NotiSur - 12/21/01 - Chile, Peru Via NY Transfer News * All the News That Doesn't Fit [Reminder: This is a private reading copy for your personal use only. It may not be redistributed under the terms of our subscription with LADB. Thanks -- NY Transfer] ------------------------------------------------------------ L A T I N A M E R I C A D A T A B A S E NotiSur - South American Political & Economic Affairs ISSN 1060-4189 Volume 11, Number 46 December 21, 2001 ------------------------------------------------------------ Copyright 2001, Latin America Data Base (LADB), Latin American Institute, University of New Mexico Director: Rebecca Reynolds Bannister Editor: Patricia Hynds Staff writers: Carlos Navarro, Robert Sandels LADB ARCHIVES: Back issues are referenced to provide historical background relevant to the articles in this newsletter. These can be accessed with a subscription to the LADB searchable on-line archives at http://ladb.unm.edu/ by clicking on Search Archive. For subscription information, e-mail info@ladb.unm.edu or call 1-800-472-0888. In This Issue: CHILE: BOTH GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION CLAIM VICTORY IN LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS * Both groups claim victory * Lagos hurt by economic downturn * Alianza por Chile makes significant gains * PDC loses ground * Lagos needs to keep the DC in the Concertacion PERU: FROM A VERY EARLY AGE, CHILDREN TRAPPED IN EL DORADO * Child laborers exposed to hazards * Debt bondage common ____________________________________________________________ ********************* CHILE ********************* CHILE: BOTH GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION CLAIM VICTORY IN LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS Chilean President Ricardo Lagos, whose 19-month-old government is struggling with a sluggish economy and high unemployment, faced his first major political test in legislative elections Dec. 16, in which all 120 lower-house seats were at stake as well as 18 of the 38 elected Senate seats. The governing Concertacion de los Partidos de la Democracia coalition saw its majority in the lower house narrowed from 20 to six seats and lost its one-vote advantage in the Senate. The Concertacion, which includes the Partido Socialista (PS), the Partido por la Democracia (PPD), the Partido Radical Socialdemocrata (PRSD), and the Partido Democracia Cristiana (PDC), has governed Chile since former dictator Gen. Augusto Pinochet (1973-1990) stepped down in 1990. The elections reduced the Concertacion's 70-50 majority in the lower house to 63-57. In the Senate, the Concertacion will have 20 seats, while the rightist Alianza por Chile--the Union Democrata Independiente (UDI) and Renovacion Nacional (RN)--will have 18. Another nine Senate seats are appointees, plus one senator for life, former President Eduardo Frei (1994-2000). Pinochet, who was also a senator for life, was suspended from the Senate during the unsuccessful attempts to try him for human rights violations during his dictatorship (see NotiSur, 2000-08-11). The Concertacion obtained 47.9% of the votes, down slightly from the 50% it received in legislative elections four years ago. The opposition Alianza took 44.3% of the vote, up from 36.3% in 1997. Within the Alianza, the more moderate RN, which captured 18% of the vote, lost ground to the far-right UDI, which went from 14.5% in 1997 to 25.2%. The UDI has now replaced the PDC as Chile's largest party. The remaining votes went to minor parties, such as the Partido Comunista de Chile (PCCh), whose 5.2% was barely above the 5% required to maintain legal status. The party had hoped for the first time since the return to democracy to win one or two seats in Congress through an agreement with the PS (2001- 07-27). Gladys Marin, secretary-general of the party, was bitter that the elections did not result in finally putting someone from the party in the legislature. "In this country, 11 years after the fall of Pinochet, what is growing is the right, and it amazes me that others don't see this," said Marin. Both groups claim victory "The Concertacion won, but...," read the headline in El Metropolitano newspaper the day after the elections. Both sides called the election a victory, with members of the Concertacion saying the results showed confidence in the government despite Chile's economic troubles. "This is an excellent performance," said PPD president Guido Girardi. "We obtained almost 49% of the vote if you add to it the vote of our independent candidates. Considering the difficult situation the country's going through, this is an enormous success for the government." "We are the government and we are the majority," said Lagos. "But the country wants more efficiency and more commitment....We will continue fighting for a more just country." The president said he would move forward with plans to overhaul the public health system and pass a divorce law opposed by the right and the Catholic Church. Also on Lagos' agenda are plans to reform the Constitution crafted by Pinochet. The administration wants to remove clauses considered undemocratic, including one prohibiting the president from firing top military commanders. Lagos said, however, that his immediate concern was to create jobs to reduce the 9.7% unemployment rate, considered a contributing factor to the gains by the opposition. "In Chile, there are now two blocs with similar, solid popular support," said opposition leader and Santiago mayor Joaquin Lavin. "This election shows that our alliance is a real alternative to win the election four years from now." Lavin, who lost a close runoff race to Lagos in January 2000, has made clear he intends to take another shot at the presidency. Lavin called for the president and parliament to work together. "The people are saying, 'End political fighting, end bickering, let's get together and do what we have to do-- overcome unemployment and crime,'" he told supporters. Lagos hurt by economic downturn Lagos took office March 11, 2000, after defeating Lavin in the runoff with 51.3% of the vote to Lavin's 48.7% (see NotiSur, 2000-01-21, 2000-03-17). In municipal elections seven months later, the Concertacion took 52.1% of the vote, while the Alianza took 40.1% (see NotiSur, 2000-11-03). Lagos has been hampered by two major problems, neither of his making. A slowdown in the world economy caused export prices for copper and wood products to fall, which limited his ability to address social problems. Unemployment has increased during the last two years, and the economy will achieve only 3% growth this year--far below the decade-long average growth of 7% in the 1990s. In addition, the long judicial process to force Pinochet to stand trial for human rights violations made Lagos' relations with the still powerful military tense. At least in part because of those factors, Lagos' achievements have been modest. The military has not kept the commitment it made last year to account for people who disappeared during the dictatorship, and critics say Lagos has not been forceful enough in pressuring the high command. Improvements in health care, promised by Lagos during his campaign, have not taken place. Reform of the Constitution to remove its "authoritarian enclaves" and complete the transition to democracy have stalled. Lagos' Cabinet members often seem to lack a clear and united vision, often publicly espousing divergent policies. A plus for Lagos is that with no more elections until December 2005, the political landscape should be stable, and he can hope to implement a good part of his program. Alianza por Chile makes significant gains RN president Sebastian Pinera commended the UDI for its exceptional showing in the elections, but stressed that credit for the success belonged to the entire Alianza. Once almost exclusively identified with the wealthier sector of Chilean society and an unabashed supporter of Pinochet's military regime, the UDI has more recently focused on grassroots organizing, increasing its support among the working class and the poor. It has also consistently criticized the Lagos administration, particularly its inability to stop the economic slowdown. While the UDI said it was prepared to cooperate with the government, the strengthened opposition could make it more difficult for Lagos to pass his key legislation, especially any constitutional reforms. UDI president Pablo Longueira said his party was "willing to collaborate to solve the problems that affect the country." He said the Alianza would meet with the government in the coming days to propose a national plan to generate jobs. However, Longueira rejected any hope of changing the electoral system under which a party must double the vote of its opponent to win both seats in a district. This means that if a party takes 62.6% of the vote in a district, and another party takes 37.4%, each party wins one seat in Congress. The system effectively shuts out smaller parties. PDC loses ground If the UDI gained the most in the elections, the PDC was the biggest loser. It slipped from its 1997 level of 23% of the vote to 19%, losing two Senate seats and 14 seats in the lower house. The PDC not only lost it position as the nation's largest party, it was displaced as the leader within the Concertacion by the PS-PPD-PRSD bloc. The progressive wing of the Concertacion took 23% of the vote. "The DC is pained and disconcerted with the percentage and number of legislators that it appears to have elected," said PDC leader and former President Patricio Aylwin (1990- 1994) on Dec. 17. Gutemberg Martinez, the party's campaign coordinator, said, however, that the drop was to be expected after almost 12 years as the main faction within the Concertacion. Despite his party's losses, PDC Sen. Alejandro Foxley was optimistic that the administration could accomplish the goals it has set. "We are going to have a free-trade accord with the US, we will push through a bill on reforms to the health system that has been agreed to in parliament, and we will give a boost to the economy," he said. On Dec. 17, the seven DC Cabinet ministers offered their resignations, but Lagos declined to accept. Lagos needs to keep the DC in the Concertacion Sociologist Jose Joaquin Bruner said the election changed the balance among the parties of the Concertacion, as well as between the Concertacion and the Alianza. He said this puts the Concertacion parties on a more equal footing and makes it more necessary for them to cooperate and find common ground. The conservative wing of the DC has never been comfortable with more left-leaning parties in the coalition, and fought to prevent Lagos from being the Concertacion's candidate for president. "Lagos should give the DC a higher profile so he doesn't lose them from the Concertacion," said political scientist Ricardo Israel. "Chile would only change politically if there were an alliance between the RN and the DC." He said such an alliance could have the power to go up against both the UDI and the Concertacion, and it could thwart Lavin's presidential aspirations. "It will be important to know what tack the government will take and when it will begin to take it, as well as to know if the UDI will take the road of confrontation or negotiation," Israel said. [Sources: The New York Times, 12/06/01; Notimex, 12/11/01, 12/12/01, 12/15-17/01; Spanish news service EFE, 12/15/01, 12/17/01; Clarin (Argentina), 12/16/01, 12/17/01; Inter Press Service, La Opinion (Los Angeles), La Tercera (Chile), Reuters, 12/17/01; Associated Press, 12/16-18/01; The Santiago Times (Chile), 12/17/01, 12/18/01; El Mercurio (Chile), El Nuevo Herald (Miami), 12/18/01] ********************* PERU ********************* PERU: FROM A VERY EARLY AGE, CHILDREN TRAPPED IN EL DORADO [The following article by Barbara J. Fraser is reprinted with the permission of Noticias Aliadas in Lima, Peru. It first appeared in the Nov. 19, 2001, edition of the weekly publication Latinamerica Press.] Javier Arono Noa started working when he was 5, trudging for an hour up a long hillside to carry meals to his father, a miner. Once there, he would "help out" a little, picking through waste rock in search of ore. By the time he was 8, he says, "it wasn't a matter of helping a little, but of hauling waste rock in a wheelbarrow or small sacks." He finally started first grade when he was 9, but even school did not keep him from mine labor. He worked in the afternoon, studied for a few hours, then carried his father's dinner up the hill and stayed to work until after dark. By the time he was in his early teens, he says, "my dad couldn't support me any more. I had to work on my own. He only gave me food. I had to work to buy clothes." Now 16 and nearing graduation, Javier dreams of becoming a mining engineer, "because I know mines." Although he has a decade of work behind him already, Javier's opportunities are limited. University studies would mean leaving the mining community where he was born, high in the hills in the central department of Arequipa, and moving to a city where he would have no way to support himself. Javier is one of about 50,000 children in mining settlements in the Peruvian highlands and jungle who have known more work than play. Although mining is the country's largest foreign-exchange producer, these youngsters do not share the wealth. Their parents work as "informal" miners, scrabbling away in shafts abandoned by large companies or sluicing sand along jungle rivers, hoping for a lucky strike. Informal mining produces 14% of Peru's gold, about 18 tons. Recent studies by the International Labor Organization (ILO) have exploded myths about Peru's informal miners and exposed the daily hazards their children face. The ILO is working with government agencies and nongovernmental organizations in Peru, Ecuador, and Bolivia to eliminate child labor in mining. The organization estimates that 260,000 children are or will soon be working in informal mining in the three countries. "One myth is that the mining population is transient, which makes people think that the mining settlements are temporary and leads to scant attention from the government in providing better services," says Maria del Carmen Piazza, who led the study in Peru. Researchers found, however, that more than 70% of the families were year-round residents of the mining camps. Of those who considered themselves temporary, the majority had been living in the settlements for four years or more. Peru's informal mining centers are clustered in several parts of the country--the central highlands of Ayacucho and Arequipa, the northern department of La Libertad, the mountains rising above the Peruvian Altiplano, and the southeastern jungle of Madre de Dios. Informal miners work without the aid of machinery or safety gear on land to which they do not have title, and where they may or may not have formal permission to excavate. The labor-intensive activity involves the whole family. Children begin as Javier did, carrying food and water, then taking on other tasks as they grow. Women do household tasks, then climb to the mine entrance where they and their youngest children pick through the waste rock for gold ore that has been overlooked. That becomes their pocket money, a fund they use for household expenses, and often the only family income over which they have direct control. "Two of every three mothers indicated that their children under age 16 are working in mining," Piazza says. "That caught my attention, because in other areas they tend to hide the fact that their children work." The honest response could be a sign that the mothers recognize the dangers, she says. And even when they send their children to the mine instead of to school (18% of the mining families have school-age children who are not enrolled in school), they still hope for a brighter future. Child laborers exposed to hazards The hazards to the children are clear. Even the youngest risk cuts and bruises as they pick through waste rock, or chill and fungus infections from washing the ore in sluices or streams. By the time the children are eight or 10 years old, one of their principal tasks is to operate the "quimbaletes," large stones used to crush the ore and amalgamate it with mercury. Exposure to mercury fumes leads to neurological disorders and learning disabilities, further complicating schooling. Older children suffer from back problems and muscle strain caused by hauling loads of ore. "We find it alarming that 10% of the families say their minor children are working in extraction of ore" from the mine shafts, Piazza says. Mercury contamination is both a health hazard and an environmental problem. While nongovernmental groups working with miners in some of the communities are trying to introduce closed retorts that reduce mercury exposure when the ore is heated to recover the gold, new methods are slow to catch on. Most mining communities lack potable water and sewer systems, and many homes do not have electricity. Diarrhea and upper-respiratory infections are common among children. Experts working in the mining communities point to a complex series of factors that trap children in mine labor from an early age. Most informal miners are campesinos who have migrated to the mining camps in hopes of a better and steadier income than that provided by subsistence farming. Mining also turns out to be a subsistence activity, however, with an average income of about US$175 a month. On small farms in the Andes, children also begin working at an early age, usually tending the family sheep. "Campesinos traditionally value child labor," Piazza says. "The problem is that the idea of formative labor, which develops discipline and a sense of responsibility, is transferred to a high-risk activity." Educational services are scant in the mining communities. Because they are remote and difficult to reach, many communities have only primary schools and teacher turnover is high. Health care, particularly specialized attention for occupational health problems related to mine labor, is also lacking. Domestic violence is common, and life expectancy in the mining communities is about 50 years. Debt bondage common For informal miners, life is often a series of broken dreams. While everyone hopes for a lucky strike, many end up working under a form of debt bondage. In Madre de Dios, a miner may strike a verbal deal with a landowner, who often takes his identity documents as a guarantee. "They are paid at the end of a three-month period," Piazza says. "But verbal agreements are often broken, and since there wasn't a formal contract and they received advances on their pay, they end up in debt again and are forced to work for three more months." In La Rinconada, a cold, barren area 4,800 meters above sea level, the miners work for a contractor. They receive no wages; instead, every month they are given one or two days to work on their own, keeping any ore they find. "Exploitation takes the form of a power chain that involves the informal miners, the owners of the quimbaletes, and the mine owners," Piazza says. Unless the chain is broken--through better education and public services, formalization of the small-scale mining, implementation of appropriate technology, and creation of employment alternatives--children will find themselves repeating the cycle, with only a primary education and little hope for the future. "We can't limit ourselves to measures that improve the condition of the people who are exploited while maintaining the situation of exploitation," says Cesar Mosquera, who heads ILO's South America program to eradicate child labor in mining. "It won't be possible to change the children's situation without changing the situation of their families and the small-scale miners, and without finding alternatives to these relationships of exploitation and injustice." ================================================================= NY Transfer News Collective * A Service of Blythe Systems Since 1985 - Information for the Rest of Us 339 Lafayette St., New York, NY 10012 http://www.blythe.org e-mail: nyt@blythe.org ================================================================= pvtsa-12.21.01-20:54:36-23184