Panama Canal Zone: Beginning of the End (Last Part) Via NY Transfer News Collective * All the News that Doesn't Fit ............................................................... Part 3 of 3 parts PANAMA CANAL ZONE: THE BEGINNING OF THE END by Eric Jackson While the fighting was deadly in areas near the canal, anti-American rioting took place in other parts of Panama. In David, the country's third largest city and the capital of Chiriqui province, a large crowd gathered at Cervantes Square, moving from there to set fire to the local branch of the Chase Manhattan Bank and several other American-owned business. In Santiago, capital of Veraguas province, one thousand people signed a petition calling for war with the United States. There were anti-American demonstrations in Chitre, the capital of Herrera province. In Aguadulce, a town on the Pan-American Highway in Cocle province, crowds attacked a Gulf Oil service station and the homes of Americans. About one hundred car loads of angry Panamanians invaded the US base at Rio Hato, setting fire to two wooden barracks which housed American soldiers during maneuvers. Before the crowd arrived, American military personnel fled in a helicopter. While preparing to flee, the soldiers disabled vehicles which were left behind and carried away whatever valuable property that could be taken away. An Air Force fire truck which was left behind at the Rio Hato airstrip was vandalized. Rural Panama also arose. An American-owned papaya plantation in the San Carlos corregimiento of Las Uvas, the largest in Panama, was ruined when a crowd cut down all of the trees. The owners, Captain and Mrs. Graham, were a Panama Canal pilot and a Balboa High School geometry teacher respectively, were notorious in the town for their hard-nosed labor relations, and though there were other Americans in the area who could have been attacked, the Grahams were the only ones whom the townspeople bothered. Banana workers at the United Fruit Company's subsidiary, the Chiriqui Land Company, went on strike and destroyed company cars and buildings. The corporation's American employees and their dependents from Puerto Armuelles after its manager was threatened. Striking dock workers left some 65,000 stems of bananas to rot on the Puerto Armuelles docks. The attacks led to the evacuation of 158 American United Fruit employees and dependents from David to Costa Rica. Major Omar Torrijos, whose normal duty station was Colon, went to David to help in this evacuation. Dozens of other American residents of Chiriqui province, including coffee plantation owners and a number of retirees, made their way to nearby Costa Rica in automobiles or small aircraft. On the morning of January 13, the fighting died down and the guardia moved into the border areas of Colon and Panama City to maintain order. That same day, President Chiari and the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Panama, Marcos McGrath, (27) joined a procession variously estimated to include between 100,000 and 250,000 mourners at the funeral of 14 of the martyrs. On the Atlantic side, Colon's Bishop Serrano, Mayor Delgado and Education Minister Solis Palma led a large crowd to Puerto Pilon Cemetery, where Colon's martyrs were laid to rest. Solis Palma gave the graveside oration. On January 16, General O'Meara turned control over the Canal Zone back to Governor Fleming. On January 17, a Panama Canal Company work crew rebuilt the Fence of Shame. Various casualty figures for the several days of fighting which became known to Panamanians as the Day of the Martyrs range from 20 to 30 dead and 200 to 579 injured. The total number of dead and wounded is disputed not only due to political motives and different judgments about how to attribute certain incidents. For a number of reasons, not the least of which was fear that jobs or pensions with the Panama Canal Company could be lost, many of the injured were not taken to hospitals, or injuries of those who were taken to hospitals were not officially reported. Moreover, during the heaviest fighting, the hospitals were so overcrowded with severely injured people that those whose injuries were relatively minor were unable to get or unwilling to seek hospital treatment. Generally, Panamanian figures include all Panamanians who died in the violence as martyrs, whether they died directly at the hands of the Americans or not, whether they took an active part in the fighting or not. January 9 became a national holiday and an enduring symbol or Panamanian resistance to foreign domination. The fallen became legendary symbols of patriotic sacrifice. Less than flattering accounts which might contradict the legend were more or less taboo in Panamanian society. Some American critics, like former US ambassador to Panama William J. Jorden, object to the designation of those who died in the Pan American Airlines building in a fire set by Panamanians as martyrs. (28) Yet in paying homage to its legends of patriotism, Americans sometimes use the methods which Jorden denigrates. For one example, there are a number of fallen American soldiers whose names appear on the Vietnam Memorial wall who died from so-called "friendly fire." Rare is the US citizen who suggests that the sacrifices of these soldiers should not be honored. Indeed, most American accounts of the January 1964 events count four or five American dead, including a soldier who fell into a ravine while on guard duty and sometimes another who died in a jeep crash along with those who were shot to death in Colon. The typical Zonian response was to count all Panamanians who were killed as thugs who got what they deserved. This latter reaction was shared by a few Panamanians. The attribution of such sentiments to Arnulfo Arias (whether accurate or not) probably cost him the presidential election that took place later in 1964. (29) Though some Panamanian sources give different names and numbers, the list of Panama's martyrs can be found at the Martyrs Memorial (where the remains of Colon's martyrs were re-interred) in Colon. The 22 as listed there include Maritza Avila Alabarca, Ascanio Arosemena, Luis Bonilla, Josi Del Cid Cobos, Teofilo Belisario De La Torre, Gonzalo A. France, Victor M. Garibaldo, Josi Enrique Gil, Ezequiel Meneses Gonzalez, Victor M. Iglesias, Rosa Elena Landecho, Carlos Renato Lara, Evilio Lara, Gustavo Lara, Ricardo Murgas Villamonte, Alberto Nichols Constance, Estanislao Orobio W., Jacinto Palacios Cobos, Ovidio L. Saldana, Rodolfo Sanchez Benitez, Alberto Oriol Tejada and Celestino Villareta. (As is common in Panama but confusing to some North Americans, some Panamanians use Spanish-style names, i.e., they use two surnames, first their father's and then their mother's, while others use only one surname, and some may use different forms of their name for different occasions.) La Hora Panama, a tabloid which was never well known for its high journalistic standards, gave the names of 5 other Panamanians who were allegedly killed in the fighting, but lists a total of 20 killed. (30) Other Panamanian accounts put the Panamanian death toll variously between 17 and 24. Most US accounts put the number of Americans killed in these events at four, though others put the death toll at three or five. Those who died fighting for the American side include Luis Jimenez Cruz, David Haupt, Gerald St. Aubin and Michael W. Rowland. Years after the events of January 1964, a number of US Army historical documents were declassified, including Southcom's figures for ammunition expended. (31) The official account has it that the US Army fired 450 .30 caliber rifle rounds, five .45 caliber pistol bullets, 953 shells of birdshot and 7,193 grenades or projectiles containing tear gas. Also, the army claims to have used 340 pounds of bulk CN-1 chemical (weak tear gas) and 120 pounds of CS-1 chemical (strong tear gas). The same account said that the Canal Zone police fired 1,850 .38 caliber pistol bullets and 600 shotgun shells in the fighting, while using only 132 tear gas grenades. As with the estimates of human casualties, there are divergent figures given for property damage. These estimates begin at a low figure that exceeds two million dollars. In its annual report for the 1964 fiscal year, the Panama Canal Company reported that 25 fires were set in the Canal Zone during the disturbances, causing several hundred thousand dollars worth of damage. (32) The damage in the fire at the Pan American Airlines building alone probably surpassed the Canal Zone's fire damages. One hundred eighty US military personnel who lived in Panama City filed claims for some $72,000 in personal property that was destroyed. More than 160 automobiles were destroyed or damaged. Despite the widespread death and destruction, the operation of the canal was never disrupted during the violence of 1964. However, at least one respectable international journal attributed a drop in Wall Street stock prices to rioting in Panama. (33) This alleged macroeconomic effect was short-lived. Individuals whose injuries left them unable or less able to work, the families of those killed or disabled who were left without support, and those individuals who suffered uninsured property losses were the ones to feel real economic effects. (34) International reaction was unfavorable to the United States. The British and French, who had been criticized by US administrations for their colonial policies, pointed to the hypocrisy of a power whose Zonian citizens were as obnoxious an any other group of colonial settlers. Nasser's Egypt suggested that Panama nationalize the Panama Canal as it had nationalized the Suez Canal. Not surprisingly, the People's Republic of China, the Soviet Union and Cuba denounced the Americans in strident terms. >From the other end of the ideological spectrum, Spanish dictator Francisco Franco's right-wing Falangist Party joined in accusing the United States of aggression against Panama. Significantly, other governments in the western hemisphere which had long backed US policies declined to back the American position. Venezuela led a chorus of Latin American criticism of the United States. The Organization of American States, on Brazil's motion, took jurisdiction over the dispute from the United Nations Security Council. The OAS in turn put the matter before its Inter-American Peace Committee. The committee held a week-long investigation in Panama which was greeted by a unanimous 15-minute Panamanian work stoppage to demonstrate Panama's united opinion. No action was taken on Panama's motion to brand the United States guilty of aggression, but the committee did accuse the Americans of using unnecessary force. Panamanians from all walks of life joined in bitter denunciation of the Americans. From the poorest laborers to the richest rabiblancos, Panamanians called for an end to American control of the canal and expressed revulsion at the Zonian actions leading up to the violence. The Canal Zone police and the US Army were branded as murderers. Virtually every professional organization, every labor union, every city council and every student group passed a resolution denouncing the Americans. Panama's political parties, though divided for the upcoming presidential elections, presented a united front for sovereignty over the Canal Zone. When analyzing the violent events, some members of Congress pointed to the same underlying causes that most Panamanians identified. Senator Wayne Morse said that "[i]t's been a terrible mistake to develop this colonial group in the Canal Zone." (35) A New York Times editorial held that "[t]he Canal Zone is about the only place in the world where the United States still has citizens with a colonial mentality." (36) The Washington Post called the status of the Canal Zone an "anachronism." (37) Yet the main body of American opinion blamed the clashes on Cuban agents. Secretary of the Army Cyrus Vance claimed that the Panamanians had arrested 10 communist agitators for inciting the riots. The Panamanian government denied it. Pressed for more details of alleged Cuban involvement, Secretary of State Dean Rusk said that: "[u]ndoubtedly Castro and agents of Castro... have taken a direct hand in one way or another." (38) Former president Truman best stated the inherent paternalism in mainstream American thinking: "The children you do the most for are the ones who cause you the most trouble, and Cuba and Panama are perfect examples of that." (39) Despite the wild accusations of civilian politicians, a more sober analysis came from the Department of Defense. For Commanders: This Changing World, a department publication for military officers, put out a special edition on Panama. It pointed to the importation of West Indians, the creation of Canal Zone commissaries and "most important of all, the creation of an extraterritorial zone in the midst of the Republic under United States control and de facto sovereignty" (40) as causes of Panamanian friction with the United States. It noted the "deep-seated resentments of Panamanians, whose country is bisected by an American-controlled enclave where the standard of living is far higher than theirs." (41) It found that "Communists were not the cause of the riots, but they have taken full advantage of them for their own purposes." (42) The flag riots echoed in the US courts. The Cristobal district officers of the Canal Zone police force were on 24-hour call until the summer of 1964. They were not allowed to take vacations, leave the Atlantic side, leave the limits of the Canal Zone or go anywhere where there was no telephone during this period. Many of the main attractions of life on the quiet north coast, like the secluded beaches and the hunting and fishing, were thus off limits. The cops sued for overtime pay but lost in the United States Court of Claims. (43) The Sojourners' Lodge (owner of the Cristobal Masonic Temple) and the YMCA sued for compensation for damages to their buildings in Cristobal. They claimed that the army's use of these buildings greatly added to the damage which were inflicted upon the properties. This case ended in the United States Supreme Court, whose justices ruled that when the army takes a private building to use it as a fortress against a hostile crowd, the government does not have to pay for the use of the building or the damage resulting from such use, if the defense of the building was an intended purpose of its occupation. (44) The International Commission of Jurists, in response to a request from the Panamanian Bar Association (ICJ), conducted an investigation of the events of January 1964. The investigating committee was composed of three eminent jurists, Professor A. D. Belinfante of Amsterdam University in the Netherlands, Judge Gustaf Petrin of Sweden and Navroz Vakil, a lawyer from Bombay, India. The ICJ's investigation was inconclusive as to the truth of the flag tearing incident and several of the deaths. The ICJ contradicted the American versions of several other deaths. Although it did not condemn the Canal Zone police and the US Army for using force once the fighting had begun, the ICJ took the police to task for failing to protect the Panamanian high school students from their Zonian counterparts at the Balboa High School flagpole. It also criticized the guardia for failing to intervene to disperse the crowds. The legality of the Panama Canal treaty and of Panamanian claims of sovereignty in the Canal Zone were not addressed in any significant way by the ICJ. However, it found that the Zonians "have developed a particular state of mind not conducive to the promotion of happy relations between them and the people of Panama... [T]he United States... should reflect on these sad facts and take effective steps to make possible a reorientation and change in outlook and thinking of the people living in the Canal Zone." (45) Whatever the verdict of international jurists or Americans of any sort, those Panamanians who fell in the events of January 1964 became the subjects of the most sacred of Panamanian legends. January 9, 1964 is commonly reckoned as the most significant of Panamanian days. FOOTNOTES 1. Doyle v Fleming, 219 F Supp 277 (D CZ 1963), p. 277. 2. T. Ambrister, "Panama, Why They Hate US: More Than One Torn Flag," Saturday Evening Post, March 7, 1964, p. 77 3. Engineering News-Record, January 16, 1964, p. 17. 4. Life, January 24, 1964, p.27. 5. As for the long-term effects of such road-building projects, there are a lot of environmentalists who in retrospect would have preferred the study to the road, because the extension of rural roads provided a major impetus to the destruction of much of Panama's rain forest. 6. Farland was also not that popular with either his superiors at the State Department or with the CIA. Departing from the norms, upon his return Farland was debriefed by neither Secretary of State Dean Rusk or CIA chief John A. McCone. After the CIA had been taken by surprise by the January 1964 events, Farland said that the agency had been out of control in Panama, more concerned with building a Canal Zone empire than in knowing what was happening in Panama. 7. L. B. Johnson, The Vantage Point: perspectives of the presidency, 1963-1969 (Holt, Rinehart & Winston 1971), p 180. 8. Panama American, January 14, 1964, p. 1. 9. Star & Herald, January 14, 1964, p. 1. 10. See, e.g..,Panama American, January 23, 1964, p. 1. 11. La Hora Panama, January 10, 1964, p. 1. 12. Panama American, January 14, 1964, p. 1. 13. La Republica, (Bogota, Colombia), January 20, 1964. 14. See J. Dubois, Danger Over Panama, Bobbs-Merrill (Indianapolis-NY 1964), or for a more succinct dose of sensationalism, his "Red Plan In Panama Told," Chicago Tribune, January 13, 1964. The gist of Mr. Dubois's paranoid fantasy was that the flag riots were a diversion that Fidel Castro created in order to distract attention from his main plot to take over Venezuela. 15. H. & M. Knapp, Red, White and Blue Paradise: The American Canal Zone in Panama"(Harcourt, Brace & Jovanovich, NY 1984). The Knapps cited their Panamanian maid as authority for this allegation! 16. The United Press International ran one such photo that, among other places, appeared in US News and World Report, March 30, 1964, p. 48. 17. Dubois, Danger Over Panama, op. cit., pp. 308-309. 18. In later years, the standard accusation made in patriotic Day of the Martyrs speeches was that the unarmed Martyrs had been brutally shot down by the Americans while demonstrating their love of country. Discussion of all of the various circumstances in which the Martyrs died was highly impolitic and generally not done, either in such speeches or in the Panamanian press. 19. Panama American, January 15, 1964, p. 10, quoting Captain Gaddis Wall. 20. Dubois, Danger Over Panama, op. cit., p. 270. 21. Panama American, January 15, 1964, p. 10. 22. The New York Times (hereafter abbreviated as "NYT"), January 13, 1964, p. 14. 23. In the wee hours of the morning of January 10, 1964, Deputy King prophetically concluded an address about the previous hours' events as follow: *Panamanian people cannot continue to be massacred. Panama has no arms with which to face the blondes of the Canal Zone. But the Panamanian people wrote today the most beautiful page in our history, because they showed the North Americans that before the force of the bullets, the force of reason will triumph. And tomorrow, or the day after, only one flag will fly in the Canal Zone. It will be the Panamanian flag!* Dubois, Danger Over Panama, op. cit., p. 295. 24. US presentation to the OAS investigators, quoted in Memorandum in Support of Claim In the Matter of The National Board of the Young Men's Christian Associations; The Sojourners Lodge Masonic Temple; and The Commerce and Industry Insurance Company, before The Office of the Judge Advocate General, Department of the Army, p. 4. See footnote 87 and accompanying text for the later developments of this case in the courts. Many thanks to my brother-in-law, First Sergeant George Klein, US Army (retired), who later worked for the Industrial Division of the Panama Canal Commission and who is an officer of the Sojourners Lodge, for letting me use the lodge's file in this case. 25. Panama American, January 15, 1964, p. 10. 26 . "This bullet must have come either from a rifle fired by a United States soldier against orders or from some unknown sniper." International Commission of Jurists, Report on the Events in Panama, January 9-12, 1964, 6 75. 27. Marcos Gregorio McGrath, the son of a Zonian father and a much-married Panamanian socialite who founded the Inter-American Women's Club, was known as Mark Gregory McGrath in his younger days. The 1964 events put an obstacle in McGrath's career-the Vatican would thereafter find it impolitic to appoint a Zonian cardinal from Panama, especially one like McGrath, who spoke accented Spanish. For his part, after the early 60s McGrath stopped using the English version of his name and never again spoke English in public. Though for a while he was seen as tilting toward the Church's liberation theology wing, toward the end of his career McGrath identified himself as an enthusiastic supporter of the most violent act in Panamanian-American relations, the December 1989 US invasion. 28. Jorden, op. cit., p. 49. Jorden also alleges that there were witnesses who claimed that one of the people who died in the Pan Am building was a looter who was carrying away a safe, who was in turn robbed and killed by another looter. 29. Many Arnulfistas argue that Arias was denied the presidency in 1964 by way of electoral fraud. It does seem, however, that Liberal Marco Robles beat him fair and square, handing the doctor his only genuine loss at the polls. Arias was elected president and overthrown by coups three times, and denied the presidency by way of General Noriega's fraudulent vote count in 1984. 30. La Hora Panama, January 11, 1964, p. 1. 31. Annual Historical Summary, United States Army Forces Southern Command, v. 2, routinely declassified after 12 years on December 31, 1970; U.S. Army Control of Riots and Civil Disturbances in Panama 9-16 January 1964, which was excluded from the routine declassification schedule but declassified sometime in the 1980s. Both of these documents are available from the Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, Washington DC. 32. Panama Canal Company/Canal Zone Government report for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1964, p. 126. 33. Times of London, January 11, 1964, p. 8. 34. Years later, the wounded Panamanians and the families of the Martyrs were partly compensated with formerly Panama Canal Company housing when, pursuant to the 1977 Carter-Torrijos treaties, it was turned over to Panama. 35. State Journal (Lansing, Michigan), January 15, 1964, p. 1. 36. NYT, January 11, 1964, p. 22. 37. Washington Post, January 14, 1964, p. A16. 38. Chicago Tribune, January 13, 1964, p. 7. 39. NYT, January 11, 1964, p. 4. 40. For Commanders: This Changing World, January 24, 1964, p. 4. 41. Ibid. 42. Ibid., p. 3. 43. Aldridge v United States, 470 F2d 1365 (Ct of Claims 1973). 44. National Board of Young Men's Christian Associations v United States, 395 US 85 (1969). Justice Hugo Black, joined by Justice William O. Douglas, dissented, disputing the majority's claim that the Army was in the buildings to protect their owners' property. The United States Court of Claims, whose decision against the building owners had been appealed to the high court, had avoided the Supreme Court's legal fictions about intended beneficiaries and flatly ruled that "destruction of private property in battle or by enemy forces is not compensable." 45. International Commission of Jurists, Report on the Events in Panama, January 9-12, 1964, 6 114. ================================================================= NY Transfer News Collective * A Service of Blythe Systems Since 1985 - Information for the Rest of Us 339 Lafayette St., New York, NY 10012 ================================================================= ================================================================= NY Transfer News Collective * A Service of Blythe Systems Since 1985 - Information for the Rest of Us 339 Lafayette St., New York, NY 10012 http://www.blythe.org e-mail: nyt@blythe.org ================================================================= nytcamer-12.31.99-16:47:59-148