Beijing and Bush: Misplaced belligerence Via NY Transfer News * All the News That Doesn't Fit Asia Times - May 21, 2002 http://www.atimes.com/china/DE21Ad01.html Beijing and Bush: Misplaced belligerence By Ehsan Ahrari The first year in office of US President George W Bush - or at least the pre-September 11 portion of it - will be remembered for his confrontational approach toward mainland China. Since then, he has been too preoccupied with fighting a war on terrorism to pay a lot of attention to China. However, his policy toward that important communist nation did not change, or so it seemed, during his last trip to Beijing. All major issues between Washington and Beijing remained. For instance, the terrorist attacks on the United States, if anything, stiffened Bush's resolve to pursue his national missile defense and theater missile defense options, and these issues continue to concern Beijing. The Chinese leadership was also critical of the unilateral US decision to abandon the 1972 Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, which both Beijing and Moscow regarded as the bedrock of nuclear-arms control. Bush also abandoned a long-standing tradition of strategic ambiguity involving Taiwan. He stated unequivocally on April 27, 2001, that his administration would take whatever actions necessary if the People's Republic of China (PRC) were to attack Taiwan. Beijing was quite annoyed by the recently disclosed US Nuclear Posture Review, which prominently includes mainland China on its nuclear target list. There is little doubt that Beijing will take measures to enhance its own nuclear deterrence capabilities significantly in the coming years. The standoffish attitude toward China is difficult to understand. Here is a country whose economy and military are of great concern in East Asia. After the United States, China is the most watched country in the region. Unquestionably, the United States needs Beijing's cooperation in creating a powerful economic momentum in East Asia, especially while the Japanese economy continues its slump. China recently demonstrated its own concern for the economic prosperity of the region by offering a loan of US$400 million to Indonesia. Fighting 'terrorism' As the Chinese leadership sees it, the September 11 terrorist incidents triggered a bellicose phase of US foreign policy. If the Bush administration was generally accused of pursuing a unilateral foreign policy before the attacks, that feature has now been given a remarkably different twist, which could be best described as "unilateral multilateralism", whereby Washington expects cooperation from other countries on terrorism. If there was any doubt about Bush's intentions, he clarified it by admonishing the community of nations that, in the fight against terrorism, "either you are with us or you are with the terrorists". No nation was going to be allowed the luxury of preferring to be a "fence-sitter". Such tough talk did not sit well with Beijing. However, Beijing made the best of what it perceived as a not-so-good option. Inside its own borders, the Uighur separatist movement was still to be crushed. As long as Beijing could label it a "terrorist" movement, it felt it could get away with any amount of brutality. After all, the thinking goes, if the United States can continue to use its awesome military force to destroy the ragtag Taliban and its al-Qaeda cohorts in the name of fighting terrorism, Beijing can too. China's leaders were dismayed by the fact that the United States acquired military bases in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan - too close to their borders - as an important aspect of its military campaign against the Taliban. Even though the Bush administration initially stated that it would stay in those Central Asian countries only during the course of the military campaign, it later decided to prolong that course. Hierarchy of interests Prior to this, Beijing viewed Central Asia as an area where it would have to compete with Russia for influence and dominance. That would not have been too challenging a task, as long as the Russian economy remained depressed. However, the US presence complicates the scope of that competition. In any competition that involves the United States, Beijing faces an uphill struggle. Beijing knows that its options are limited as long as the United States remains focused on the military aspects of its foreign-policy options. The US preference was further clarified when Bush gave his "axis of evil" speech. The fact remains that China is involved, in one way or another, with all three countries mentioned in Bush's speech, namely North Korea, Iran and Iraq. North Korea is a fellow communist nation, and Beijing is conducting a variety of military-related transactions with Iran and Iraq. Thus, it is not about to support potential US military actions against any of these countries, and it has unambiguously expressed its intentions to the United States. What can Beijing do to pursue its own interests during what it perceives as a manifestly militant phase of US foreign policy? To start with, China's leaders are determined to remain fully focused on their own hierarchy of strategic interests. Their foremost concern is the Taiwan issue. They know that their now-familiar stand of "not ruling out the use of force" to resolve the issue has become especially difficult. To make matters worse, Bush did not commit himself to the now familiar "one China" mantra that all US presidents have repeated when they visited the mainland. Instead, he mentioned the Taiwan Relations Act to underscore his continued resolve to sell weapons to the island. What is confusing is that Bush expects Beijing to stop supporting North Korea simply because he has decided to lump it under the contentious category of "axis of evil". His persistent emphasis on the moral aspect of US foreign policy may be justified, when viewed from his perspective, but China's rulers not only categorically reject it, but also are likely to take measures to undermine his "demands". South Korea is especially puzzled about Bush's high-minded moral rhetoric in dealing with North Korea. President Kim Dae-jung, who is pursuing a highly nuanced "Sunshine Policy" toward his neighbor to the north, will have to decide how far he should go in harmonizing relations with Pyongyang without annoying Washington. Naturally, Beijing will watch Kim's diplomatic maneuvers with interest. Rocky relations The US president also failed to extract any concession from Beijing on another significant issue of his foreign policy - agreement to stop the sale of dual-use technology to Iran and Iraq, and transfer of missile technology to Pakistan and Iran. It might be possible for him to persuade Beijing to suspend missile and nuclear ties with Iran, but as a quid pro quo, he would have to show equal restraint on weapons sales to Taiwan. Such a compromise may emerge only when Bush relies more on diplomatic channels to communicate with Beijing, and eases off on public posturing. Another interesting development has been in the area of Beijing's relations with Pakistan, which have acquired an entirely different hue. Pakistan is now Washington's important new ally in its global war on terrorism. In the near future, Bush will learn that it is always better to use a lot of discretion with Beijing. Undoubtedly, the United States needs China's cooperation on a number of global issues, the foremost of which is to fulfill Bush's resolve to defeat global terrorism. From Beijing's perspective, however, his "axis of evil" phraseology has to unravel to exclude North Korea and Iran, if not be abandoned altogether. The communist regime regards North Korea as an important ally, so it can forestall all US-sponsored actions against Pyongyang that are placed before the United Nations. Similarly, on Iran and Iraq, Beijing - and perhaps Russia - is likely to wield its veto in the UN Security Council if the issues of collective action are presented for approval to that body. Beijing's cooperation in boosting growth and stability in the East Asian economies is also crucial for the United States. Besides, political moderates in countries such as Indonesia are in dire need of escalated economic growth. The same also may be said about Thailand and the Philippines. Bush's preference for a democratic Taiwan bodes well for that island, but Beijing sees it as aimed, at best, at creating an impasse or, at worst, at promoting a "two Chinas" policy. Neither option is acceptable. However, Beijing is still hoping that Bush, in following the tradition of his eminent predecessors, would make a volte face and recommit himself to the "one China" policy. Such a commitment may be used by Beijing to soften its own stance and open avenues of dialogue with the Taiwanese government. It will be interesting to see whether or when Bush breaks away from his consistent policy of confronting China. Thus far, such a policy has not created any deleterious outcome for the United States. However, given the fact that Beijing's significance and the US presence in East Asia will not decline any time soon, these two large powers will have to stop viewing each other as competitors. Since the Bush administration has done little to ease tensions in this regard, this might be a good place to start. (c) 2002 by Ehsan Ahrari. Republished with permission from Taipei Journal ================================================================= NY Transfer News Collective * A Service of Blythe Systems Since 1985 - Information for the Rest of Us 339 Lafayette St., New York, NY 10012 http://www.blythe.org e-mail: nyt@blythe.org ================================================================= nytas-05.26.02-02:48:35-3520