NIX MOX sign-on Via NY Transfer News Collective * All the News that Doesn't Fit source - nirsnet@nirs.org Tue May 18 11:02:26 1999 NIX MOX sign-on statement. Please reply to ieer@ieer.org, not to NIRS. Below is a statement that has been signed onto by groups which participate in the Washington DC Nix MOX working group, as well as by a number of representatives of national organizations in Russia. While we originally had hoped to be able to release a statement as a part of Nix MOX day activities today, delays in drafting it have made us re-think our strategy. So, this statement, with the few signatures that you see at the end of this message, was distributed in a very limited way today--particularly at the IAEA conference in Vienna, Austria. A larger release will take place on June 15, the date of US Department of Energy public hearings on the Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement in Washington DC. Vladimir Sliviak of the Anti-Nuclear Campaign of the Socio-Ecological Union has graciously agreed to translate the statement into Russian to facilitate the gathering of additional Russian signatures. We hope you'll sign the letter below. Send sign-ons (include name, organization, city, country, and email address) to IEER by e-mail (ieer@ieer.org) or fax (301-270-3029) by Friday, June 11 so that they can be compiled in advance of the release. Please indicate whether you are signing on behalf of your organization or in a personal capacity (in which case we will make it clear that the organization is listed for identification purposes only). Please also circulate this statement to others who might be interested in signing on. Thank you, Anita Seth Lisa Ledwidge IEER = = = = = = = = = = STATEMENT OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS ON PLUTONIUM DISPOSITION Release for general signature May 17, 1999 Last day to sign June 11, 1999 To be released June 15, 1999 The nuclear arms race has left the United States and Russia with large plutonium stockpiles. Both countries have had terrible experience with plutonium processing and its attendant wastes. Contamination of areas such as Hanford, Savannah River, and Rocky Flats in the United States, and Chelyabinsk, Tomsk, and Krasnoyarsk in Russia demonstrates the hazards of plutonium processing, and the poor environmental and safety culture of the US Department of Energy (DOE) and the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom). With the end of the Cold War, we have the opportunity to redirect resources from nuclear weapons programs into cleaning up the legacy of nuclear weapons development, and to other needed programs. Under the pressure of people of both countries, the governments of our countries have between them declared 100 metric tons of plutonium (roughly one-third of the total) to be "surplus" to military needs. We recognize the need for this plutonium to be stored as safely as possible, and to be converted into non-weapons-usable forms. However, we are deeply disturbed by the primary method by which this conversion is planned. We are convinced that using surplus weapons plutonium in fuel for nuclear reactors (known as mixed-oxide or MOX fuel) is not an acceptable solution. A better method of disposition would be to immobilize the plutonium-that is, to mix it with ceramic or glass and to provide a radioactive barrier to further prevent theft and diversion. We are very concerned about the safety risks of using MOX fuel in existing reactors, almost none of which are designed to run on plutonium fuel. According to a study released by the Nuclear Control Institute in January, the use of a one-third core of warhead plutonium fuel in U.S. nuclear reactors could result in up to a 37% increase in cancer risk to the public in the event of a severe accident. Concerns are even greater in Russia. Many of the Russian reactors slated for MOX use are old and will reach the end of their 30-year licensed lifetimes before the disposition program is complete. Furthermore, Russian regulatory agencies do not have sufficient resources or political standing to adequately ensure safety at a MOX fabrication facility and at reactors. Furthermore, we are dismayed that the people of both countries have been cut out of the process as decisions about plutonium disposition are made. The US has not ensured that Russian programs funded with American money follow environmental and public participation requirements. Joint US-Russian documents are largely unavailable to the Russian public, and the Russian translation of a 1996 joint study was marked "for official use only." Within the US itself, the DOE has made a mockery of the public participation process by issuing a contract for production and irradiation of MOX fuel before issuing a final Environmental Impact Statement and Record of Decision on the subject. It has also failed to include the input of communities living near reactors that are proposed for MOX fuel irradiation. Much of the European reprocessing and MOX performance record, cited by DOE as proof that MOX is a sound technology, is secret, further hindering public participation. We hear a number of contradictory things from our governments about the rationale behind a MOX program. DOE representatives say that the United States must support MOX programs in both countries because Russia insists upon it. Meanwhile, Minatom has said that it would prefer not to undertake a large-scale MOX program at the current time, and will do so only with heavy funding from abroad. Minatom officials claim that plutonium is a valuable energy resource. Yet by their own estimates, plutonium-based nuclear energy will be more expensive than uranium-based nuclear energy for at least several decades. US officials say that MOX is not being pursued for its energy value but rather that it has been chosen to facilitate quick disposition of plutonium in Russia. However, immobilization is likely to be a much faster and cheaper method of plutonium disposition than MOX. Finally, we are told that the MOX program is a non-proliferation measure. But under pressure from nuclear establishments in both countries, the goal of stabilization and immobilization of plutonium has been undermined by a program which threatens to push both of our countries into a plutonium economy. Money makes policy. The larger the investment into plutonium facilities under the auspices of a disposition program, the more likely it is that these facilities will continue to be used for other purposes once the dispositon program is completed. Furthermore, it is apparent that international plutonium companies such as Cogema (France) and British Nuclear Fuels, Ltd. are seeking to serve their own financial interests by pushing MOX. Fresh MOX fuel in commerce presents a proliferation threat as the plutonium in it can be removed and used for weapons purposes. A 1997 DOE non-proliferation assessment of plutonium disposition found "that fresh MOX fuel remains a material in the most sensitive safeguards category, because plutonium suitable for use in weapons could be separated from it relatively quickly and easily." It is clear to us that rather than solving the problem of placing plutonium into safe and secure forms, a MOX program is likely to promote further plutonium processing and use, something that is undesirable on environmental, safety, economic, and non-proliferation grounds. Therefore, we call on our governments to stop MOX disposition programs in both the US and Russia. Instead, emphasis should be placed on safe storage and development of immobilization programs. Plutonium disposition programs must include significant and meaningful public input, including access to all information, including costs and operating records of the various actors involved in a disposition program. The public in the communities most directly affected should have ample opportunity for meaningful input into the decision-making process. All US funding of Russian programs should be contingent on compliance with the appropriate environmental and public process laws. Signed, Oleg Bodrov Green World Sosnovy Bor (Russia) Ethan Brown Carolina Peace Resource Center Columbia, South Carolina (USA) Susan Gordon Alliance for Nuclear Accountability Seattle, Washington (USA) Linda Gunter Safe Energy Communication Council Washington, DC (USA) Alexandra Koroleva ECODEFENSE! Kaliningrad (Russia) Paul L. Leventhal Nuclear Control Institute Washington, DC (USA) Arjun Makhijani Institute for Energy and Environmental Research Takoma Park, Maryland (USA) Michael Mariotte Nuclear Information and Resource Service Washington, DC (USA) Natalia Mironova Movement for Nuclear Safety Chelyabinsk (Russia) Don Moniak Serious Texans Against Nuclear Dumping Amarillo, Texas (USA) Robert K. Musil, PhD Physicians for Social Responsibility Washington, DC (USA) Lydia Popova Socio-Ecological Union Center for Nuclear Ecology and Energy Policy Moscow (Russia) Galina Ragouzina WISE Russia Kaliningrad (Russia) Vladimir Sliviak Anti-Nuclear Campaign, Socio-Ecological Union Moscow (Russia) ============================================= Lisa Ledwidge Outreach Coordinator and Editor, Science for Democratic Action Institute for Energy and Environmental Research (IEER) 6935 Laurel Ave., Suite 204 Takoma Park, MD 20912 USA (301) 270-5500 fax: (301) 270-3029 http://www.ieer.org ================================================================= NY Transfer News Collective * A Service of Blythe Systems Since 1985 - Information for the Rest of Us 339 Lafayette St., New York, NY 10012 http://www.blythe.org e-mail: nyt@blythe.org ================================================================= nytenv-05.19.99-03:17:33-25364