Reforming Russias Police-Prospects id WAA08681; Wed, 8 Oct 1997 22:39:18 -0400 Via NY Transfer News Collective * All the News that Doesn't Fit source:mnovick@laedu.lalc.k12.ca.us Fri Oct 3 02:42:59 1997 REFORMING RUSSIA'S POLICE: PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE Jane's Intelligence Review 9/30/97 [...] Reforming Russia's police has, therefore, largely taken the form of five main trends or initiatives: Paramilitarisation: Kulikov has only accelerated an existing trend towards increased reliance on high-profile and heavily armed policing by patrol - precisely the type of confrontational policing other forces in the world have begun to renounce. Ironically, this has not made the militsioner any safer: 201 died in 1994, 248 in 1995 and 263 in 1996. Anti-corruption campaign: At best, this is still a limited success. A total of 10,000 MVD staff were brought to trial on one charge or another in 1996, including 3,500 on criminal offences, but only 318 for accepting bribes. Data for the first six months of 1997 suggest a similarly low proportion of those dismissed actually being convicted bribe-takers. In some ways, this is predictable: faced with the burden of proof, many commanders would rather simply dismiss corrupt officers on lesser charges or allow them to retire quietly. It also reflects the extent to which the campaign is as much public relations as a serious initiative. Besides which, most of the corrupt victims of 'Clean Hands' have either been small-fry or politically out of favour. Centralisation: On assuming office, Kulikov began trying to reverse the trend towards decentralisation of recent years. He promptly sought to bring key departments under his direct control, including the directorates responsible for fighting organised crime and operational surveillance, as well as the master Radio- Electronic Control Centre. Bureaucratic pressures have ensured that they remain formally subordinated to their respective deputy ministers, but their heads are regularly required to report directly to Kulikov. It is harder to assess just how effective Kulikov has been. While local elites are now less likely to assert their autonomy openly, in practice they still retain very considerable lee-way. Furthermore, the rise of the Municipal Militias and similar forces simply reflects a side-stepping of Kulikov's authority. Establishing specialised formations: As mentioned previously, the central MVD and local commands alike are establishing new units to deal with new and growing problems, even if most are limited by a lack of funding and expertise. Developing international co-operation: Crime is increasingly transnational and this is especially true for Russia. Its powerful mafiya has internationalised quickly, while the country's transition from being just part of the multi-national land empire which was the USSR is still incomplete. Its 58,000 km-long borders are often porous and hard to secure, and cross-cut by personal friendships, traditional routes and ethnic loyalties. Russia thus needs to develop co-operation with its neighbours and the international community at large. Within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), there are many formal structures for liaison, from the CIS Interior Ministers' Committee on down, but probably it is the informal contacts which work best. After all, today's senior police figures within the CIS rose within the Soviet MVD and trained and worked together. Beyond this, the situation is less satisfactory. Russian participation within Interpol has been sometimes grudging or ineffective. The FBI has had a representative office in Moscow since 1994, but is still unhappy with the level of Russian co-operation. Many nations either lack working channels for information-sharing or feel the Russians are more eager to receive than give assistance. There are cases of good practice, though, such as in relations with the Finnish police, and Kulikov appears eager to develop these. A memorandum of understanding (MoU) between nations appears to be the preferred foundation for such links. The UK, for example, has posted a liaison officer to its embassy, and an MoU has been initialled prior to signing for when Prime Minister Tony Blair visits Moscow in October 1997. It still must be said, however, that the Russian MVD's attempts to reform will continue to be hindered by three main limiting factors: Money: The funding crisis squeezing the government means that the MVD's budget is healthier than, for example, that of the army, but still inadequate for its needs. At the beginning of 1996, the MVD was 3.4 trillion roubles (US$717 million) in debt, and preliminary figures suggest that this may have increased by 20-25 per cent by January 1997. Of the funds the MVD does receive, fully 75 per cent is swallowed simply by salaries and other personnel costs and the basic upkeep of premises, with another 11 per cent going on the prisons. Very little is then left for training, research and the procurement of more modern equipment and vehicles. Conservative attitudes within the police: The senior and middle- ranking officers within the MVD are all veterans of the Soviet era. They have at best trouble coming to terms with ideas such as community-based policing and public accountability and at worst actively resist them. In part, this is a generational issue and one can hope that in time more flexible officers will emerge. At the moment, however, this is a sharp brake on reform and, given that mavericks do not tend to rise rapidly within any police force, one which may last. Attitudes within the elite: Similarly, many if not most within the elite continue to see the MVD as an agency of political control rather than impartial law enforcement: the presumption is still that loyalty to the Rule of Law should be subordinated to that of the state or individuals within it. There is also a continuing and counter-productive desire to see the police involved in work outside their true remit, such as tax collection. Kulikov, for his own reasons, supports this. Reforming Russia's police and establishing an adequate and stable level of public security are thus difficult and lengthy tasks. Meanwhile, the country continues to suffer the rise of a form of warlordism as communities and companies establish their own forces. The slow pace of change also contributes to public disillusion with democracy and reform. This could yet allow the rise of the Communists or some nationalists on a platform of law and order, by whatever means necessary. It also means that the country continues to be a source of international organised crime and a key route for the illegal transfer of guns, dirty money and narcotics. Policing Russia is thus also an important matter for regional and global security. Copyright (c) 1997 Janes Intelligence Review. - In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. section 107, this material is distributed without profit or payment to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving this information for non-profit research and educational purposes only. Be PART of the solution -- People Against Racist Terror/ PO Box 1055/Culver City CA 90232-1055/310-288-5003/ Order our journal "Turning the Tide." mnovickttt@igc.org Free Mumia Abu Jamal! Free All POW's and Political Prisoners! 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