"To carry out the revolution, a revolutionary party is necessary. Without a revolutionary party, without a revolutionary party created upon Marxist-Leninist revolutionary theory, and in the Marxist-Leninist revolutionary style, it is impossible to lead the working class and the great masses of the people to victory in the struggle against imperialism and its lackeys. In more than 100 years, which have passed since the birth of Marxism, only thanks to the example of the Russian Bolsheviks in guiding the October Revolution and socialist construction, and defeating fascist aggression, have revolutionary parties of a new kind been formed and developed in the world. With the birth of revolutionary parties of this kind, the face of world revolution has changed. The change has been so great that, amidst fire and thunder, transformations, totally inconceivable for people of the older generation, have taken place . . . With the birth of the Communist Party, the face of the Chinese revolution upheld an entirely new view of society. Isn't clear enough this fact?"President Mao Tse-Tung
To conclude our theme, Marxism and the construction of the Party, we look at the thesis of Mao Tse-tung about the necessity of the Party, its construction, and the internal struggle. His thesis about the necessity of the Party is transcribed precisely in the first quotation of this article. It would be useless to repeat it.
Turning to the problem of construction, we find that, in "Problems of War and Strategy," Mao established construction upon the universal principle of revolutionary violence. Thus, he teaches us the following:
"The central task, and the highest form of all revolution, is the conquest of power by means of the armed struggle, that is to say, the solution of the problem by means of war. This Marxist- Leninist revolutionary principle has universal validity in China as well as in other countries."
Taking this Marxist-Leninist principle, and differentiating the development of the revolution in
capitalist countries and in China, in the same work he stated:
"In China, the principal form of the struggle is war, and the principal form of organization the
army. All other forms, such as the organizations and struggles of the masses of the people, are
also very important and indispensable, and in no way can they be left aside. The objective of all
of them is to serve the war. Before the outbreak of a war, all organizations and struggles have
the goal of preparing for it . . . After the outbreak of a war, all organizations and struggles are
coordinated directly or indirectly with the war."
Developing the problem of the construction of the Party, Mao, in "On the Appearance of The Communist Magazine," proposes and resolves fundamental problems. Thus he tells us that, in the first place, the Chinese Communist Party maintained great and numerous struggles, in which its militants, cadres, and organizations were formed; that it obtained great victories and also suffered serious defeats; and that to understand the laws of the development of the Party requires analyzing its own history, and extracting from it, the solution to its problems of construction.
Secondly, in judging his own Party in its relations with the bourgeoisie, and its relations with the
united front and the armed struggle, he established the following great thesis:
"Through these complicated relations with the Chinese bourgeoisie, the Chinese revolution and
the Chinese Communist Party have been developing. This is a historical peculiarity, a
characteristic of revolution in colonies or semi-colonies, a characteristic absent in the history of
revolution of any capitalist country."
This question is basic for us Peruvian communists and revolutionaries, since our society is also semi-colonial and semi-feudal, from which derives that our revolution is also democratic- bourgeois, like the first stage of the Chinese revolution. Therefore, "the principal targets of the revolution are imperialism and feudalism."
Thirdly, the Chinese revolution presents two peculiarities; in Mao's own words: "Thus, the formation by the proletariat of a revolutionary national united front with the bourgeoisie, or the forced rupture of this front, in the first phase; and the armed struggle as the principal form of revolution in the second phase, have been the two fundamental peculiarities in the course of the democratic-bourgeois revolution in China."
Fourthly, from the previous one it is inferred that the construction and development of the Chinese Communist Party cannot understood separate from these two peculiarities, which are questions basic to the political line of democratic revolution. As the same great leader teaches us: "The failure or success of the Party, its retreats or advances, the decrease or increase of its ranks, its development and consolidation, cannot remain unlinked to the relations of the Party with the bourgeoisie and with the armed struggle. When the political line of the party correctly resolves the question of the establishment of the united front with the bourgeoisie, or the forced rupture of said front, the Party moves forward . . . similarly, when the Party handles correctly the revolutionary armed struggle, it moves forward . . . the course of the construction of the Party, and of its Bolshevization, have been closely linked to its political line, and its correct or incorrect solution to the questions of the united front and of the armed struggle."
Fifthly, is inferred the problem of a correct direction for the Chinese revolution. In the pamphlet
mentioned, the following thesis is stated, which we should contemplate very seriously, to see in
what measure we are taking the correct road:
"The united front, the armed struggle, and the construction of the Party constitute, then, three
questions fundamental for our Party in the Chinese revolution. A good understanding of these
three questions, and of their mutual relations, means the right direction for the Chinese
revolution."
And, finally, defining the role of the Party, he indicates the following in the same pamphlet: "Experience . . . shows us that the united front and the armed struggle are the two basic weapons for defeating the enemy. The united front is a front united to maintain the armed struggle. And the organizations of the Party are the heroic combatants who maintain these two weapons -- the united front and the armed struggle -- to assault and destroy the positions of the enemy. Such is the mutual relation existing among these three factors."
Here it is, for our understanding, the ideological and political basis of the construction of the Party in a semi-colonial and semi-feudal country, masterfully established by Mao Tse-tung. The importance of this question cannot be put aside in any way, since at the same time, he teaches us: "Whether the ideological and political line is correct or not, decides all."
Upon this ideological and political basis, Mao established his plan of organizational construction of the Party, its tactics and the principle of struggle. This problem was stated in Point Six of his article "Audaciously Expand the Anti-Japanese forces" (Vol. II, p 453- Spanish version). Let us analyze the problem. In the first place, he establishes the policy of organizational construction in the regions dominated by reaction:
"In the first (the dominated regions), our policy is to secretly maintain the Party organization, and make it compact, select, and efficient, to remain hidden for a long time, to accumulate forces, and to await the propitious moment, and not to rush, nor expose oneself."
Secondly, he establishes the principle of tactics which ought to be our guide: "Applying the principle of the struggle with reason, with advantage, and without overextending ourselves, our tactic in the struggle against the recalcitrant is to fight on secure territory and gather forces, using all that the laws and decrees of the Kuomintang and social customs permit."
Thirdly, he establishes penetration into reactionary organizations, and the work of revolutionaries in the same.
Fourthly, he points out the basic policy: "In all the regions dominated by the Kuomintang, the basic policy of the Party consists equally in developing the progressive forces (the organizations of the Party and the movements of the masses), winning over the intermediate forces (the national bourgeoisie, the sensible shenshi, the 'heterogeneous' troops, the intermediate sectors of the Kuomintang, the intermediate sectors of the central army, the upper layer of the petit bourgeoisie, and the minority political parties and groups -- 7 categories in all), and isolating the reactionary forces, finally overcoming the danger of capitulation, and obtaining a change in the situation."
Fifthly, he states the need to prepare for contingencies: "At the same time, we must be fully prepared to confront any emergency situation of local or national scale." Sixthly, emphasizing secrecy: "The Party organizations in the regions of the Kuomintang must maintain the strictest secrecy."
Seventhly, he emphasizes the verification of the members of the Committees: "In the bureau of the Southeast, and in all the provincial, special, district, or territorial Committees, each member of the personnel (from the secretaries of the Party to the cooks) must be submitted to severe and minuscule verification, and it is absolutely unacceptable that any person open to the slightest suspicion remain in these directing organs."
And finally: "We must give much care to the protection of our cadres." All of these are correct and valuable instructions on the organizational life and the struggle of the Party. As for the internal struggle, it is enough to say that it is precisely Mao who has developed the understanding of the struggle within the Party, as a reflection of the contradictions of the struggle of classes, and between the old and the new in the social world. But he even states that the struggle within the Party is the struggle of two lines, which cover all its processes of development, and that if such contradictions and struggles were not given up, "the life of the Party would come to an end." Also, it is he who, for the correct development of the struggle within the Party, stated the thesis "to learn lessons from past errors, to avoid them in the future; and to treat the illness, to save the patient." We should apply this great thesis tenaciously, today more than ever, remembering his statement: "We must put on the table, without having consideration for anyone, all mistakes committed, and analyze and criticize scientifically all the evil of the past, so that in the future the work will be carry out more carefully and better. This is the meaning of 'to learn lessons from past errors, to avoid them in the future." But, in denouncing errors and criticizing defects, we do it, like a doctor treating a case, with the sole objective of saving the patient, and not killing him."
Comrade Mao has summarized the great historical experience of the Chinese CP, in regard to two line struggle, in the following words: "We must practice Marxism and not revisionism; unite and do not split, be frank and honest, and do not plot intrigues and machinations." We must submit ourselves to this great lesson. Nonetheless, one must never lose vigilance, as he taught in 1964: "We must be alert against those who plot intrigues and machinations. For example: there have appeared in the Central Committee Kao Kang, Yao Shu-shi, Peng Te-juai, Juang Ke- cheng, and others. Everything is divided in two. Some persist in plotting intrigues. What are we going to do if they want to act like this? Also, there are persons who are willing to plot! That conspirators exist is an objective fact, it is not a question of whether we like it or not."
But, what is the struggle in the Party for? The ultimate goal is to maintain unity, and to persist in Marxism, to reject the split, and repudiate revisionism; since, as he teaches, unity rises in the struggle itself. Unity is relative and struggle is absolute. Thus, in consequence, the struggle is to maintain unity upon Marxism, since unity is important: "The unity within the Party, and unity between the Party and the people, are two weapons of incalculable value in overcoming difficulties. All comrades of the Party should appreciate them."
Here it is, the substantive theses of Mao on the necessity of the Party, its construction, and the struggle within it. We should study them, because they are decisive for guiding the construction of the Party of the proletariat in our country.
