NOCS, OPS, CLONES AND IDEAS /McGehee id WAA31129; Sun, 12 Oct 1997 22:36:07 -0400 Via NY Transfer News Collective * All the News that Doesn't Fit source rmcgehee@igc.org Fri Oct 10 09:05:46 1997 NOCS, CLONES, OPS AND IDEAS Below is a general request for comments re the use of Non-Official Cover Agents by the CIA and my response. Included is some information from CIABASE on history of the NOC program. Ralph McGehee CIABASE ------------------------------------------------------------------- Reques: NOC NOC? While even most critics acknowledge the need for a HUMINT capability (as distinct from covert operations), the question remains as to how such assets should be put in the field. Some analysts are critical of the use of Foreign Service/State Department cover for Case Officers overseas, as it can lead to a duplication of effort, hardly palatable when seeking to maximize resources. Horror stories have been reported wherein both FSOs and COs, often with the same contacts because of the overt USG cover of the CO, submit redundant information, one version of which is classified, but because of the U.S., not foreign, source. Classification also tends to lend an air of "sexiness" to a report as well, thereby giving undue weight to a CO source over another, even though both contain largely the same information, though not necessarily (and this is perhaps a meatier issue) the same analysis. One would think that maximizing the bang for our HUMINT buck would be better served by greater use of non-official cover (NOC). Sources who may be reluctant to talk to a USG official may be more forthcoming in discussions with a businessman/reporter/insert occupation here. Accepting the fact that NOC assets, like their Case Officer brethren, have made mistakes/been used improperly, I am interested in opinions from Agency critics and supporters alike as to what the advantages/disadvantages are regarding shifting away from official cover toward NOC. Again, let's assume a perfect world for argument's sake, where all Intel operations really are in the national security, etc. In other words, assuming we agree that HUMINT remains necessary, does it make sense to put more resources in the NOC basket rather than Official Cover? --------------------------------------------------------------------- R. McGehee response. The question of the use of NOC agents for humint is complicated and defies a definite up or down vote. One NCO officer assigned to Japan for a number of years, John Quinn, defined his experiences (below) and was quite critical of the way the NOC program was administered. The accomplishments of NOC officers may be concealed under security requirements, but when you measure the overall intelligence product from the CIA, and that product has been labeled poor -- then we might assign that rating to NOCs as well as regular case officers. NOC officers do not operate under official cover and therefore might have greater freedom to circulate in a milieu that includes terrorists, drug dealers, and other targeted undesirables. I continue to insist that the work of the CIA would be improved immensely and immediately with the assignment of (non-politicized) analysts both to operations as well as intelligence. Since these could operate for the most part in an official cover structure, or even in some cases as overtly CIA, this is one direction the CIA should move. DCI Tenet ignored Congressional Oversight Committees criticisms of CIA's (non) analytical capabilities. He says its new priorities are counterterrorism, counternarcotics, counterproliferation and counterintelligence. If this is true then the CIA needs operational/intelligence analysts more than additional NOCs. DCI Casey caused CIA's egregious intelligence analysis, in part, when in the early 1980s, he blamed the USSR for world terrorism. Casey purged the CIA's analytical division of those who would not toe the hard line and elevated Robert Gates, one of hardest liners, to head of the Directorate of Intelligence. Gates gave his allies, who became known as "Gates Clones," key positions. Some of those were David Carey, George Kolt, John McLaughlin, Jim Lynch, Winston Wiley, and John Gannon. Many good analysts quit. (Source: Consortium 9/97) In July 1997, Tenet announced his new management team -- prominent among them are: John C. Gannon, Chairman of the National Intelligence Council; David W. Carey, CIA Executive Director; John E. McLaughlin, Deputy Director for Intelligence; and, Winston P. Wiley, Associate Deputy for Intelligence. These seemingly guarantee continued politicization of intelligence. Yet, DCI Tenet appears unaware of the problem, or is part of the problem, or is not too concerned with the CIA's intelligence product. In June 1997 the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, said the Intelligence Community (IC) has very limited analytical capabilities to meet the myriad challenges, especially strategic and predictive. It said the IC lacks the analytical depth, breath, and expertise to monitor political, military, and economic developments worldwide. Analytical deficiencies include: a largely inexperienced workforce; lack of foreign languages; and limited in-country familiarity among analysts; and, a focus on current intelligence that erodes strategic analyses. The IC must improve training and [personnel selection]. The IC is awash in un-exploited open source information. "Put simply, collecting information that is not processed and analyzed is simply a waste..." SOLVING THE PROBLEMS A few years ago during Congressional hearings on the nomination of Robert Gates to be DCI, several dozen analysts, put their careers on the line and volunteered to testify that Gates politicized intelligence. The CIA needs a personnel pool of those with demonstrated integrity -- here it is. Also a number of good analysts quit the Directorate of Intelligence (DI) over the issue of politicization -- another potential manpower pool of those with demonstrated integrity. Appointing such individuals to top positions in the DI would go a long way in overcoming politicization. Since these are an experienced workforce they satisfy one of the other major requirements put forth by Congress. Also Congress said the intelligence community must improve training and [personnel selection] -- this solution responds to much of this recommendation. The Congressional report noted the lack of foreign languages and limited in-country familiarity among analysts -- with a cadre of proven talent as noted above, this requirement could be dynamically addressed. Tenet, said recently that CIA will continue to use technical operations. But CIA technical operations have existed for decades -- they capture communications and take overhead photos. It is an extremely inefficient terrorist, drug or weapons of mass destruction organization that does not recognize their vulnerability to electronic intercepts or overhead photography. Such awareness renders these tools rather ineffective. Further, commercially available sophisticated encoding material makes it possible to overload the system with (many) indecipherable messages. The use of technical intercepts and overhead cameras, therefore, should constitute only one small leg of a multi-faceted attack on the major targets. Yet the CIA has large "Counter" centers in Langley Virginia, reading this and that source material. It undoubtedly has few analysts out in the field digging up and assessing locally available data. Per Congress, the CIA's "focus on current intelligence erodes strategic analyses." This weakness is caused by the overwhelming concentration on covert operations and the role "intelligence" plays in supporting operations. With an emphasis on accurate intelligence, the support role, decreases, producing the potential for more accurate intelligence. Congress said the IC is awash in un-exploited open source information. "Put simply, collecting information that is not processed and analyzed is simply a waste..." The question of [the failure to use] open source information is one that could fill books. Particularly now in the Internet world, good open source information abounds, but the CIA resists using this invaluable resource. The CIA traditionally collects its intelligence from agents who quickly recognize what is wanted, and shape their reports to satisfy the pressure for "proper" results. Open source information decreases the ability to shape intelligence to desired conclusions. Former DCI Richard Helms, at a speech to Agency employees during its 50th birthday anniversary event, noted the various review layers of raw intelligence that defeated the production of accurate information -- he recommended a more elitist less bureaucratic, smaller organization. In my experience raw intelligence reports had to survive political decisions by about eight layers of DO managers. DI analysts claim that this process is repeated in the Directorate of Intelligence -- no "non-conventional wisdom" data survives this intimidating gauntlet. The Congressional Oversight committees did not address the question of operational analysis. Operational analysis allows the identification and selection of targets and methods for action. This is especially important in the scattered nature of many small, frequently unconnected terrorist and other groups. In my experience CIA operational analysis exists only in the most superficial form. DO case officers are selected based on their results-oriented psychological profiles. They are measured by how many agents they recruit and how many reports they write. Analysis frequently challenge operations and few analysts survive in the DO. Operational analysis is critical to the current requirements of counterterrorism, counterproliferation, counternarcotics, and, counterintelligence. In another posting I cited my experiences as an operations officer with an analytical bent and outlined examples of research for intelligence, and research for operations. Operational analysis cannot be handled adequately by some Headquarters-based, politically-correct bureaucrat, reading reports, photos and intercepts. It must be performed in the field by competent and trained analysts. The DO must assign analysts to its operations. If the CIA is serious about countering terrorism, narcotics, weapons of mass destruction and counter intelligence, it must change. I fear that this bureaucratic structure will desperately cling to its past procedures and personnel and never change. As a consequence it is becoming obsolete. Ralph McGehee CIABASE Extracts from CIABASE: 90-95 do must end recruitment numbers game where promotion based on numbers of agents recruited. Case officers recruited Africans, Arabs, and Asians by hundreds - safe house keepers and info peddlers. Garbage intel overwhelmed good intel. Stolz as do instituted "asset validation system," to cull roster of agents. Six years later winnowing files continuing. Where a large station might have hundreds of agents now the list is down to double digits. Debate over non-official cover (NOCs) and official cover officers. NOCs might be better to gather info on terrorism, nuclear proliferation, narcotics and economic intel. NOCs expensive and difficult to train and place. David ignatius Washington post outlook 3/5/95 c1,2 86 tom darcy a nonofficial cover officer (NOC). He transporting interception equipment to a CIA boat to sail off coast of Lebanon to eavesdrop on terrorists. He earlier in the Caribbean. Darcy left CIA in 93. more spies going under NOC cover because terrorists, nuclear smugglers, money launderers and warlords are not found in cocktail diplomatic circuit. CIA expanding NOC program - several hundred now in field and numbers growing. Only top level officials of companies know identity of CIA NOC officers. Handling tax returns. To recruit NOCs, CIA uses front companies and places adds in major newspapers. CIA's office of central cover must assign a staff member to handle NOC officer's personal affairs. NOC officers in Colombia wounded or killed in gunfights with drug smugglers. A NOC officer in Africa was beaten and jailed for a month. NOC officers have more luck in hard targets such as Iran, Iraq and north Korea. CIA experimenting with setting up two stations in countries. Morale at CIA at rockbottom. Young case officers demanding housecleaning of top officials of ops directorate. 12/94 CIA settled a lawsuit with Jamaican station chief janine brookner for 410,000 plus lawyers fees. Time 2/20/95 28 90-95 more of the spies being recruited today are NOCs (non-official cover) rather than diplomatic corps. For past four years, CIA has been quietly expanding its NOC program, placing undercover officers in u.s. businesses overseas. During cold war, CIA case officers under embassy cover could cruise foreign ministries and cocktail parties to collect intel on the USSR. To penetrate new threats, like terrorism, drugs, economic intel unconventional covers are needed so the CIA continues to expand its NOC program. Intel officials say several hundred NOCs are now in the field, and number is growing. Senior officials from agency's national collections branch have been quietly approaching businesses doing overseas work to ask if they will provide covers for CIA case officers. Energy companies, import-export firms, multinational concerns, banks with foreign branches and high-tech corporations are among those being approached. Usually the company president and perhaps another senior officer, such as the general counsel, are the only ones who know of arrangement. Time 2/20/95 90-95 officials say that NOC (non-official cover) officers overseas can be four times as expensive as assigning officers under an embassy cover. elaborate clandestine communications must be established so NOC officer can pass his intel. CIA's office of central cover must assign a staff member to handle a NOC officer's personal affairs and keep his real-life bills paid while he leads his cover life. Companies providing cover are understandably skittish about having it blown. Time contacted half a dozen fortune 500 firms to ask if they accepted NOC officers. Most either refused to comment or said they do not participate. NOC work can take its toll on the case officer as well. NOC officers cannot count on just being expelled from countries like officers with diplomatic immunity. NOC officers in Colombia who have set up import-export companies as covers -- bribing drug couriers for intel -- have been wounded or killed in gunfights with traffickers. A NOC officer serving in Africa was beaten up and jailed for a month. another, grabbed by a hizballah faction in Beirut, managed to talk his way out by convincing his fundamentalist captors that he was a u.s. narcotics agent fighting evil drugs. You've got to be your own life-support system, says john f. Quinn, who once worked as a NOC officer in Japan collecting economic intel. You're out in the cold. You're alone. You have to be a tightrope walker all the time, balancing your corporate job, your intel job and your mental sanity. CIA believes NOCs are the best way to carry out many clandestine ops. Services usually have no trouble spotting CIA officers operating under an embassy's cover. Not so for NOCs. If you're working drugs, thugs or tech transfers, you're going to be in banks all the time looking at financial transactions -- jobs often better suited for an officer under corporate cover. NOC officers also have had more luck spying on hard targets such as Iran, Iraq and north Korea, where u.s. has no embassies in which to hide CIA operatives. CIA is even experimenting with setting up two stations in some countries. One would be under the traditional embassy cover, while another much more secretive station would handle the NOCs. Time 2/20/95 CIA uses blind ads to recruit business people and professionals to serve under nonofficial cover (NOC) officers disguised as employees of major u.s. corporations. CIA with end of cold war devoting substantial resources to economic intel spying on allies using NOCs to gather intel of foreign technology, trade secrets, commercial contracts, and business deals. Spies currently active in Japan, western Europe, and in developing nations like Mexico, brazil and India, and countries in the middle east. Spy scandal in France exposed four diplomats and a NOC - a woman supposedly working as in pr for Dallas market center, owned by international real estate mogul trammell crow. She accused of trying to recruit and bribe French corporate officials to pass technology secrets to CIA. CIA really interested in France telecom's advanced atm switching technology and French telecom's international ops in key developing countries. There still CIA ops aimed at such as France's alcatel. Le monde reported u.s. has 80 CIA agents in France, 30 of whom are NOCs. Mother Jones 6/95 15-6 circa 80 Howard interviewed to be NOC officer, a CIA officer under nonofficial cover. Wise, d. (1988). The spy who got away 72 debate over non-official cover (NOCs) and official cover officers. NOCs might be better to gather info on terrorism, nuclear proliferation, narcotics and economic intel. NOCs expensive and difficult to train and place. To attack such targets as terrorism or nuclear proliferation, cant just hang around diplomatic receptions - must assess communications intercepts from NSA, must piece together small fragments. David ignatius Washington post outlook 3/5/95 c1,2 France, 90-95 a CIA case officer working in Europe acted as a representative of a Texas foundation that was interested in world economics. She operated as a non-official cover or NOC. DCI gates tried to increase NOCs in ways that would have changed the CIA's operations directorate. It is now time to cut back the practice of CIA officers operating out of the embassy. CIA spokesman Dennis boxx refused to comment on the change. In past some NOCs were employed by CIA proprietaries, others as consultants or representatives to American companies or attached to overseas offices of u.s. corporations. Best NOCs are normally older people, experienced in business and often fluent in several languages. One female NOC [tried to recruit] a French government official. When her spying role became apparent, he turned her in to French counterintelligence. Washington post 1/12/96 a18 gilligan with NOC management job 3 years circa 73-76 during period ddo undertook yet another ddo-wide initiative on deep cover, partially in response to inordinate number of NOC resignations occurring in Asia. NOCs now selected specifically for deep cover; we were no longer sending inside officers outside as though the two career tracks were interchangeable. A centrally administered support structure was again created, training of NOCs placed on par with inside officers. NOC life continued to be difficult. Gilligan, t. (1991). CIA life 156 in 60-65 CIA sent fair number first-tour officers abroad under some form of academic cover. Lif 69. Gilligan placed dozens of NOC officers in latin america in a two-year period during tenure of david phillips as chief div. gilligan, t. (1991). Cia life 154 japan, 47-94 dozens of u.s. corporations secretly assisting cia, allowing it to place full-time officers into its offices abroad. This referred to as nonofficial cover (NOC) or knock program. 110 cia officers currently serve as NOCs. Corporations that are used are: RJR Nabisco, prentice-hall, ford motor co., Proctor and gamble, general electric, IBM, bank of america, chase Manhattan bank, pan am, Rockwell international, Campbell soup, and sears roebuck. Ross perot and late Malcolm forbes actively cooperated in program. NOCs increasingly turning attention to economics and technical developments. John Quinn, a former NOC officer who spent much of his time in Tokyo complained of NOCs isolated life. DCI Casey in early 80s decided to beef up NOC program. Richard kerr, former deputy director, said Casey interested in economic intel, technology, and trade secrets. Casey tripled number of NOCs in 86. NOC program beset with bungling, corruption and poor tradecraft. Tom darcy served 5 years as a NOC in western Europe said clumsiness caused more than one NOC to go to prison or die. Hqs always protects the division chief, or cos and will discipline the NOC. Mother Jones 2/95 39-42 see discussion of non official cover officers aka NOCs throughout lif. Of several young officers under NOC, all came out or resigned after first tour. Gilligan, t. (1991). Cia life 86 us has long spied on Japanese business, making extensive use of yet another tool in its spy kit, non-official cover (NOC). In the NOC program, corporations allow the cia to plant operatives among their personnel abroad to spy on competitors. Japan is a prime target. According to john Quinn, a former NOC officer in japan, Japanese caught a team of 13 NOC officers in 1989. 15-year program was broken up by Japan's public security investigative agency, which simply hired thugs to bust up homes and offices of NOCs, causing the cia to recall them in a panic. 30 of the 80 cia agents in France reportedly operate as NOCs. One of the cia operatives expelled in last February's spy scandal worked under non-official cover. Officially known as domestic resources division, with offices in cities around country, the program took off in early 1980s under Reagan's DCI Casey, who tightened agency liaison with treasury and enlisted some 150 companies for the project. The roster of corporate volunteers has included bank of america, Campbell soup, chase Manhattan bank, ford, general electric, IBM, pan am, prentice-hall, Procter & gamble, Rockwell international, RJR Nabisco, and sears roebuck. Recruitment for the NOC program includes blind help wanted ads. One such ad was placed in the wall street journal by the mclean, Virginia-based headhunter firm of stackig, sanderson & white. unlike most cia officers working abroad, NOCs do not have diplomatic cover, leaving them vulnerable to criminal prosecution if caught, or, as was the case in japan in 1989, subject to non-official thuggery. And 30 of the 80 cia agents in France reportedly operate as NOCs. One of cia operatives expelled in last February's spy scandal worked under non-official cover. covert action information bulletin (now covert action quarterly) winter 1996 93-95 ads for recruits for economic intel. Ad in WSJ 2/7/95, placed by selwyn, bryant, and Brooke associates in Stamford, Conn. No firm by that name. Ad had been placed by stackig inc., Of mclean, Virginia. Employee admitted firm worked for cia. Cia uses blind ads to recruit business people and professionals to serve under nonofficial cover (NOC) officers disguised as employees of major u.s. corporations. Cia with end of cold war devoting substantial resources to economic intel spying on allies using NOCs to gather intel of foreign technology, trade secrets, commercial contracts, and business deals. Spies currently active in japan, western Europe, and key developing nations like Mexico, brazil and India, and countries in the middle east. Spy scandal in France exposed four diplomats and a NOC - a woman supposedly working as in pr for Dallas market center, owned by international real estate mogul trammell crow. She accused of trying to recruit and bribe French corporate officials to pass technology secrets to cia. Cia really interested in France telecom's advanced atm switching technology and French telecom's international ops in key developing countries. There still cia ops aimed at such as France's alcatel. Le monde reported u.s. has 80 cia agents in France, 30 of whom are NOCs. Mentions Raytheon case in brazil. Mother Jones 6/95 15-6 japan, 85-89 japan a major theatre of ops since post W.W.II occupation by the u.s. during Vietnam war. Cia expanded its presence in japan, with additional focus on trade and political relations with the USSR, china, Cuba and other communist powers. CIA's Tokyo station one of largest in world. DCI Casey had used CIA's non-official cover (NOC) program as means to penetrate Japan's scientific, technological and commercial institutions. thirteen NOCs stationed in japan in mid-80s per john Quinn. Branch chief opposed to NOCs and carped at expenses, etc. Japan's public security counterintel unit (psia) alerted by CIA's glorious ineptitude. When liaison officers did not take hints from Japanese, psia trashed the homes and offices of several NOCs, stealing their commo equipment and wreaking havoc. the cia withdrew at least 10 NOCs. Mother Jones 2/95 39-42 japan, 90-95 cia NOC officers wanted to know structure of company inside, who were bigwigs, who were their policy-makers, where was their r&d section, what was r&d section working on, what was their budget, what were critical technologies they were developing, said john Quinn, former cia NOC officer. Cia has some 60 officers now in japan investigating companies like Mitsubishi heavy industries, kyocera, dai nippon printing, and the national space development agency. Covert action information bulletin (now covert action quarterly) winter 1996 japan, 85-89 japan a major theatre of ops since post W.W.II occupation by the u.s. during Vietnam war. Cia expanded its presence in japan, with additional focus on trade and political relations with the USSR, china, Cuba and other communist powers. CIA's Tokyo station one of largest in world. DCI Casey had used CIA's non-official cover (NOC) program as means to penetrate Japan's scientific, technological and commercial institutions. thirteen NOCs stationed in japan in mid-80s per john Quinn. Branch chief opposed to NOCs and carped at expenses, etc. Japan's public security counterintel unit (psia) alerted by CIA's glorious ineptitude. When liaison officers did not take hints from Japanese, psia trashed the homes and offices of several NOCs, stealing their commo equipment and wreaking havoc. the cia withdrew at least 10 NOCs. Mother Jones 2/95 39-42 90-95 with non official cover officers, companies get free executives. for the cover to be plausible, the cia must recruit business-school graduates who can put in a productive day's work with the firm and then spy during their off-hours. Cia has even begun experimenting with recruiting mid-level corporate executives who yearn for adventure, then placing them in overseas firms as "NOCs of convenience" to penetrate a target for several years. When mission is over, the execs return to the business world. But while they are NOC officers, the cia pays their salary. Company pays them a corporate salary -- usually much larger -- to keep up the cover, but that money is quietly returned to the company. CIA's covert tax branch has a secret relationship with the IRS to resolve the two w-2 forms an officer gets each year. Disparity in salaries, however, has already created a retention problem for the cia. A NOC officer who discovered that his corporate earnings were making him a millionaire on paper recently left the agency to work in the company as an honest-to-goodness executive. To recruit NOC officers, cia, working through phony front companies, will place ads in major newspapers asking for young business-school graduates who want to live overseas. Or the front company will hire corporate headhunting firms that remain unaware that they're finding candidates for cia. NOC training classes at camp Peary are small, no more than two or three students, all of whom are given new names. Their real names will never appear on any computer personnel list at its hqs. Time 2/20/95 for years cia has maintained net of "non-official cover" operatives. Cia intends to beef up NOC program - but same story told many times. Gates does not trust ddo perhaps because of trigon flap. Gates for "one agency" concept where operators and analysts freely swap info - and jobs. [results not good]. Congress demanding a bigger and more aggressive ddo. Gates probably will not let ddo run same insular way. U.s. news and world report 6/3/91 22-24 japan, 94-95 john f. Quinn is alive and well after serving in japan as a cia "knock," NOC or non official cover officer. He is now international representative of the japan intel & research college and the only non-Japanese member of the japan investigation services association (nippon chsagy kykai). Japan investigation services association has approximately 2,500 member firms nationwide, with some 400 member firms in Tokyo. intelligence - a computerized intelligence newsletter published in France 6/5/95 60 94-95 "the CIA's mission is itself" article by Tim weiner. Current hard targets are Iran, Iraq, north Korea, china, and Russia. Recent embarrassments in France and japan gathering economic intel. Challenge to move the directorate of operations (do) away from [official cover to NOC ops]. If terrorists, thugs and tribes are to be targets, the do needs to be rebuilt. New York times mag 12/10/95 passim ================================================================= NY Transfer News Collective * A Service of Blythe Systems Since 1985 - Information for the Rest of Us 339 Lafayette St., New York, NY 10012 http://www.blythe.org e-mail: nyt@blythe.org ================================================================= nytcov-10.12.97-22:35:54-23402