doesn't avoid the institution's loss of prestige. In this sense, the open handling of the subject of drug dealers' charities by a priest is exceptional. This attitude facilitates its discussion, which, besides contributing to democracy, opens the possibilities of searching for a solution that may convince society. 2. However, freedom of press also demands attachment to the truth, and converting the largest religious institution of the country in a factor of permanent scandal is of benefit only to those who search its weakening, its internal division and/or the sale of newspapers. 3. The catholic clergy must attend to those who are considered the worst of society, but with a purpose of transformation. Charities issued from actions that are an attempt on human dignity are not justifiable, even less so within the religious scope. As the saying goes, "the goal does not justify the means". All of these communication problems represent a great challenge for the catholic church since, within its main demands to the government there is a legal modification that would permit the Church to have access to and even own mass media. Even though this is a struggle with instances outside the Church, it must also learn, within the institution itself, to make use of them. On the other hand, journalists must make the effort to know the institution better and handle information with more attachment to the truth. Social Sciences Team Centro Antonio de Montesinos (CAM) 15.10.1997 * This is against mexican law. ================================================================= NY Transfer News Collective * A Service of Blythe Systems Since 1985 - Information for the Rest of Us 339 Lafayette St., New York, NY 10012 http://www.blythe.org e-mail: nyt@blythe.org ================================================================= nytcamer-10.21.97-00:16:04-23547