La Opinion #79 11/5/97 Via NY Transfer News Collective * All the News that Doesn't Fit source ist@mixcoac.uia.mx Tue Nov 11 14:36:01 1997 LA OPINION Bulletin No. 79 Published by CIACH Centro de Informacion y Analisis de Chiapas 5 November 1997 THE COVERT WAR WAGED BY GUNMEN, WHITE GUARDS AND P ARAMILITARY FORCES Introduction The campesinos and indigenous people of Chiapas who have fought=20 to recover a piece of land have most suffered the repression=20 of illegal police forces which, depending on the origin and=20 their procedures, can be distinguished as gunmen, white guards=20 or paramilitary forces. Traditionally, large landowners and=20 cattle ranchers have used these types of illegal forces. We often tend to use the terms indistinctly, but they do have a=20 difference, at least here in Chiapas, and we therefore offer our=20 readers a brief definition of each. Gunmen: When a cattle rancher or large landowner needs a personal or home security force, he will generally hire two, three or more=20 men, adept in the use of small weapons. Traditionally they=20 follow their employer everywhere.=20 When they are at the ranch, they are easily spotted hanging around=20 the home, or on horseback checking out the property; they wear hats,=20 blue jeans, dark glasses, long jackets or vests to hide a pistol. =20 When they enter a city, they often use private vehicles with=20 tinted glass, keeping an eye on their boss from a prudent distance=20 and with a low profile, individually or in groups of two. They=20 are often called "hounds", in reference to their good hunting=20 abilities. Their job is to "hunt" those who would harm their boss or his properties. Some cattle ranchers and large landowners hire them to protect their families as well. White Guards: The name white guards is taken from the ex-USSR. =20 After the October 1917 Revolution, the Soviet government handed=20 out land to those needing it, but it encountered resistance from=20 property owners=92 private police, sometimes called white guards. =20 The Soviets chose to fight them with red guards. The white guards in Chiapas came into existence during the=20 governorship of Samuel Leon Brindis (1958-1964), through a 1961 decree that permitted cattle ranchers to carry arms and hire=20 "private police", thus virtually legalizing the white guards. In parts of Chiapas where no authorities existed, cattle ranchers and landowners made their own laws, using the white=20 guards to enforce their will. These landed interests often rotated public posts among themselves, allowing them to decree=20 "certificates of agrarian inaffectability" (i.e., the government is barred from expropriating their holdings). They were thus able to set aside for themselves some 224,619 hectares of land during 1934-1988. =20 During the period of Governor Patrocinio Gonzalez in the early=20 90s, the policy changed and there was a movement to do away with=20 these types of "traditional landholders", because they were an=20 obstacle to the implementation of the North American Free Trade=20 Agreement. These had to be weakened and another group, the=20 "modern cattle ranchers" strengthened.=20 These modern ranchers operate on Chiapas=92 Pacific coast, use no=20 gunmen or white guards. But while the latter are now preferred,=20 given an overall push towards modern practices, the former remain=20 in existence, and so too their henchmen. When groups of gunmen from various landholders come together at=20 a municipal (county) or regional level, they organize to train in=20 the use of heavy-caliber weapons. Should their forces be=20 insufficient, campesinos from the PRI (Party of the Institutional=20 Revolution) or the CNC (PRI-linked campesino organization) will be=20 hired to defend landholdings from possible takeovers, to intimidate,=20 attack and murder campesinos who are struggling for land. On occasion,=20 they have been used to annihilate certain groups disputing=20 landholders=92 interests or who were competing in illegal businesses. On many occasions it is the white guards who, in coordination=20 with the Public Security Police, expel campesinos from land that=20 has been reclaimed.=20 Governmental authorities turn a blind eye to their activities=20 because they are useful in certain moments. One such moment came=20 in Chicomuselo municipality on 10 January 1995, when white guards,=20 identified with a yellow ribbon tied to their left arm, joined with=20 forces of the Public Security Police to battle campesinos of the=20 OCEZ-CNPA who had taken the municipal president=92s office. The tally:=20 7 campesinos dead, various wounded, among them the parish priest=20 who was in the belfry when hit by two bullets.=20 Paramilitary: These are groups of campesinos and Indians, organized=20 in a police-military structure who act in a more coordinated fashion,=20 whether within community groups or mass organizations. They don=92t=20 depend so much on large landowners and cattle ranchers as they do=20 on the federal army, Public Security Police, on the government and=20 on governmental institutions that finance them by means of=20 development projects and other handouts. They respond more to=20 political interests, and not so much on a need to defend landholdings. =20 These groups are said to be a part of the PRI and are generally linked=20 to a deputy (i.e., congressional representative) of that party.=20 PARAMILITARIZATION At the start of the governorship of Eduardo Robledo in 1994 and=20 before the rise of the paramilitary groups per se, the Secretary=20 General of the (state) Government, Eraclio Zepeda, and=20 Undersecretary Uriel Jarquin chose to support and strengthen the=20 UNAL (Lombardist National Unity). An attempt to penetrate NGOs was=20 made through the creation of ARELIDH, with the improbable=20 name of Revolutionary Association for the Liberation of Human=20 Rights, and through AEDPCH (Democratic State Assembly of the=20 Chiapaneco People), from where alliances were struck with the=20 CRIACH (Council of Indigenous Representatives of the Altos of=20 Chiapas). The principal means of co-optation were the encouragement=20 of land takeovers in the countryside, the granting of taxi licenses=20 in the city to foment strife between organizations, death threats=20 to leaders, etc. Later, after the UNAL was strengthened, Robledo and Zepeda=20 founded, in alliance with CRIACH, an organization known as APAZ=20 (Zapatista Alliance Political Grouping), notorious for two aspects:=20 its presence among some indigenous groups and its Zapatista rhetoric.=20 This organization made a major effort to divide, co-opt, encourage confrontation, murder leaders, etc., of the independent (i.e.,=20 non-governmental) popular movement, with activities similar to=20 paramilitary groups. With its seemingly pro-Zapatista discourse, the group created public confusion, slandered the true Zapatista=20 movement, and cast dispersion on the reputation of Bishop Samuel Ruiz. =20 They also created ill will towards the Dioceses of San Cristobal=20 among the "True Coletos". (Coletos is a nickname for residents of=20 San Cristobal. True Coletos is an expression which certain,=20 rather conservative, generations-old residents of San Cristobal=20 gave to themselves, to set them off from newcomers and other=20 interlopers, who, according to the Coletos, bring with them=20 unacceptable values, customs and a political ideas). These divisive activities were not as successful as their=20 founders might have hoped When this organization failed to achieve=20 it ends, another actor was brought on stage in Chiapas: the=20 paramilitary groups.=20 There had been no paramilitary movement for the past 15 years=20 in Chiapas. It was not until after the government=92s military=20 offensive of February 1995 against the EZLN that paramilitary=20 activities became known. Not surprisingly, paramilitary groups=20 have come into existence where there is a significant independent=20 or Zapatista organization. The first group to surface was the=20 "Chinchulines" in the municipality of Bachajon. Later on 5 May=20 1996, the rank-and-file support for the groups in conflict in=20 Bachajon settled their dispute, but this did not mean an end to=20 the Chinchulines.=20 After the EZLN=92s National Consultation on Democracy in 1995,=20 a paramilitary group known as "Paz y Justicia" appeared in the=20 municipalities of Tila, Sabanilla, Tumbala, and Salto de Agua,=20 openly led by local PRI deputy Samuel Sanchez, member of SOCAMA=20 (Campesino Teacher Solidarity). The outcome of the Consultation=20 in these municipalities was heavily in favor of the EZLN, and=20 the government, faced with the difficulty of openly confronting=20 the Zapatista movement with the armed forces, chose to do so with=20 Paz y Justicia and other paramilitary groups. In the area of Venustiano Carranza, where organizations such=20 as OCEZ-Casa del Pueblo, Union de Organizaciones, Ejidos y=20 Comunidades and the Comit=E9 de Campesinos, among others, have=20 strength, another paramilitary group was formed. This one is=20 called "Alianza San Bartolome de los Llanos", made up of expelled=20 members of the Casa del Pueblo. When this group was founded,=20 PRI federal deputy Eucario Orantes was present, leading members=20 of the Casa del Pueblo to accuse him of being its principal=20 promoter. In San Cristobal, the "True Coletos", known for their belligerency=20 against the Diocese and who attacked the diocesan curia on 19=20 February 1995, was founded in the presence of local PRI deputy=20 Jorge Lescieur, leading two urban-rights groups, BACOSAN and=20 CIUSPAZ, to accuse him of being behind the illicit activities=20 of this conservative group. Many of these right wing organizations have failed to=20 accomplish their objectives, given the resistance and internal=20 strength of the popular groups they have wished to destroy. In=20 indigenous areas the paramilitary groups have grown thanks to the=20 bilingual teachers, members of SOCAMA. There are, however, teachers=20 who now oppose the use of SOCAMA to cover up paramilitary activities=20 in the Northern and Altos Areas, and in response have formed FRECOMA (Teachers=92 Convergence Front). =20 There is evidence that the PRI groups are arming and training in=20 an operations center in the municipality of Chenalho. "In the town=20 of Los Chorros there is a group of 56 PRI members that stand guard=20 nightly to impede the return of 56 displaced families, who support=20 the EZLN. In order to be able to return, PRI members are=20 demanding between 5,000-10,000 pesos (US$588-1,1763), and forcing=20 returning families to join the PRI. To stand guard, members are=20 getting paid 750 pesos (US$88) every two weeks (cf.: Angelica Inda y=20 Andres Aubry, Paramilitares, La Jornada del Campo, page. 12, 29=20 October 1997). The obvious question is where the money comes from=20 and who is paying them? Might the funds be part of grants=20 disbursed when President Zedillo visits Chiapas? =20 Since its founding, the paramilitary group Paz y Justicia has=20 grown in strength and changed its name to Desarrollo (Development),=20 Paz y Justicia, obtaining its legal recognition as a "civil=20 association". This legal move allows it to receive government funds=20 for development. =20 Sources state that the Chinchulines are once again active,=20 coordinating with "...the Alianza San Bartolome, to whom military=20 training is being given in the town of Joibe in the municipality=20 of Chilon..." (cf.: Ibid.). The Chinchulines group has been seen=20 in the company of a captain of the army and a PRI deputy in the town=20 of Laja Tendida, municipality of Venustiano Carranza, purportedly=20 to recruit members, strengthen paramilitary forces and to being=20 training in the area. (cf.: Denouncement made by members of the Casa del Pueblo in Altamirano municipality). In the municipality of Oxchuc, the new paramilitary group known=20 as MIRA (Antizapatista Indigenous Revolutionary Movement), supposedly=20 linked to PRI federal deputy Norberto Santiz, hopes to make the=20 area its principal center of operations, a strategic point given its=20 access to the Selva region, the main base of operations of the EZLN. =20 Members of the PRD (Party of the Democratic Revolution) in Oxchuc=20 have denounced that the MIRA undertakes operations in the towns of=20 San Rosa, San Fernando and 20 de Noviembre (La Jornada, 23=20 October 1997).=20 On 10 September, the PRD=92s ex-candidate for federal deputy=20 in Ocosingo, Nicolas Lopez was ambushed on the Altamirano-Ocosingo=20 road. His vehicle was hit four times by bullets. The same day,=20 the commander of the municipal police of Ocosingo was victim of=20 a similar attack, not far from the military roadblock at Cuxulja. =20 There has been speculation that these attacks were linked to=20 the MIRA.=20 Paramilitary groups are also organizing in the municipalities=20 of Simojovel and Huitiupan and have already caused casualties. =20 On 22 September 1997 in the town of Mercedes Isidoro, assailants=20 who were in a red pickup wounded a member of the EZLN with arms=20 fire, but when he didn=92t die, they ran the truck over him. =20 Another incident occurred in the town of Chitamukum, Simojovel=20 municipality on 3 October 1997 in which three members of the EZLN=20 were murdered by PRI members. Another member of the EZLN was shot=20 to death in the town of Emiliano Zapata, municipality of Huitiupan=20 last August by a group of unknown assailants. (La Jornada, 23=20 October 1997).=20 CARACTERISTICS OF THE PARAMILITARIZATION IN CHIAPAS OBJECTIVES: Cover over the army=92s "dirty war" of counterinsurgency;=20 its dirty war against the civilian population; repression=20 against social and independent organizations; create instability=20 within the jurisdiction of the Diocese of San Cristobal; evade=20 denouncements of human rights violations and thus not sully the=20 honor of the army; impede easy detection of the strategists behind=20 the war; allow impunity to reign; blame the Diocese, priests and=20 Bishop Samuel Ruiz of the violence. COMMAND: a) Civilian: Local and federal deputies of the PRI; =20 b) Military: commanders from the federal army and the Public=20 Security Police. In rural areas: ex-military personnel,=20 ex-members of Public Security and PRI members.=20 MILITIA: PRI campesinos who control crossroads and create terror=20 among the population. INCENTIVES: Privileges for PRI municipal presidents;=20 strengthening of regional power of caciques (local strongmen);=20 political advantages for the PRI; monetary rewards, goods,=20 arms, salaries, etc. FINANCING: a) Governmental: channeled through mayors=92 offices=20 and regional development programs to strengthen certain local=20 political cliques; b) Independent fund raising: by charging=20 displaced people for the right to return to their homes; for the=20 right to pass roadblocks, for having joined a particular group=20 under coercion, etc. ALLIES: Some Protestant sects, cattle ranchers, merchants,=20 owners of transport vehicles, teachers from SOCAMA, right-wing=20 Catholic groups such as Amatulis, some journalists, some=20 municipal mayors, development institutions funded by the federal=20 or state governments. RECRUITMENT AND TRAINING: PRI members, the federal army, Public=20 Security Police.=20 ADDENDUM: In the event of a natural disaster, so-called=20 emergency programs are carried out by the army; army incursions=20 with the pretext of fighting drug traffickers; implementation of=20 certain development programs, above all those having to do with=20 reforestation; advantage is taken of intracommunity squabbles;=20 social services are carried out by cadets from the Military=20 College; limited "good-will" support given for the return of=20 the displaced; control of roads, schools, health centers, plus=20 having the services of some newspapers and journalists. RESULTS: Unraveling of the social fabric within communities;=20 increase in human rights violations; tension in communities;=20 increase in violence; spreading of paramilitary activity from=20 the Northern Area to the Altos; defamation in newspapers and=20 physical abuse against catechists, priests, Bishops of San=20 Cristobal, nuns, etc; greater investment for development=20 programs; greater division among organizations and communities;=20 decreased observation by independent sources of the Northern Area;=20 decreased possibilities of placing members of the armed forces=20 on trial. RECENT CHRONOLOGY=20 Chenalho: Displaced people from Los Chorros, presently in San=20 Cristobal, denounced that on 17-18 October 1997 Public Security=20 Police accompanied PRI members from Los Chorros to the hamlets of=20 Yibelho and Acteal, where they set ablaze homes of PRD members. In=20 a separate incident, Public Security Police were reported to have=20 entered and sealed off the town of Tzanembolom.=20 According to the local press, starting 19 October 1997, task forces from the CISEN (Center for National Security Investigations)=20 from the Attorney General=92s Office and from the SEDENA (Secretary=20 of Defense) have been entering communities where confrontations=20 between indigenous groups have been reported, in order to analyze=20 the political and social situation in Chiapas. It is thought that=20 they are in several communities in Chenalho. =20 A teacher was murdered recently in Chenalho for having quit a=20 group of 14 indigenous persons who were recruited, armed and=20 trained as a paramilitary group. Simojovel: Nuns from the Diocese of San Cristobal denounced that=20 on 12 October in the town of Galeano, Lucas Sanchez, who held a=20 religious post within the Catholic Church, was murdered. On 15=20 October in the town of La Paz, catechist Mariano Gomez was=20 murdered, apparently by PRI members. PRI members are also said=20 to have suffered casualties.=20 Oxchuc: Paramilitary groups linked to the MIRA are said to be=20 operating in some communities that border on the Huixtan and=20 Oxchuc municipalities. PRI members in these communities are said=20 to have closed the Catholic church; the few members of the PRD=20 have been constantly under attack.=20 =09 Nuns from the parish at Oxchuc denounced that on 12 October during=20 a demonstration held by PRD members and civil society, Public=20 Security Police went into the church=92s belfry to watch what was=20 going on. Altamirano: State government funds are financing the construction=20 of an unpaved road from La Laguna to the town of La Realidad, in=20 the rebellious municipality of San Pedro de Michoacan, where the=20 General Command of the EZLN is supposedly located. Salto de Agua: The army has set up a new military camp between=20 the municipal capital and the town of Pantianeja. Tila: This past week, a caravan led by San Cristobal bishops Samuel=20 Ruiz and Raul Vera was fired upon as it traveled through=20 Chenalho municipality on a pastoral mission. The prelates were=20 unharmed but three members of the caravan were injured. Hours later,=20 Ruiz=92s sister was attacked in San Cristobal and required=20 hospitalization. Bishop Ruiz declared that the two incidents were=20 not unrelated. By CIACH Note: We sincerely appreciate our readers=92 suggestions regarding=20 this Bulletin. If you would like to have a map of Chiapas with its=20 municipal and electoral districts, please e-mail a request to CIACH and=20 we will send it to you as "attached mail" in Word for Windows. INFORMATION: CIACH is a non-governmental organization, created in=20 1985 with the goal of being an alternative source of training,=20 analysis and investigation for social, campesino and indigenous=20 organizations, NGOs, students and researchers. CIACH also has a=20 newspaper data bank that dates from 1985 to the present, classified=20 by topics pertinent to Chiapas. The Center also undertakes=20 research and analysis regarding current topics in the state, it=20 edits publications and carries out workshops on analysis and on mental health with social organizations. ******************************************************************* Dear Friends: Putting out this Bulletin on a weekly basis generates=20 costs for CIACH. Help us ensure it will continue to reach you by=20 sending your donation to CIACH, checking account no. 1000790-7, branch =20 437 of BANCOMER in San Cristobal, Chiapas, Mexico. If you make a=20 deposit, please let us know the date and the amount. Thank you=20 very much! ********************************************************************* NOTICE ON REPODUCING THIS BULLETIN This La Opinion Bulletin may be reproduced by other means such=20 as in Internet web pages or in printed matter, as long as the=20 source and our e-mail address are cited. Centro de Informacio'n y Ana'lisis de Chiapas, A.C. (CIACH) Flavio A. 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